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When the trust agreement is established by the federated parties prior to the federation transaction, the trust agreement SHALL establish the following terms:
The set of subscriber attributes, derived attributes, and attribute bundles that the IdP can make available to the RP
The attribute storage policy of the IdP for the subscriber account, including any available means for the subscriber to request deletion
Any attribute sources from which the IdP receives applicable subscriber attributes, derived attributes, and attribute bundles, including the CSP
Any identity APIs that are made available by the IdP, either directly or through an external provider, and which subscriber attributes are available at these APIs
The population of subscriber accounts for which the IdP can create assertions
Any additional uses of subscriber information beyond providing the identity service
The set of subscriber attributes, derived attributes, and attribute bundles that the RP is allowed to request (i.e., a subset of the attributes made available)
The purpose for each attribute requested by the RP
The provisioning models used by the RP for RP subscriber accounts
The authorized party responsible for decisions regarding the release of subscriber attributes to the RP (e.g., the IdP organization, the subscriber)
The process and techniques used to inform subscribers about attribute sharing
The process and techniques for collecting consent from the authorized party when necessary
The xALs available from the IdP
The xALs required by the RP
The terms of the trust agreement SHALL be available to the operators of the RP and the IdP upon its establishment. The terms of the trust agreement SHALL be made available to subscribers upon request to the IdP or RP. The IdP and RP SHALL each assess their respective redress mechanisms for efficacy in resolving complaints or problems and disclose the results of this assessment as part of the trust agreement. See Sec. 3.5.3 for additional requirements and considerations for redress mechanisms. If FAL3 is allowed within the trust agreement, the trust agreement SHALL stipulate the following terms regarding holder-of-key assertions (see Sec. 3.15) and bound authenticators (see Sec. 3.16):
The means by which holder-of-key assertions can be verified by the RP (such as a common trusted PKI system)
The means by which the RP can associate holder-of-key assertions with specific RP subscriber accounts (such as attribute-based account resolution or pre-provisioning)
Whether bound authenticators are supplied by the RP or the subscriber
Documentation of the binding ceremony used for any subscriber-provided bound authenticators
If shared signaling is used by the IdP or RP (see Sec. 4.8), the terms of the trust agreement SHALL establish:
The events that trigger a signal to be sent
Which signals are sent for each trigger
The information included in each signal
The expected behavior of the party receiving the signal
Runtime decisions at the IdP (see Sec. 4.6.1.3), MAY be used to further limit which subscriber attributes are sent between parties in the federated transaction (e.g., a runtime decision could opt to not disclose an email address, even though this attribute was included in the terms of the trust agreement). The trust agreement SHALL be reviewed periodically to ensure that it is still fit for purpose and to avoid unnecessary data exchange and the over-collection of subscriber data.
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