+Artikel 24 2.

Artikel 24 2.

Foruden de i stk. 1 omhandlede krav sikrer centrale modparter, at deres politik for IKT-driftsstabilitet:

a) 

indeholder en maksimal genopretningstid for deres kritiske funktioner, som ikke overstiger 2 timer

b) 

tager hensyn til eksterne sammenkoblinger og indbyrdes afhængighed inden for de finansielle infrastrukturer, herunder markedspladser, der cleares af den centrale modpart, værdipapirafviklings- og betalingssystemer og kreditinstitutter, der anvendes af den centrale modpart eller en tilknyttet central modpart

c) 

indeholder krav om, at der er indført ordninger med henblik på at:

i) 

sikre stabiliteten af den centrale modparts kritiske eller vigtige funktioner på grundlag af katastrofescenarier

ii) 

vedligeholde et sekundært afviklingssted, der kan sikre stabilitet i den centrale modparts kritiske eller vigtige funktioner, og som er identisk med det primære anlæg

iii) 

vedligeholde eller opnå umiddelbar adgang til et sekundært forretningssted, således at personalet kan sikre tjenestens driftsstabilitet, hvis det primære forretningssted ikke er tilgængeligt

iv) 

tage hensyn til behovet for ekstra afviklingssteder, navnlig såfremt det primære og sekundære steds forskellige risikoprofiler ikke giver tilstrækkelig sikkerhed for, at den centrale modparts mål for driftsstabilitet vil blive opfyldt i alle scenarier.

Med henblik på litra a) afslutter centrale modparter under alle omstændigheder procedurer ved dagens afslutning og afvikler betalinger på det krævede tidspunkt og den krævede dag.

Med henblik på litra c), nr. i), skal de ordninger, der er omhandlet heri, omhandle tilgængeligheden af tilstrækkelige menneskelige ressourcer, den maksimale nedetid for kritiske funktioner og svigt samt genopretning på et sekundært afviklingssted.

Med henblik på litra c), nr. ii), skal det sekundære afviklingssted, der er omhandlet heri, have en geografisk risikoprofil, som er forskellig fra det primære afviklingssteds risikoprofil.

1. Oversigt

,
Titel Regulering

1.1 Referencer

1.2 Identificerede krav

1.3 Relaterede standarder

2. Identificerede krav

Krav
Kilde Krav

3. Relaterede standarder

Standarder
Kilde Krav
NOREA Business Continuity Policy

Establish an ICT business continuity policy that enables the continuity of critical or important functions, ensures rapid response to incidents, facilitates the resumption of activities, deployment of containment measures, activation and deactivation of response and recovery procedures, estimation of impact, damage, and losses, and provides clear communication to relevant stakeholders. Regularly review the business continuity policy and make necessary adjustments to enhance effectiveness.

Refer to Articles 24.2-4 of the RTS RM for specific requirements for Central counterparties, Trading venues, and Central security depositories.

NOREA Crisis Management
Formulate and maintain a crisis management team tasked with overseeing and coordinating actions during a crisis or major disruption. Regularly review recovery/response plans. Make necessary adjustments to enhance effectiveness.
NOREA Record Keeping
Keep detailed records of activities conducted before, during, and after disruptions, including actions taken and outcomes. Maintain an estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses resulting from major disruptions. This information shall be reported to the regulator upon their request.
NOREA Business Impact analysis
Perform a comprehensive Business Impact Analysis (BIA) of exposures to severe business disruptions. The BIA should be done by means of quantitative and qualitative criteria, using internal and external data and scenario analysis, as appropriate. The BIA shall consider the criticality of identified and mapped business functions, support processes, third-party dependencies and information assets, and their interdependencies. Financial entities shall ensure that ICT assets and ICT services are designed and used in full alignment with the BIA, in particular with regard to adequately ensuring the redundancy of all critical components.

NOREA Response and Recovery

Establish comprehensive response and recovery plans encompassing short-term and long-term recovery options. These plans must thoroughly identify potential scenarios and shall duly take into account scenarios of cyber-attacks, switchovers, degradation of critical function provision, premises failure, breakdowns in ICT assets or communication infrastructure, staff unavailability, natural disasters and the impact of climate change, pandemic situations, physical attacks, insider threats, political or social instability, and power outages. Additionally, these plans must incorporate alternative options in cases where primary recovery measures are impractical in the short term due to factors such as cost, risks, logistics, or unforeseen circumstances. Address potential failures of key ICT third-party service providers into the plans.

NOREA Testing and Assessment

Regularly test ICT business continuity, response, and recovery plans, particularly in collaboration with third-party service providers supporting critical or important functions. Testing should  take into account the financial entity’s BIA and the ICT risk assessment and occur on a yearly basis and whenever there are significant changes to systems supporting critical or important functions. 
Tests must be based on realistic scenarios and encompass scenarios like cyber attacks, insolvency or failure of the third-party, backup restores, and switchover between primary and redundant processing sites. 
The testing shall verify whether at least critical or important functions can be operated appropriately, for a sufficient period of time and whether the normal functioning (of the business process) may be restored. Conduct testing of crisis communication plans to ensure effective communication strategies during a crisis or major disruption. Document test results and report any identified deficiencies resulting from the tests to the management body.

Refer to Articles 24.2-3 of the RTS RM for the specific requirements for Central counterparties and Central security depositories.