+Άρθρο 27 Απαιτήσεις για δοκιμαστές για τη διενέργεια TLPT
---+Άρθρο 27 1
---+Άρθρο 27 2
---+Άρθρο 27 3

Άρθρο 27 Απαιτήσεις για δοκιμαστές για τη διενέργεια TLPT

1. Επισκόπηση

,
Άρθρο 27 1

1.   Οι χρηματοοικονομικές οντότητες, για τη διενέργεια TLPT, χρησιμοποιούν μόνο δοκιμαστές οι οποίοι:

α)

είναι απολύτως κατάλληλοι και έγκριτοι,

β)

διαθέτουν τεχνικές και οργανωτικές ικανότητες και επιδεικνύουν ειδική εμπειρογνωσία σε θέματα πληροφοριών για απειλές, δοκιμών παρείσδυσης και δοκιμών κόκκινης ομάδας,

γ)

έχουν πιστοποίηση από οργανισμό διαπίστευσης κράτους μέλους ή τηρούν επίσημους κώδικες ή πλαίσια δεοντολογίας,

δ)

παρέχουν ανεξάρτητη διαβεβαίωση ή έκθεση ελέγχου όσον αφορά την ορθή διαχείριση των κινδύνων που σχετίζονται με τη διενέργεια TLPT, συμπεριλαμβανομένων της δέουσας προστασίας των εμπιστευτικών πληροφοριών της χρηματοοικονομικής οντότητας και της αντιμετώπισης των επιχειρηματικών κινδύνων της χρηματοοικονομικής οντότητας,

ε)

καλύπτονται δεόντως και πλήρως από σχετική ασφάλιση επαγγελματικής ευθύνης, μεταξύ άλλων έναντι κινδύνων παραπτωμάτων και αμέλειας.
Άρθρο 27 2

2.   Όταν χρησιμοποιούν εσωτερικούς δοκιμαστές, οι χρηματοοικονομικές οντότητες διασφαλίζουν ότι, πέραν των απαιτήσεων στην παράγραφο 1, πληρούνται και οι ακόλουθες προϋποθέσεις:

α)

η χρήση αυτή έχει εγκριθεί από τη σχετική αρμόδια αρχή ή από την ενιαία δημόσια αρχή που έχει οριστεί σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 26 παράγραφοι 9 και 10,

β)

η σχετική αρμόδια αρχή έχει επαληθεύσει ότι η χρηματοοικονομική οντότητα διαθέτει επαρκείς ειδικούς πόρους και έχει διασφαλίσει την αποφυγή συγκρούσεων συμφερόντων καθ’ όλη τη διάρκεια των φάσεων σχεδιασμού και εκτέλεσης της δοκιμής και

γ)

ο πάροχος πληροφοριών για απειλές είναι εξωτερικός σε σχέση με τη χρηματοοικονομική οντότητα.
Άρθρο 27 3

3.   Οι χρηματοοικονομικές οντότητες διασφαλίζουν ότι οι συμβάσεις που συνάπτονται με εξωτερικούς δοκιμαστές προϋποθέτουν την ορθή διαχείριση των αποτελεσμάτων των TLPT και ότι οποιαδήποτε σχετική επεξεργασία δεδομένων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων τυχόν παραγωγής, αποθήκευσης, συγκέντρωσης, σχεδίου, αναφοράς, επικοινωνίας ή καταστροφής, δεν προκαλεί κινδύνους για τη χρηματοοικονομική οντότητα.

1.1 Παραπομπές

1.2 Εντοπισμένες απαιτήσεις

1.3 Σχετικά πρότυπα

2. Εντοπισμένες απαιτήσεις

Απαιτήσεις

3. Σχετικά πρότυπα

Πρότυπα
SCF Independent Penetration Agent or Team

Description

Mechanisms exist to utilize an independent assessor or penetration team to perform penetration testing.

Possible Solutions & Considerations

Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2

∙ Note: Typically not required at this size; use independent third party when penetration testing is required

Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4

∙ Independent third-party penetration tester (not the internal IT team or MSP that built the environment)

Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6

∙ Third-party independent penetration testing

Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8

∙ Enterprise independent penetration testing program (qualified third-party testers)

Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9

∙ Enterprise independent pen testing program
∙ Qualified third-party pen test teams
∙ Annual and ad-hoc testing
∙ Full red team exercises

SCR-CMM

Level 0 Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 Performed Informally

Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with VPM domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Attack Surface Management (ASM)-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.

Level 2 Planned Tracked

Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with VPM domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with VPM domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with VPM domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Vulnerability management-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ Vulnerability management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel, or contracted professionals, use red team exercises to simulate attempts by adversaries to compromise TAASD in accordance with entity-defined rules of engagement.

Level 3 Well Defined

Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with VPM domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with VPM domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ A vulnerability management team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain VPM domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of vulnerability management operations (e.g., patch management solution and vulnerability scanning solution).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with VPM domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to utilize an independent assessor or penetration team to perform penetration testing.

Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled

Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational.
▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs).
▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties.
▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review).
▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes.
▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.

Level 5 Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.