Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: * In a Direct Pipeline Execution scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml` in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) * In an Indirect Pipeline Execution scenario, the threat actor injects malicious code into files referenced by the CI configuration file. These may include makefiles, scripts, unit tests, and linters.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) * In a Public Pipeline Execution scenario, the threat actor does not have direct access to the repository but instead creates a malicious pull request from a fork that triggers a part of the CI/CD pipeline. For example, in GitHub Actions, the `pull_request_target` trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an `npm build` command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: GitHub Security Lab GitHub Actions Security 2021) Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted.(Citation: Wiz Ultralytics AI Library Hijack 2024)(Citation: Synactiv Hijacking GitHub Runners)(Citation: GitHub Security Labs GitHub Actions Security Part 2 2021) Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.(Citation: John Stawinski PyTorch Supply Chain Attack 2024) By poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195)).

Linked Issues

Issuelinks
is related to Techniques
is blocked by User Account Management
is blocked by Software Configuration
is blocked by Detection Strategy for Poisoned Pipeline Execution via SaaS CI/CD Workflows
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