1 Introduction

The expected outcomes of identity proofing include:

Identity proofing services are expected to incorporate privacy-enhancing principles (e.g., data minimization) and employ good usability practices to minimize the burden on applicants while still accomplishing the expected outcomes.

Assurance (confidence) in a subscriber’s identity is established using the processes associated with the identity assurance levels (IAL) defined in these guidelines. Each successive IAL builds on the requirements of lower IALs in order to achieve increased assurance.

No identity proofing: There is no requirement to link the applicant to a specific, real-life person. Evidence collection is not required; attributes may or may not be validated; and identity verification is not conducted. This does not exclude attributes from being validated as part of other business processes, but attribute validation is not required for access.

IAL1: The identity proofing process supports the real-world existence of the claimed identity and provides some assurance that the applicant is associated with that identity. Core attributes are obtained from identity evidence or self-asserted by the applicant. All core attributes (see Sec. 2.2) are validated against authoritative or credible sources, and steps are taken to confirm that the attributes are associated with the person undergoing the identity proofing process. Identity proofing is performed using remote or on-site processes, with or without the attendance of a CSP representative. Upon the successful completion of identity proofing, the applicant is enrolled into a subscriber account and any authenticators can then be bound to the account, including subscriber-provided authenticators. IAL1 is designed to limit highly scalable attacks (e.g., automated enrollment attacks) and to protect against synthetic identities and attacks using compromised personal information.

IAL2: IAL2 requires collecting additional evidence and more rigorous processes for validating evidence and verifying identities, including enhanced processes to confirm that the applicant is the rightful owner of the presented evidence. Like IAL1, identity proofing at IAL2 can be performed using remote or on-site processes, with or without the attendance of a CSP representative. In addition to those threats addressed by IAL1, IAL2 is designed to limit scaled and targeted attacks and to protect against basic evidence falsification, evidence theft, and social engineering tactics.

IAL3: IAL3 adds the requirements for a trained CSP representative (i.e., proofing agent) to interact directly with the applicant as part of an on-site attended identity proofing session and the collection of at least one biometric characteristic. The successful on-site identity proofing session concludes with the enrollment of the applicant into a subscriber account and the delivery of one or more authenticators bound to that account. IAL3 is designed to limit more sophisticated attacks, and protect against advanced evidence falsification, theft, repudiation, and more advanced social engineering tactics.

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This guideline uses the following typographical conventions in text:

This document is organized as follows. Each section is labeled as either normative (i.e., mandatory for compliance) or informative (i.e., not mandatory).