+3.4 Tailor and Document Assurance Levels
---+3.4.1 Assess Privacy, Customer Experience, and Threat Resistance
---+3.4.2 Identify Compensating Controls
---+3.4.3 Identify Supplemental Controls
---+3.4.4 Digital Identity Acceptance Statement

3.4 Tailor and Document Assurance Levels

The second dimension of risk addressed by the DIRM process focuses on risks from the identity management system that represent the unintended negative consequences of the initial selection of xALs and related technical and process controls in Sec. 3.3.4.

Tailoring provides a process to modify an initially assessed assurance level and implement compensating or supplemental controls based on ongoing detailed risk assessments. It provides a pathway for flexibility and enables organizations to achieve risk management objectives that align with their specific context, users, and threat environments. This process focuses on assessing the risks posed by the identity system itself, specific environmental threats, and privacy and customer experience impacts. It does not prioritize any specific risk area or outcomes for organizations. Making decisions that balance different types of risks to meet organizational outcomes remains the responsibility of organizations.

While organizations are required to implement and document a tailoring process, this guideline does not require the initial assurance levels or control sets to be modified as a result. However, organizations are expected to complete the assessments in the tailoring section to fully account for the outcomes of their selected initial assurance levels.

Within the tailoring step, organizations SHALL focus on impacts to mission delivery due to the implementation of identity management controls, including the possibility of legitimate users who are unable to access desired online services or experience sufficient friction or frustration with the identity system (and technology selection) that they abandon attempts to access the online service.

As a part of the tailoring process, organizations SHALL review the Digital Identity Acceptance Statements and practice statements1 from CSPs and IdPs that they use or intend to use. However, organizations SHALL also conduct their own analysis to ensure that the organization’s specific mission and the communities being served by the online service are given due consideration for tailoring purposes. As a result, the organization MAY require their chosen CSP to strengthen or provide optionality in the implementation of certain controls to address risks and unintended impacts to the organization’s mission and the communities served.

To promote interoperability and consistency, organizations SHOULD implement their assessed or tailored xALs consistent with the normative guidance in this document. However, these guidelines provide flexibility to allow organizations to tailor the initial xALs and related controls to meet specific mission needs, address unique risk appetites, and provide secure and accessible online services. In doing so, CSPs MAY offer and organizations MAY utilize tailored sets of controls that differ from the normative statements in this guideline.

Organizations SHALL establish and document their xAL tailoring process. At a minimum, this process:

SHALL follow a documented governance approach to allow for decision-making
SHALL document all decisions in the tailoring process, including the assessed xALs, modified xALs, and supplemental and compensating controls in the Digital Identity Acceptance Statement (see Sec. 3.4.4)
SHALL justify and document all risk-based decisions or modifications to the initially assessed xALs in the Digital Identity Acceptance Statement (see Sec. 3.4.4)
SHOULD establish a cross-functional capability to support subject-matter analysis of xAL selection impacts in the tailoring process (e.g., subject-matter experts who can speak about risks and considerations related to privacy, customer experience, fraud and impersonation impacts, and other germane areas)

The tailoring process promotes a structured means of balancing risks and impacts while protecting online services, systems, and data in a manner that enables mission success and supports security, customer experience, and privacy for individuals.

1. Yleiskatsaus

Otsikko Standardi
3.4.1 Assess Privacy, Customer Experience, and Threat Resistance

When selecting and tailoring assurance levels for specific online services, considerations extend beyond the initial impact assessment in Sec. 3.2. When progressing from the initial assurance level selection in Sec. 3.3.4 to the final xAL selection and implementation, organizations SHALL conduct detailed assessments of the controls defined for the initially selected xALs to identify potential impacts in the operational environment.

At a minimum, organizations SHALL assess the impacts and potential unintended consequences related to the following areas:

Privacy – Identify unintended consequences to the privacy of individuals who will be subject to the controls at an assessed xAL and of individuals affected by organizational or third-party practices related to the establishment, management, or federation of a digital identity. A privacy assessment SHOULD leverage an existing Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) or Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) as inputs during the privacy assessment process.2 However, as the goal of the privacy assessment is to identify privacy risks that arise from the initial assurance level selection, additional assessments and evaluations that are specific to the baseline controls for the assurance levels may be required for the underlying information system.
Customer Experience – Determine whether implementation of the initial assurance levels may create substantial or unacceptable barriers to individuals seeking to access services. Customer experience assessments SHALL consider impacts that result from the identity management controls to ensure that they do not cause undue burdens, frustrations, or frictions for individuals and that there are pathways to provide service to users of all capabilities, resources, technology access, and economic statuses.
Threat Resistance – Determine whether the defined assurance level and related controls will address specific threats to the online service based on the operational environment, its threat actors, and known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Threat assessments SHALL consider specific known and potential threats, threat actors, and TTPs within the implementation environment for the identity management functions. For example, certain benefits programs may be more subject to familial threats or collusion. Based on their assessments, organizations MAY implement supplemental controls specific to the communities served by their online service. Conversely, organizations MAY tailor their assessed xAL down or modify their baseline controls if their threat assessment indicates that a reduced threat posture is appropriate based on their environment.

Organizations SHOULD leverage consultation and feedback from the entities and communities served to ensure that the tailoring process addresses their known constraints.

Organizations SHOULD also conduct additional business-specific assessments as appropriate to fully represent mission- and domain-specific considerations that have not been captured here. All assessments applied during the tailoring phase SHALL be extended to any compensating or supplemental controls, as defined in Sec. 3.4.2 and Sec. 3.4.3. While identity system costs are not specifically included as an input for DIRM processes or as a metric for continuous evaluation, the costs and cost effectiveness of implementation and long-term operation are inherent considerations for responsible program and risk management. Based on their available funding and resources, organizations will likely need to make trade-offs that can be more effectively informed by the DIRM process and its outputs. Any cost-based decisions that result in modifications to assessed xALs or baseline controls SHALL be documented in the Digital Identity Acceptance Statement (see Sec. 3.4.4).

The outcome of this step is a set of risk assessments for privacy, customer experience, threat resistance, and other dimensions that inform the tailoring of the initial assurance levels and the selection of compensating and supplemental controls.

3.4.2 Identify Compensating Controls

A compensating control is a management, operational, or technical control employed by an organization in lieu of a normative control (i.e., SHALL statements) in the defined xALs. To the greatest degree practicable, a compensating control is intended to address the same risks as the baseline control it is replacing. Organizations MAY choose to implement a compensating control if they are unable to implement a baseline control or when a risk assessment indicates that a compensating control sufficiently mitigates risk in alignment with organizational risk tolerance. This control MAY be a modification to the normative statements defined in these guidelines or MAY be applied elsewhere in an online service, digital transaction, or service life cycle. For example:

A federal agency could choose to use a federal background investigation and checks [FIPS201] to compensate for the identity evidence validation with authoritative sources requirement under these guidelines.
An organization could choose to implement stricter auditing and transactional review processes on a payment application where verification processes using weaker forms of identity evidence were accepted due to the lack of required evidence in the end-user population.

Where compensating controls are implemented, organizations SHALL document the compensating control, the rationale for the deviation, comparability of the chosen alternative, and any resulting residual risks. CSPs and IdPs that implement compensating controls SHALL communicate this information to all potential RPs prior to integration to allow the RP to assess and determine the acceptability of the compensating controls for their use cases.

The process of tailoring allows organizations and service providers to make risk-based decisions regarding how they implement their xALs and related controls. It also provides a mechanism for documenting and communicating decisions through the Digital Identity Acceptance Statement described in Sec. 3.4.4.

3.4.3 Identify Supplemental Controls

Supplemental controls may be added to further strengthen the baseline controls specified for the organization’s selected assurance levels. Organizations SHOULD identify and implement supplemental controls to address specific threats in the operational environment that may not be addressed by the baseline controls. For example:

To complete the proofing process, an organization could choose to verify an individual against additional pieces of identity evidence beyond what is required by the assurance level due to a high prevalence of fraudulent attempts.
An organization could restrict users to only phishing-resistant authentication at AAL2.
An organization could choose to implement risk-scoring analytics and re-proofing mechanisms to confirm a user’s identity when their access attempts exhibit certain risk factors.

Any supplemental controls SHALL be assessed for impacts based on the same factors used to tailor the organization’s assurance level and SHALL be documented.

3.4.4 Digital Identity Acceptance Statement

Organizations SHALL develop a Digital Identity Acceptance Statement (DIAS) to document the results of the DIRM process for (i) each online service managed by the organization, and (ii) each external online service used to support the mission of the organization, including software-as-a-service offerings (e.g., social media platforms, email services, online marketing services). RPs who intend to use a particular CSP/IdP SHALL review the latter’s DIAS and incorporate relevant information into the organization’s DIAS for each online service.

Organizations SHALL prepare a DIAS for their online service that includes, at a minimum:

Initial impact assessment results,
Initially assessed xALs,
Tailored xAL and rationale if the tailored xAL differs from the initially assessed xAL,
All compensating controls with their comparability or residual risks, and
All supplemental controls.

Federal agencies SHOULD include this information in the information system authorization package described in [NISTRMF].

CSPs/IdPs SHALL implement the DIRM process and develop a DIAS for the services they offer if they deviate from the normative guidance in these guidelines, including when supplemental or compensating controls are added. To complete a DIRM of their offered assurance levels and controls, CSPs/IdPs MAY base their assessment on anticipated or representative digital identity services that they wish to support. In creating this risk assessment, they SHOULD seek input from real-world RPs on their user populations and anticipated context. The DIAS prepared by a CSP SHALL include, at a minimum:

Claimed xAL, related controls, and rationale for any deviations from normative guidance;
All compensating controls with their comparability or residual risks; and
All supplemental controls.

The DIRM process for external online services used by the organization SHALL consider relevant inputs from the provider of the service and document the results in a DIAS. The DIAS prepared by the organization for external online services SHALL include, at a minimum:

Assessed xAL, related controls, and rationale for any deviations from normative guidance;
All compensating controls with their comparability or residual risks; and
All supplemental controls.

The final implemented xALs do not all need to be at the same level. There may be variance based on the functions of the online service, the impact assessment, and the tailoring process.

1.1 Viittaukset

1.2 Tunnistetut vaatimukset

1.3 Liittyvät säädökset

2. Tunnistetut vaatimukset

Vaatimukset
Lähde Vaatimus

3. Liittyvät säädökset

Säädökset
Lähde Sääntely
  • NIST -

    EN: Publications of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, from their electronic versions (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 from its HTML version, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Works of NIST employees are not subject to copyright protection in the United States (17 U.S.C. § 105); the OSCAL content is dedicated to the public domain worldwide (CC0 1.0); outside the United States NIST grants the right to reprint its technical series publications in all formats (NIST copyright statement). Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; each document names its citation. Divided into sections and converted into the GRCA format, the wording unchanged. Only the versions published by NIST are authoritative.

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