+Credential Dumping Mitigation

Credential Dumping Mitigation

Windows

Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[1]

On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[2]

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[3] tools, like AppLocker,[4],[5] or Software Restriction Policies[6] where appropriate.[7]

With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements.[8] It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[9]

Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication.[10],[11]

Consider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic.[12]

Linux

Scraping the passwords from memory requires root privileges. Follow best practices in restricting access to escalated privileges to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive regions of memory.

References

  1. Plett, C., Poggemeyer, L. (12, October 26). Securing Privileged Access Reference Material. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
  2. Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved February 13, 2015.
  3. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  4. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  5. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  6. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  7. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
  8. Lich, B. (2016, May 31). Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  9. NSA IAD. (2017, April 20). Secure Host Baseline - Credential Guard. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
  10. Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  11. Microsoft. (n.d.). How to grant the "Replicating Directory Changes" permission for the Microsoft Metadirectory Services ADMA service account. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
  12. Microsoft. (2012, November 29). Using security policies to restrict NTLM traffic. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

1. Oversigt

1.1 Referencer

1.2 Identificerede krav

1.3 Relaterede reguleringer

2. Identificerede krav

Krav

3. Relaterede reguleringer

Reguleringer

Linkede sager

Sagslinks
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