Assessment Objectives
In addition to relevant policies, standards and procedures, the assessor shall examine, interview, and/or test to determine if appropriately scoped evidence exists to support the claim that:
- TDA-20_A01 the developer of system, systems component or system service is required to have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned official duties.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-21a. - TDA-20_A02 configuration items under configuration management are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10_ODP[01] 53A_R5_SA-10_ODP[02] - TDA-20_A03 personnel to whom security flaws and flaw resolutions within the system, component or service are reported is/are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10_ODP[03] - TDA-20_A04 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to perform configuration management during system, component or service per organization-defined criteria.
Defined parameters: development, implementation, AND operation
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10a. - TDA-20_A05 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to document the integrity of changes to configuration items.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10b.[01] - TDA-20_A06 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to manage the integrity of changes to configuration items.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10b.[02] - TDA-20_A07 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to control the integrity of changes to configuration items.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10b.[03] - TDA-20_A08 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component or service.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10c. - TDA-20_A09 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to document approved changes to the system, component or service.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10d.[01] - TDA-20_A10 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to document the potential security impacts of approved changes.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10d.[02] - TDA-20_A11 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to document the potential privacy impacts of approved changes.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10d.[03] - TDA-20_A12 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to track security flaws within the system, component or service.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10e.[01] - TDA-20_A13 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to track security flaw resolutions within the system, component or service.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10e.[02] - TDA-20_A14 the developer of the system, system component or system service is required to report findings to personnel.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10e.[03] - TDA-20_A15 an alternate configuration management process has been provided using organizational personnel in the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-10(02) - TDA-20_A16 the frequency with which to reassess individual positions and access to sensitive / regulated data is defined.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.1e_ODP[2] - TDA-20_A17 individuals that require enhanced personnel screening are identified.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.1e[a] - TDA-20_A18 positions that require access to sensitive / regulated data are identified.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.1e[b] - TDA-20_A19 organization-defined enhanced personnel screening is conducted for individuals.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-21b. 172A_3.9.1e_ODP[1] 172A_3.9.1e[c] - TDA-20_A20 individual positions and access to sensitive / regulated data is reassessed per an organization-defined frequency.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.1e[d] - TDA-20_A21 individuals with access to sensitive / regulated data are identified.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.2e[a] - TDA-20_A22 adverse information about individuals with access to sensitive / regulated data is defined.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.2e[b] - TDA-20_A23 organizational systems to which individuals have access are identified.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.2e[c] - TDA-20_A24 mechanisms are in place to protect organizational systems if adverse information develops or is obtained about individuals with access to sensitive / regulated data.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 172A_3.9.2e[d]
Verknüpfte Vorgänge
| Verknüpfungstyp | Vorgang |
|---|---|
| blocks | Developer Configuration Management |
- Secure Controls Framework -
The Secure Controls Framework® (SCF)
"The SCF is the Common Controls Framework™ (CCF), the world's most comprehensive cybersecurity and data privacy metaframework - it is also free to use. The entire concept is building secure, compliant and resilient capabilities in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.
The SCF is more than just a unified control catalog, since its included content creates a playbook for Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) capabilities. Used globally by organizations of every size, the SCF is a robust and scalable solution for security, compliance and resilience controls. As a comprehensive security framework, the SCF maps 1,400+ controls across 200+ laws, regulations, and industry frameworks so you can implement once and comply everywhere.
Like it or not, cybersecurity is a protracted war on an asymmetric battlefield, where the threats are everywhere and as defenders we have to make the effort to work together to help improve cybersecurity and data privacy practices, since we all suffer when massive data breaches occur or when cyber attacks have physical impacts. Hackers share information on attack methods with other hackers, so why shouldn’t the good guys share information on how to best protect an organization? We decided to take action and make a difference, since we feel it is too important to wait for someone else to fix the problems that exist.
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