+4 Authenticator Event Management
---+4.1 Authenticator Binding
------+4.1.1 Binding at Enrollment
------+4.1.2 Post-Enrollment Binding
---------+4.1.2.1 Binding an Additional Authenticator
---------+4.1.2.2 Binding Across Endpoints
------+4.1.3 Binding to a Subscriber-Provided Authenticator
------+4.1.4 Renewal
---+4.2 Account Recovery
------+4.2.1 Account Recovery Methods
---------+4.2.1.1 Saved Recovery Codes
---------+4.2.1.2 Issued Recovery Codes
---------+4.2.1.3 Recovery Contacts
---------+4.2.1.4 Repeated Identity Proofing
------+4.2.2 Recovery Requirements by IAL/AAL
---------+4.2.2.1 Recovery Without Identity Proofing
---------+4.2.2.2 Recovery at AAL2
---------+4.2.2.3 Recovery at AAL3
------+4.2.3 Account Recovery Notification
---+4.3 Loss, Theft, Damage, and Compromise
---+4.4 Expiration
---+4.5 Invalidation
---+4.6 Account Notifications

4 Authenticator Event Management

This section is normative.

Events can occur over the lifetime of a subscriber’s authenticator and affect its use. These events include binding, maintenance, loss, theft, compromise, unauthorized duplication, expiration, and revocation. This section describes the actions to be taken in response to those events.

1. Přehled

Název Standard
4.1 Authenticator Binding

Authenticator binding refers to establishing an association between a specific authenticator and a subscriber account to enable the authenticator to authenticate for that subscriber account, possibly in conjunction with other authenticators.

Authenticators SHALL be bound to subscriber accounts by either:

Being issued by the CSP as part of enrollment or
Using a subscriber-provided authenticator that is acceptable to the CSP.

The SP 800-63 suite of guidelines refers to the binding rather than the issuance of authenticators to accommodate both options.

Throughout the lifetime of a digital identity, CSPs SHALL maintain a record of all authenticators that are bound to each subscriber account. The CSP SHALL determine the characteristics of the authenticator being bound (e.g., single-factor versus multi-factor, phishing-resistant or not) so that verifiers can assess compliance with the requirements at each AAL. This determination MAY be based on strong evidence (e.g., authenticator attestation), direct information from having issued the authenticator, or typical characteristics of authenticator implementations (e.g., whether a user verification bit is set by [WebAuthn]).

The CSP SHALL also maintain other state information that is required to meet the authenticator verification requirements. For example, the throttling of authentication attempts described in Sec. 3.2.2 requires the CSP or verifier to maintain state information on recent failed authentication attempts, except for activation factors verified at the authenticator.

The record created by the CSP SHALL contain the date and time of significant authenticator life cycle events (e.g., binding to the subscriber account, renewal, update, expiration). The record SHOULD include information about the source of the binding (e.g., IP address, device identifier) of any device associated with the event.

As part of the binding process, the CSP MAY require additional information about the new authenticator or its associated endpoint to determine whether it is suitable for the requested AAL.

4.2 Account Recovery

Account recovery is when a subscriber recovers from losing control of the authenticators that are needed to authenticate at a desired AAL. This may be accomplished by repeating portions of the identity proofing process, using a prearranged recovery contact, or presenting one or more recovery codes, perhaps in conjunction with using an authenticator that is still available to the subscriber bound to their subscriber account. Once this is completed, the subscriber can bind one or more new authenticators to their subscriber account. An account recovery event always causes one or more notifications to be sent to the subscriber to help detect the fraudulent use of account recovery.

Account recovery differs from authentication in several ways. Since account recovery is expected to be invoked infrequently, it is generally less convenient than authentication and — depending on the situation and recovery methods offered by the CSP — may involve extended waiting times.

Replacement of a forgotten password where the subscriber can authenticate with one or more other authenticators is considered to be the binding of a new authenticator (see Sec. 4.1.2.1) rather than account recovery.

4.3 Loss, Theft, Damage, and Compromise

Compromised authenticators include those that have been lost, stolen, or subject to unauthorized duplication or that have activation factors that are no longer in the subscriber’s control. Generally, one must assume that a lost authenticator has been stolen or compromised by someone other than the legitimate holder of the authenticator. Damaged or malfunctioning authenticators are also considered compromised to guard against any possibility of the extraction of the authenticator’s secret.

The CSP SHALL suspend, invalidate, or destroy compromised authenticators from the subscriber’s account promptly following compromise detection. Organizations SHOULD establish time limits for this process.

To facilitate the secure reporting of an authenticator’s loss, theft, damage, or compromise, the CSP SHOULD provide the subscriber with a method of authenticating using a backup or alternate authenticator. This backup authenticator SHALL be a password or a physical authenticator. Either could be used, but only one authentication factor is required to make this report. Alternatively, the subscriber MAY establish an authenticated protected channel for the CSP to verify the information collected during identity proofing. The CSP MAY choose to verify a contact address (i.e., the email address, telephone number, or postal address) and suspend or invalidate authenticators that are reported to have been compromised.

CSPs MAY support the temporary suspension of authenticators that are suspected of possible compromise. If suspension is supported, it SHOULD be reversed after the subscriber successfully authenticates to the CSP using a valid (i.e., not suspended) authenticator and requests reactivation of the suspended authenticator. The CSP MAY set a time limit after which a suspended authenticator can no longer be reactivated.

4.4 Expiration

CSPs MAY bind authenticators that expire to subscriber accounts. When an authenticator expires, it SHALL NOT be usable for authentication. When an authentication is attempted using an expired authenticator, the CSP SHOULD indicate to the subscriber that the authentication failure is due to expiration rather than some other cause.

The CSP SHOULD retrieve any authenticator that contains personal information or provide for its erasure or destruction promptly following expiration.

The replacement of expired authenticators SHALL conform to the binding process for an additional authenticator, as described in Sec. 4.1.2.

4.5 Invalidation

The invalidation of an authenticator (sometimes referred to as revocation or termination) is the removal of the binding between the authenticator and a subscriber account.

CSPs SHALL promptly invalidate authenticators when a subscriber account ceases to exist (e.g., subscriber’s death, the discovery of a fraudulent subscriber), when requested by the subscriber, when the authenticator is compromised, or when the CSP determines that the subscriber no longer meets its eligibility requirements. The CSP SHALL make a risk-based determination of the authenticity of invalidation requests from the subscriber. The consequences of not invalidating a compromised authenticator are usually more significant than the denial-of-service potential of invalidating one in error.

The CSP SHOULD retrieve any authenticator that contains personal information or provide for its erasure or destruction promptly following invalidation. The CSP SHOULD notify the subscriber when an authenticator is invalidated, as described in Sec. 4.6.

Further requirements on the invalidation of PIV authenticators are found in [FIPS201].

4.6 Account Notifications

Certain subscriber account events (e.g., the binding of an authenticator, account recovery) require the subscriber or someone designated by them to be independently notified. These notifications help the subscriber detect possible fraud associated with their subscriber account.

Events that require notification SHALL cause a notification to be sent to the notification addresses stored in the subscriber account. Notification addresses may be any means by which the subscriber can be reliably contacted, such as:

Postal address
Email address
Address (e.g., telephone number) to which a text message or voice message may be sent
Reference to the subscriber in a push notification service

CSPs SHALL support at least two notification addresses per subscriber account. For subscriber accounts that have undergone identity proofing, at least one address SHALL have been validated during the identity proofing process. The CSP SHOULD allow subscribers with authentication at AAL2 or higher (or at AAL1 if that is the highest AAL available for the subscriber account) to update their notification addresses. The CSP SHOULD encourage the subscriber to maintain multiple notification addresses to improve the likelihood of contacting them if a contact address changes.

Notifications SHALL be sent to all notification addresses except postal addresses. However, notifications SHALL be sent to postal addresses if no other form of notification address is stored in the subscriber account or if the notification is for account recovery at AAL3. Account recovery notifications SHALL also be sent to a postal address if the only other notification address in the subscriber account is the address to which an issued recovery code was sent.

The notification SHALL provide clear instructions, including contact information, in case the recipient repudiates the event associated with the notification.

1.1 Odkazy

1.2 Identifikované požadavky

1.3 Související regulace

2. Identifikované požadavky

Požadavky
Zdroj Požadavek

3. Související regulace

Regulace
Zdroj Regulace
  • NIST -

    EN: Publications of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, from their electronic versions (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 from its HTML version, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Works of NIST employees are not subject to copyright protection in the United States (17 U.S.C. § 105); the OSCAL content is dedicated to the public domain worldwide (CC0 1.0); outside the United States NIST grants the right to reprint its technical series publications in all formats (NIST copyright statement). Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; each document names its citation. Divided into sections and converted into the GRCA format, the wording unchanged. Only the versions published by NIST are authoritative.

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