6.8.2 For that purpose, the relevant entities shall: (a) consider the functional, logical and physical …

GUIDANCE 67, 68

• Make sure that the segments are in line with the results of the risk assessment (Annex to the regulation, point 2.1).
• Apply a graduated set of measures in different logical network domains to further segregate the network security environments, including:
  • publicly accessible systems;
  • internal networks;
  • OOB connections; and
  • assets with high criticality.
• Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically and/or logically separate from internal organisational networks.
• Determine the degree of physical separation of system components from physically distinct components:
  • in separate racks in the same room,
  • in separate rooms for the components with high criticality and
  • more significant geographical separation of the components with high criticality.
• Implement separate network addresses (that is,, different subnets) to connect to systems in different security domains.
• Monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the system as well as at key internal boundaries within the system, including segmentation violations.
• Where appropriate, isolate information security tools, mechanisms and support components from other internal information system components, where appropriate (69), by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.
• Route all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed interface for the purposes of access control and auditing.
• Implement a managed interface for each external telecommunication service.

Requirement

For that purpose, the relevant entities shall: (a) consider the functional, logical and physical relationship, including location, between trustworthy systems and services; (b) grant access to a network or zone based on an assessment of its security requirements; (c) keep systems that are critical to the relevant entities operation or to safety in secured zones; (d) deploy a demilitarised zone within their communication networks to ensure secure communication originating from or destined to their networks; (e) restrict access and communications between and within zones to those necessary for the operation of the relevant entities or for safety; (f) separate the dedicated network for administration of network and information systems from the relevant entities’ operational network; (g) segregate network administration channels from other network traffic;

(h) separate the production systems for the relevant entities’ services from systems used in development and testing, including backups.

Examples of evidence

• Risk assessments that justify the segmentation decisions.
• Interviews with IT and security staff to understand the rationale behind network segmentation.
• Up-to-date network diagrams showing segmentation into different networks or zones (e.g. DMZ (70), internal networks and guest networks).
• Verification that the diagrams align with business functions and risk profiles.
• Documented criteria for creating and maintaining different network zones.
• VLAN configurations on network switches and routers.
• VLANs corresponding to different security zones and business functions.
• Measures (e.g. IDS/IPS and monitoring systems) tailored to each network zone.
• Configurations of network devices (e.g. routers, switches and firewalls) for appropriate segmentation settings.
• Configuration settings that match documented segmentation rules and diagrams.
• ACLs that consider segregation of duties.
• Firewall configurations.

1. Oversigt

1.1 Referencer

1.2 Identificerede krav

1.3 Relaterede reguleringer

2. Identificerede krav

3. Relaterede reguleringer

Linkede sager

• ENISA -