Assessment Objectives
In addition to relevant policies, standards and procedures, the assessor shall examine, interview, and/or test to determine if appropriately scoped evidence exists to support the claim that:
- TDA-05_A01 software development techniques that promote effective cybersecurity / data privacy are identified.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 171A_3.13.2[b] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[01] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[02] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[03] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[04] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[05] 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[06] - TDA-05_A02 testing, evaluation, assessment, verification and validation methods are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[07] - TDA-05_A03 cybersecurity / data privacy requirements to be satisfied by the process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15_ODP[02] 53A_R5_SA-15_ODP[03] - TDA-05_A04 identified software development techniques that promote effective cybersecurity / data privacy are employed.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 171A_3.13.2[e] - TDA-05_A05 quality control processes are defined.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-04(03)_ODP[08] - TDA-05_A06 frequency at which to review the development process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations is defined.
Defined parameters: at least every 12 months, or when there are significant incidents or significant changes to risks
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15_ODP[01] - TDA-05_A07 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that explicitly addresses security requirements.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.01[01] - TDA-05_A08 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that explicitly addresses privacy requirements.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.01[02] - TDA-05_A09 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that identifies the standards used in the development process.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.02[01] - TDA-05_A10 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that identifies the tools used in the development process.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.02[02] - TDA-05_A11 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that documents the specific tool used in the development process.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.03[01] - TDA-05_A12 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that documents the specific tool configurations used in the development process.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.03[02] - TDA-05_A13 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process that documents, manages and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15a.04 - TDA-05_A14 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process in which the development process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations are reviewed frequently to determine that the process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations selected and employed satisfy security requirements.
Defined parameters: at least annually
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15b.[01] - TDA-05_A15 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to follow a documented development process in which the development process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations are reviewed frequently to determine that the process, standards, tools, tool options and tool configurations selected and employed satisfy privacy requirements.
Defined parameters: at least annually
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-15b.[02] - TDA-05_A16 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle process that includes organization-defined system security engineering methods.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-04(03)(a) 53A_R5_SA-04(03)(b) 53A_R5_SA-04(03)(c)
Propojené úkoly
| Typ vazby | Úkol |
|---|---|
| blocks | Secure Software Development Practices (SSDP) |
- Secure Controls Framework -
The Secure Controls Framework® (SCF)
"The SCF is the Common Controls Framework™ (CCF), the world's most comprehensive cybersecurity and data privacy metaframework - it is also free to use. The entire concept is building secure, compliant and resilient capabilities in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.
The SCF is more than just a unified control catalog, since its included content creates a playbook for Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) capabilities. Used globally by organizations of every size, the SCF is a robust and scalable solution for security, compliance and resilience controls. As a comprehensive security framework, the SCF maps 1,400+ controls across 200+ laws, regulations, and industry frameworks so you can implement once and comply everywhere.
Like it or not, cybersecurity is a protracted war on an asymmetric battlefield, where the threats are everywhere and as defenders we have to make the effort to work together to help improve cybersecurity and data privacy practices, since we all suffer when massive data breaches occur or when cyber attacks have physical impacts. Hackers share information on attack methods with other hackers, so why shouldn’t the good guys share information on how to best protect an organization? We decided to take action and make a difference, since we feel it is too important to wait for someone else to fix the problems that exist.
The SCF is made up of volunteers, mainly specialists within the cybersecurity profession, who focus on GRC and the cybersecurity side of data privacy. These are auditors, engineers, architects, incident responders, consultants and other specialists who live and breathe these topics on a daily basis. The end product is "expert-derived content" that makes up the SCF." https://securecontrolsframework.com/Terms & Conditions
The SCF End User License Agreement (EULA) governs the use of the Secure Controls Framework® (SCF) under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License.