3.13 System and Communications Protection

Statement

Employ a diverse set of information technologies for the following system components in the implementation of the system: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.01E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational systems reduces the impact of exploitations or compromises of specific technologies. Such diversity protects against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks. Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use to compromise one system component will be effective against other system components, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead that could ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes contain and exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

a diverse set of information technologies is employed for {{ insert: param, A.03.13.01E.ODP.01 }} in the implementation of the system.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation list of technologies deployed in the system acquisition documentation acquisition contracts for system components or services system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with system acquisition, development, and implementation responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the use of a diverse set of information technologies

Statement

Employ {{ insert: param, A.03.13.02E.ODP.01 }} to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets.

Guidance

Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries regarding the actions that organizations take to defend their systems against attacks. Such actions may impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target organizational systems that support critical missions or business functions. Uncertainty may cause adversaries to hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques that involve randomness include performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing different information technologies, using different suppliers, and rotating the roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets. This requirement also depends on the selection of 03.13.03E.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes deceive) Direct threat events away from defender-chosen resources.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and (to a lesser extent) reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts cease.

  • The adversary actions are mistargeted or misinformed.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.02E.ODP.01 }} are employed to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing concealment and misdirection techniques for the system system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system architecture list of techniques to be used to introduce randomness into organizational operations and assets system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with the responsibility to implement concealment and misdirection techniques for systems personnel with information security responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing randomness as a concealment and misdirection technique

Statement

Employ the following concealment and misdirection techniques to mislead adversaries: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.03E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the targeting capabilities of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to initiate and complete attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations with the ability to disguise systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. The increased use of specific concealment and misdirection techniques and methods, including randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization, may sufficiently confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery or exposing tradecraft. Concealment and misdirection techniques may provide additional time to perform core mission and business functions. The implementation of concealment and misdirection techniques may add to the complexity and management overhead required for the system. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes deceive) Direct threat events away from defender-chosen resources.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and (to a lesser extent) reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts cease.

  • The adversary actions are mistargeted or misinformed.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.03E.ODP.01 }} are used to mislead adversaries.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing concealment and misdirection techniques for the system system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system architecture list of concealment and misdirection techniques to be used for organizational systems system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with the responsibility to implement concealment and misdirection techniques for systems

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing concealment and misdirection techniques

Statement

Employ boundary protection mechanisms to isolate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.04E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Organizations can isolate system components that perform different mission or business functions. Isolating system components with boundary protection mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual system components and to more effectively control information flows between those components. The degree of isolation varies depending on the mechanisms selected. Boundary protection mechanisms include routers, gateways, and firewalls that separate system components into physically separate networks or subnetworks; cross-domain devices that separate subnetworks; virtualization techniques; and the encryption of information flows among system components using distinct encryption keys. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

boundary protection mechanisms are employed to isolate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.04E.ODP.01 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing boundary protection system design documentation system hardware and software enterprise architecture documentation system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with boundary protection responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to separate system components

Statement

Change the location of {{ insert: param, A.03.13.05E.ODP.02 }} {{ insert: param, A.03.13.05E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Adversaries target critical missions and business functions and the systems that support those missions and business functions while also trying to minimize the exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and deterministic nature of organizational systems targeted by adversaries make such systems more susceptible to attacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful. Changing processing and storage locations (also referred to as moving target defense) addresses the advanced persistent threat using techniques such as virtualization, distributed processing, and replication. This enables organizations to relocate the system components (i.e., processing, storage) that support critical missions and business functions. Changing the locations of processing activities and/or storage sites introduces a degree of uncertainty to the targeting activities of adversaries. The targeting uncertainty increases the work factor of adversaries and makes compromises or breaches of the organizational systems more difficult and time-consuming. Uncertainty also increases the chances that adversaries may inadvertently disclose aspects of their tradecraft while attempting to locate critical organizational assets. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt and negate) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes contain and exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

the location of {{ insert: param, A.03.13.05E.ODP.01 }} is changed {{ insert: param, A.03.13.05E.ODP.02 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy configuration management policy and procedures procedures addressing concealment and misdirection techniques for the system list of processing and/or storage locations to be changed at organizational time intervals change control records configuration management records system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with the responsibility to change processing and/or storage locations

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing changing processing and/or storage locations

Statement

Include within organizational systems the following platform independent applications: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.06E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Platforms are the hardware, software, and firmware components used to execute the organization’s software applications. Platforms include operating systems, the underlying computer architectures, or both. Platform-independent applications are applications with the capability to execute on multiple platforms. Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms. The portability of applications and the ability to reconstitute applications on different platforms increase the availability of mission-essential functions within organizations when systems with specific operating systems are under attack. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes shorten and reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.06E.ODP.01 }} are implemented within organizational systems.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing platform-independent applications system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation list of platform-independent applications system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities system developers

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing platform-independent applications

Statement

Employ virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity of operating systems and applications that are changed {{ insert: param, A.03.13.07E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

While frequent changes to operating systems and applications can pose significant configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for adversaries to conduct successful attacks. Changing virtual operating systems or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems or applications, provides virtual changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. Virtualization techniques can assist in isolating untrustworthy software or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

virtualization techniques are employed to support the deployment of a diverse range of operating systems and applications that are changed {{ insert: param, A.03.13.07E.ODP.01 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy configuration management policy and procedures system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system architecture list of operating systems and applications deployed using virtualization techniques change control records configuration management records system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with responsibilities for implementing approved virtualization techniques to the system

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the use of a diverse set of information technologies mechanisms supporting and/or implementing virtualization techniques

Statement

Include components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks for detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.

Guidance

Decoys (i.e., honeypots, honeynets, or deception nets) are established to attract adversaries and deflect attacks away from the operational systems that support organizational missions and business functions. The use of decoys requires some supporting isolation measures to ensure that any deflected malicious code does not infect organizational systems. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes detect) Reduce risk due to ignorance of threat events and possible replicated or similar threat events in the same or similar environments.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary loses the advantage of stealth as defenders are better prepared by developing and sharing threat intelligence.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to detect such attacks.

Assessment objective

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to deflect such attacks.

Assessment objective

components within organizational systems specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks are included to analyze such attacks.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing the use of decoys system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities system developers

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing decoys

Statement

Isolate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.09E.ODP.01 }} from other internal system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.

Guidance

Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful for isolating computer network defenses from critical operational processing networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques employed by organizations. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.09E.ODP.01 }} are isolated from other internal system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing boundary protection system design documentation system hardware and software system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation list of security tools and support components to be isolated from other internal system components system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with boundary protection responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the isolation of information security tools, mechanisms, and support components

Statement

Implement separate network addresses to connect to systems in different security domains.

Guidance

The decomposition of systems into subnetworks (i.e., subnets) helps to provide the appropriate level of protection for network connections to different security domains. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

separate network addresses are implemented to connect to systems in different security domains.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing boundary protection system design documentation system hardware and software system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities system developers personnel with boundary protection responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing separate network addresses or different subnets

Statement

Employ minimal functionality and information storage on the following system components: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.11E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

The deployment of system components with minimal functionality reduces the need to secure every endpoint and may reduce the exposure of information, systems, and services to attacks. Reduced or minimal functionality includes diskless nodes and thin client technologies. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes contain) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

Assessment objective

minimal functionality for {{ insert: param, A.03.13.11E.ODP.01 }} is employed.

Assessment objective

minimal information storage on {{ insert: param, A.03.13.11E.ODP.01 }} is employed.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing use of thin nodes system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing thin nodes

Statement

• {{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.01 }} the effects of the following types of denial-of-service events: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.02 }}.

• Employ the following safeguards to prevent the denial-of-service events{{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.03 }}.

Guidance

Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate the origination and effects of denial-of-service events. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect system components on internal networks from being directly affected by or the source of denial-of-service attacks. Employing increased network capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy also reduces the susceptibility to denial-of-service events. This requirement is sourced to a control tailored out of the SP 800-53B .13 moderate baseline in SP 800-171.

Statement

• (includes preempt and negate) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

the effects of {{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.01 }} are {{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.02 }}.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.12E.ODP.03 }} are employed to protect against or limit the effects of denial-of-service events.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing denial-of-service protection list of denial-of-service attacks requiring employment of security safeguards to protect against or limit effects of such attacks system design documentation list of security safeguards protecting against or limiting the effects of denial-of-service attacks system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel with incident response responsibilities system developers

Assessment method

• Mechanisms protecting against or limiting the effects of denial-of-service attacks

Statement

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.01 }} disable or remove {{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.02 }} on the following systems or system components: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.03 }}.

Guidance

Connection ports include Universal Serial Bus (USB), Thunderbolt, and Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include optical drives (e.g., compact disc and digital versatile disc drives), printers, and network attached storage devices. Disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O devices helps prevent the exfiltration of information from systems and the introduction of malicious code from those ports or devices. Physically disabling or removing ports and/or devices is the stronger action. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes contain) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

Assessment objective

{{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.01 }} are {{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.02 }} disabled or removed on {{ insert: param, A.03.13.13E.ODP.03 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy access control policy and procedures procedures addressing port and input/output device access system design documentation system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation systems or system components list of connection ports or input/output devices to be physically disabled or removed on systems or system components system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the disabling of connection ports or input/output devices

Statement

Employ a detonation chamber capability within {{ insert: param, A.03.13.14E.ODP.01 }}.

Guidance

Detonation chambers (also known as dynamic execution environments) allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute URL requests in the safety of an isolated environment or a virtualized sandbox. Protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of determining whether the associated attachments or applications contain malicious code. While related to the concept of deception nets, the employment of detonation chambers is not intended to maintain a long-term environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed. Rather, detonation chambers are intended to quickly identify malicious code and either reduce the likelihood that the code is propagated to user environments of operation or prevent such propagation completely. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt and negate) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes contain and exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes detect and reveal) Reduce risk due to ignorance of threat events and possible replicated or similar threat events in the same or similar environments.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary loses the advantage of stealth as defenders are better prepared by developing and sharing threat intelligence.

Assessment objective

a detonation chamber capability is employed within the {{ insert: param, A.03.13.14E.ODP.01 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing detonation chambers system configuration settings and associated documentation system audit records system design documentation system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• system/network administrators personnel with information security responsibilities personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the detonation chamber capability

Statement

Implement {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.01 }} separate subnetworks to isolate the following critical system components and functions: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.02 }}.

Guidance

Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command-and-control function from the in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial aircraft provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of critical system functions. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

subnetworks are separated {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.01 }} to isolate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.02 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing boundary protection system design documentation system hardware and software system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation criticality analysis system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators organizational personnel with information security responsibilities system developer organizational personnel with boundary protection responsibilities

Assessment method

• Mechanisms separating critical system components and functions

Statement

Partition the system into {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.02 }} residing in separate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.01 }} domains or environments based on {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.03 }}.

Guidance

System partitioning is part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components. Physical separation options include physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, critical components in separate rooms, and geographical separation of critical components. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow among partitioned system components. This requirement does not enhance a specific requirement in SP 800-171 but can be used to strengthen the protection of CUI associated with critical programs or high value assets.

Statement

• (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

  • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

  • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

• (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

  • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

  • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

• (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

  • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

  • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

the system is partitioned into {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.01 }} residing in separate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.02 }} security domains or environments based on {{ insert: param, A.03.13.16E.ODP.03 }}.

Assessment method

• System and communications protection policy procedures addressing system partitioning system design documentation system configuration settings and associated documentation system architecture list of system physical domains (or environments) system facility diagrams system network diagrams system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

• System/network administrators organizational personnel with information security responsibilities organizational personnel installing, configuring, and/or maintaining the system system developers/integrators

Assessment method

• Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the physical separation of system components