Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.[1],[2],[3],[4]
Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).[5] By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
References
- Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
- Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.
- Nati Tal and Oleg Zaytsev. (2023, October 13). “EtherHiding” — Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
- Bill Toulas. (2023, October 13). Hackers use Binance Smart Chain contracts to store malicious scripts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
- Sebastian Obregoso and Christophe Tafani-Dereeper. (2024, May 23). Malicious PyPI packages targeting highly specific MacOS machines. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Linkede sager
| Linktype | Sag |
|---|---|
| is related to | Techniques |
| is blocked by | Pre-compromise |
| is blocked by | Detection of Upload Malware |
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