+NIST SP 800-63B-4 Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management
---+1 Introduction
------+1.1 Notations
------+1.2 Document Structure
---+2 Authentication Assurance Levels
------+2.1 Authentication Assurance Level 1
---------+2.1.1 Permitted Authenticator Types
---------+2.1.2 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
---------+2.1.3 Reauthentication
------+2.2 Authentication Assurance Level 2
---------+2.2.1 Permitted Authenticator Types
---------+2.2.2 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
---------+2.2.3 Reauthentication
------+2.3 Authentication Assurance Level 3
---------+2.3.1 Permitted Authenticator Types
---------+2.3.2 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
---------+2.3.3 Reauthentication
------+2.4 General Requirements
---------+2.4.1 Security Controls
---------+2.4.2 Records Retention Policy
---------+2.4.3 Privacy Requirements
---------+2.4.4 Redress Requirements
------+2.5 Summary of Requirements
---+3 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
------+3.1 Requirements by Authenticator Type
---------+3.1.1 Passwords
------------+3.1.1.1 Password Authenticators
------------+3.1.1.2 Password Verifiers
---------+3.1.2 Look-Up Secrets
------------+3.1.2.1 Look-Up Secret Authenticators
------------+3.1.2.2 Look-Up Secret Verifiers
---------+3.1.3 Out-of-Band Devices
------------+3.1.3.1 Out-of-Band Authenticators
------------+3.1.3.2 Out-of-Band Verifiers
------------+3.1.3.3 Authentication Using the Public Switched Telephone Network
------------+3.1.3.4 Multi-Factor Out-of-Band Authenticators
---------+3.1.4 Single-Factor OTP
------------+3.1.4.1 Single-Factor OTP Authenticators
------------+3.1.4.2 Single-Factor OTP Verifiers
---------+3.1.5 Multi-Factor OTPs
------------+3.1.5.1 Multi-Factor OTP Authenticators
------------+3.1.5.2 Multi-Factor OTP Verifiers
---------+3.1.6 Single-Factor Cryptographic Authentication
------------+3.1.6.1 Single-Factor Cryptographic Authenticators
------------+3.1.6.2 Single-Factor Cryptographic Verifiers
---------+3.1.7 Multi-Factor Cryptographic Authentication
------------+3.1.7.1 Multi-Factor Cryptographic Authenticators
------------+3.1.7.2 Multi-Factor Cryptographic Verifiers
------------+3.1.7.3 Usage With Subscriber-Controlled Wallets
------------+3.1.7.4 Syncable Authenticators
------+3.2 General Authenticator Requirements
---------+3.2.1 Physical Authenticators
---------+3.2.2 Rate Limiting (Throttling)
---------+3.2.3 Use of Biometrics
------------+3.2.3.1 Biometric Accuracy
------------+3.2.3.2 Presentation Attack Detection
------------+3.2.3.3 Injection Attack Detection
------------+3.2.3.4 Use of Biometric Samples
---------+3.2.4 Attestation
---------+3.2.5 Phishing Resistance
------------+3.2.5.1 Channel Binding
------------+3.2.5.2 Verifier Name Binding
---------+3.2.6 Verifier-CSP or IdP Communications
---------+3.2.7 Replay Resistance
---------+3.2.8 Authentication Intent
---------+3.2.9 Restricted Authenticators
---------+3.2.10 Activation Secrets
---------+3.2.11 Connected Authenticators
------------+3.2.11.1 Wired Connections
------------+3.2.11.2 Wireless Connections
------------+3.2.11.3 Hybrid Connections
---------+3.2.12 Random Values
---------+3.2.13 Exportability
---+4 Authenticator Event Management
------+4.1 Authenticator Binding
---------+4.1.1 Binding at Enrollment
---------+4.1.2 Post-Enrollment Binding
------------+4.1.2.1 Binding an Additional Authenticator
------------+4.1.2.2 Binding Across Endpoints
---------+4.1.3 Binding to a Subscriber-Provided Authenticator
---------+4.1.4 Renewal
------+4.2 Account Recovery
---------+4.2.1 Account Recovery Methods
------------+4.2.1.1 Saved Recovery Codes
------------+4.2.1.2 Issued Recovery Codes
------------+4.2.1.3 Recovery Contacts
------------+4.2.1.4 Repeated Identity Proofing
---------+4.2.2 Recovery Requirements by IAL/AAL
------------+4.2.2.1 Recovery Without Identity Proofing
------------+4.2.2.2 Recovery at AAL2
------------+4.2.2.3 Recovery at AAL3
---------+4.2.3 Account Recovery Notification
------+4.3 Loss, Theft, Damage, and Compromise
------+4.4 Expiration
------+4.5 Invalidation
------+4.6 Account Notifications
---+5 Session Management
------+5.1 Session Bindings
---------+5.1.1 Browser Cookies
---------+5.1.2 Access Tokens
------+5.2 Reauthentication
------+5.3 Session Monitoring
---+6 Threats and Security Considerations
------+6.1 Authenticator Threats
------+6.2 Threat Mitigation Strategies
------+6.3 Authenticator Recovery
------+6.4 Session Attacks
---+7 Privacy Considerations
------+7.1 Privacy Risk Assessment
------+7.2 Privacy Controls
------+7.3 Use Limitation
------+7.4 Agency-Specific Privacy Compliance
---+8 Customer Experience Considerations
------+8.1 Usability
---------+8.1.1 Common Usability Considerations for Authenticators
---------+8.1.2 Usability Considerations by Authenticator Type
------------+8.1.2.1 Passwords
------------+8.1.2.2 Look-Up Secrets
------------+8.1.2.3 Out-of-Band
------------+8.1.2.4 Single-Factor OTP
------------+8.1.2.5 Multi-Factor OTP
------------+8.1.2.6 Single-Factor Cryptographic Authenticator
------------+8.1.2.7 Multi-Factor Cryptographic Authenticator
---------+8.1.3 Summary of Usability Considerations
---------+8.1.4 Usability Considerations for Biometrics
------+8.2 Customer Success Considerations
---+A Strength of Passwords
------+A.1 Introduction
------+A.2 Length
------+A.3 Complexity
------+A.4 Central vs. Local Verification
------+A.5 Summary
---+B Syncable Authenticators
------+B.1 Introduction
------+B.2 Cloning Authentication Keys
------+B.3 Implementation Requirements
------+B.4 Sharing
------+B.5 Example
------+B.6 Security Considerations
---+C List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms
---+D Glossary
---+E Change Log
|
NIST SP 800-63B-4 Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management
Temoshok D, Fenton JL, Choong YY, Lefkovitz N, Regenscheid A, Galluzzo R, Richer JP (2025) Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) NIST SP 800-63B-4. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63B-4 Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Read from https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html.
1. Vue d’ensemble
| Intitulé |
Norme |
|
1 Introduction
|
This section is informative. Authentication is the process of determining the validity of one or more authenticators used to claim a digital identity by establishing that a subject attempting to access a digital service is in control of the secrets used to authenticate. If return visits are applicable to a service, successful authentication provides reasonable risk-based assurance that the subject accessing the service today is the same as the one who previously accessed the service. One-time services (i.e., the subscriber will only ever access the service once) do not necessarily require persistent digital authentication nor the issuance of authenticators. The authentication of claimants is central to the process of associating a subscriber with their online activity as recorded in their subscriber account, which is maintained by a credential service provider (CSP). Authentication is performed by verifying that the claimant controls one or more authenticators (called tokens in some earlier editions of SP 800-63) associated with a given subscriber account. The authentication process is conducted by a verifier, which is a role of the CSP or — in federated authentication — of an identity provider (IdP). Upon successful authentication, the verifier asserts the identifier for the subscriber to the relying party (RP). Optionally, the verifier may assert additional attributes to the RP. This guideline provides recommendations on types of authentication processes, including choices of authenticators, that may be used at various authentication assurance levels (AALs). It also provides recommendations on events that may occur during the lifetime of authenticators, including initial issuance, maintenance, and invalidation in the event of loss or theft of the authenticator. This guideline applies to the digital authentication of subjects to systems over a network. It also requires that verifiers and RPs participating in authentication protocols be authenticated to claimants to assure the identity of the services with which they are authenticating. It does not address the authentication of a person for physical access (e.g., to a building). This guideline recognizes that subscribers are responsible for protecting their authentication secrets and not disclosing them to others (e.g., credential sharing). The protections at the various AALs are intended to protect against credential theft and are not intended to protect against willful disclosure of credential secrets by a subscriber. In most cases, there are very few technical controls that can detect and prevent such willful collusion and sharing. AALs categorize the strength of an authentication transaction. Stronger authentication (i.e., a higher AAL) requires malicious actors to have better capabilities and to expend greater resources to successfully subvert the authentication process. Authentication at higher AALs can effectively reduce the risk of attacks. A high-level summary of the technical requirements for each of the AALs is provided below; see Sec. 2 and Sec. 3 of this document for specific normative requirements. Authentication Assurance Level 1: AAL1 provides basic confidence that the claimant controls an authenticator bound to the subscriber account being authenticated. AAL1 requires only single-factor authentication using a wide range of available authentication technologies. However, it is recommended that applications assessed at AAL1 offer multi-factor authentication options. Successful authentication requires the claimant to prove possession and control of the authenticator. Authentication Assurance Level 2: AAL2 provides high confidence that the claimant controls one or more authenticators bound to the subscriber account being authenticated. Proof of the possession and control of two distinct authentication factors is required. Applications assessed at AAL2 must offer a phishing-resistant authentication (see Sec. 3.2.5) option. Authentication Assurance Level 3: AAL3 provides very high confidence that the claimant controls one or more authenticators bound to the subscriber account being authenticated. Authentication at AAL3 is based on the proof of possession of a key through the use of a public-key cryptographic protocol. AAL3 authentication requires a phishing-resistant authenticator (see Sec. 3.2.5) with a non-exportable authentication key (see Sec. 3.2.13). To authenticate at AAL3, claimants are required to prove possession and control of two distinct authentication factors. When a session has been authenticated at a given AAL and a higher AAL is required, an authentication process may also provide step-up authentication to raise the session’s AAL.
|
|
2 Authentication Assurance Levels
|
This section is normative. To satisfy the requirements of a given AAL and be recognized as a subscriber, a claimant SHALL authenticate to an RP (or IdP, as described in [SP800-63C]) with a process whose strength is equal to or greater than the requirements at that level. The authentication process results in an identifier that uniquely identifies the subscriber each time they authenticate to that RP. The identifier MAY be pseudonymous. Other attributes that identify the subscriber as a unique subject MAY also be provided. Detailed normative requirements for authenticators and verifiers at each AAL are provided in Sec. 3. See [SP800-63] Sec. 3 for details on how to choose the most appropriate AAL. Personal information collected during and after identity proofing (see [SP800-63A]) MAY be made available to the subscriber by the digital identity service through the subscriber account. The release or online availability of any personal information by federal agencies requires multi-factor authentication in accordance with [EO13681]. Therefore, federal agencies SHALL select a minimum of AAL2 when personal information is made available online. At all AALs, indicators of potential fraud, including applicable indicators described in Sec. 5.3, MAY be used to lower the risk of misauthentication. For example, authentication from an unexpected geolocation or IP address block (e.g., a cloud service) might prompt the use of additional risk-based controls. CSPs or verifiers SHALL assess their use of indicators of potential fraud for efficacy and to identify and mitigate potential negative impacts on their user populations. CSPs or verifiers SHALL include fraud indicators in the authentication privacy risk assessment. The use of potential fraud indicators prior to or during the authentication process does not impact or change the AAL of a transaction or substitute for an authentication factor. Throughout this document, [FIPS140] requirements are satisfied by security technologies, products, and services that utilize implementations of cryptography validated by the Cryptography Module Validation Program [CMVP]. FIPS 140 requirements at a given AAL are often different for authenticators and verifiers, with more stringent requirements generally applying to verifiers. This is in recognition of the practical limitations on the certification of authenticators as well as the broader scope that is often associated with a security breach at a verifier.
|
|
3 Authenticator and Verifier Requirements
|
This section is normative. This section provides detailed requirements that are specific to each type of authenticator. With the exception of the reauthentication requirements specified in Sec. 2 and the requirement for phishing resistance at AAL3 described in Sec. 3.2.5, the technical requirements for each authenticator type are the same, regardless of the AAL at which the authenticator is used. In federated applications described in [SP800-63C], the authentication functions of an IdP correspond closely with that of a CSP or verifier. In the discussion below, the requirements associated with a CSP also apply to an IdP. In many circumstances, subscribers need to share devices that are used in authentication processes, such as a family phone that receives OTPs. In public-facing applications, CSPs SHOULD NOT prevent a device from being registered as an authenticator by multiple subscribers. However, they MAY establish restrictions to prevent large-scale fraud or misuse (e.g., limiting the total number of subscriber accounts a single device can be registered with). Authentication, authenticator binding (discussed in Sec. 4.1), and session management (discussed in Sec. 5) are based on proof of possession of one or more types of secrets, as shown in Table 2. Table 2. Summary of secrets (non-normative)
| Type of Secret |
Purpose |
Reference Section |
| Password |
A subscriber-chosen secret used as an authentication factor |
3.1.1 |
| Look-up secret |
A secret issued by a verifier and used only once to prove possession of the secret |
3.1.2 |
| Out-of-band secret |
A short-lived secret generated by a verifier and independently sent to a subscriber’s device to verify its possession |
3.1.3 |
| One-time passcodes (OTP) |
A secret generated by an authenticator and used only once to prove possession of the authenticator |
3.1.4, 3.1.5 |
| Activation secret |
A password that is used locally as an activation factor for a multi-factor authenticator |
3.2.10 |
| Long-term authenticator secret |
A secret embedded in a physical authenticator to allow it to function for authentication |
4.1 |
| Recovery code |
A secret issued to the subscriber to allow them to recover an account at which they are no longer able to authenticate |
4.2 |
| Session secret |
A secret issued by the verifier at authentication and used to establish the continuity of authenticated sessions |
5.1 |
|
|
4 Authenticator Event Management
|
This section is normative. Events can occur over the lifetime of a subscriber’s authenticator and affect its use. These events include binding, maintenance, loss, theft, compromise, unauthorized duplication, expiration, and revocation. This section describes the actions to be taken in response to those events.
|
|
5 Session Management
|
This section is normative. Once an authentication event has occurred, it is often desirable to allow the subscriber to continue using the application across multiple subsequent interactions without requiring them to repeat the authentication event. This is particularly the case with federation scenarios (see [SP800-63C]) in which the authentication event necessarily involves the coordination of several components and parties across a network. To facilitate this behavior, a session MAY be started in response to an authentication event and continue until it is terminated. The session MAY be terminated for any number of reasons, including an inactivity timeout or an explicit logout event. The session MAY be extended through a reauthentication event (see Sec. 5.2) in which the subscriber repeats some of the initial authentication process or performs a full authentication, thereby reestablishing the authenticated session. Session management is preferable to the continual presentation of credentials, as the poor usability of continual presentation often creates incentives for workarounds (e.g., caching activation factors), thereby negating authentication intent and obscuring the freshness of the authentication event.
|
|
6 Threats and Security Considerations
|
This section is informative.
|
|
7 Privacy Considerations
|
This section is informative.
|
|
8 Customer Experience Considerations
|
This section is informative. To align with the standard terminology of user-centered design, customer experience, and usability, the term “user” is used throughout this section to refer to the human party. In most cases, the user in question will be the subject in the role of applicant, claimant, or subscriber. Customer experience sits at the nexus of usability, accessibility, and optionality. Considering user needs allows organizations to provide responsive and secure identity solutions while minimizing unnecessary friction and frustration.
|
|
A Strength of Passwords
|
This appendix is informative. This appendix uses the word “password” for ease of discussion. Where used, it should be interpreted to include passphrases and PINs.
|
|
B Syncable Authenticators
|
This appendix is normative.
|
|
C List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms
|
- AAL
- Authentication Assurance Level
- ASCII
- American Standard Code for Information Interchange
- CAC
- Common Access Card
- CSP
- Credential Service Provider
- CSRF
- Cross-Site Request Forgery
- DNS
- Domain Name System
- FEDRAMP
- Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
- FIPS
- Federal Information Processing Standards
- FMR
- False Match Rate
- FNMR
- False Non-Match Rate
- IAL
- Identity Assurance Level
- IdP
- Identity Provider
- KBA
- Knowledge-Based Authentication
- MAC
- Message Authentication Code
- MF
- Multi-Factor
- MFA
- Multi-Factor Authentication
- NARA
- National Archives and Records Administration
- NFC (communications protocol)
- Near-Field Communication
- OTP
- One-Time Password
- OWASP
- Open Worldwide Application Security Project
- PAD
- Presentation Attack Detection
- PIA
- Privacy Impact Assessment
- PIN
- Personal Identification Number
- PIV
- Personal Identity Verification
- PKI
- Public-Key Infrastructure
- PSTN
- Public Switched Telephone Network
- QR
- Quick Response
- RP
- Relying Party
- SAOP
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- SF
- Single-Factor
- SMS
- Short Message Service
- SORN
- System of Records Notice
- SSO
- Single Sign-On
- TEE
- Trusted Execution Environment
- TLS
- Transport Layer Security
- TPM
- Trusted Platform Module
- USB
- Universal Serial Bus
- VOIP
- Voice-Over-IP
- XSS
- Cross-Site Scripting
|
|
D Glossary
|
This section is informative. A wide variety of terms are used in the realm of digital identity. While many definitions are consistent with earlier versions of SP 800-63, some have changed in this revision. Many of these terms lack a single, consistent definition, warranting careful attention to how the terms are defined here.
- account recovery
- The ability to regain ownership of a subscriber account and its associated information and privileges.
- activation
- The process of inputting an activation factor into a multi-factor authenticator to enable its use for authentication.
- activation factor
- An additional authentication factor that is used to enable successful authentication with a multi-factor authenticator.
- activation secret
- A password that is used locally as an activation factor for a multi-factor authenticator.
- applicant
- A subject undergoing the processes of identity proofing and enrollment.
- approved cryptography
- An encryption algorithm, hash function, random bit generator, or similar technique that is Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)-approved or NIST-recommended. Approved algorithms and techniques are either specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.
- assertion
- A statement from an IdP to an RP that contains information about an authentication event for a subscriber. Assertions can also contain identity attributes for the subscriber in the form of attribute values, derived attribute values, and attribute bundles.
- asymmetric keys
- Two related cryptographic keys comprised of a public key and a private key that are used to perform complementary operations, such as encryption and decryption or signature verification and generation.
- attestation
- Information conveyed to the CSP, generally at the time that an authenticator is bound, to describe the characteristics of a connected authenticator or the endpoint involved in an authentication operation.
- attribute
- A quality or characteristic ascribed to someone or something. An identity attribute is an attribute about the identity of a subscriber (e.g., name, date of birth, address).
- attribute validation
- The process or act of confirming that a set of attributes are accurate and associated with a real-life identity. See validation.
- authenticate
- See authentication.
- authenticated protected channel
- An encrypted communication channel that uses approved cryptography in which the connection initiator (client) has authenticated the recipient (server). Authenticated protected channels are encrypted to provide confidentiality and protection against active intermediaries and are frequently used in the user authentication process. Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC9325] are examples of authenticated protected channels in which the certificate presented by the recipient is verified by the initiator. Unless otherwise specified, authenticated protected channels do not require the server to authenticate the client. Authentication of the server is often accomplished through a certificate chain that leads to a trusted root rather than individually with each server.
- authenticated session
- See protected session.
- authentication
- The process by which a claimant proves possession and control of one or more authenticators bound to a subscriber account to demonstrate that they are the subscriber associated with that account.
- authentication assurance level (AAL)
- A category that describes the strength of the authentication process.
- authentication factor
- The three types of authentication factors are something you know, something you have, and something you are. Every authenticator has one or more authentication factors.
- authentication intent
- The process of confirming the claimant’s intent to authenticate or reauthenticate by requiring user intervention in the authentication flow. Some authenticators (e.g., OTPs) establish authentication intent as part of their operation. Others require a specific step to establish intent, such as pressing a button. Authentication intent is a countermeasure against malware at the endpoint as a proxy for authenticating an attacker without the subscriber’s knowledge.
- authentication key
- A private or symmetric key used by an authenticator to generate the authenticator output.
- authentication protocol
- A defined sequence of messages between a claimant and a verifier that demonstrates that the claimant has possession and control of one or more valid authenticators to establish their identity and, optionally, demonstrates that the claimant is communicating with the intended verifier.
- authentication secret
- A generic term for any secret value that is used to verify the subscriber in an authentication protocol. These are further divided into short-term authentication secrets, which are only useful to an attacker for a limited period of time, and long-term authentication secrets, which allow an attacker to impersonate the subscriber until they are manually reset. The authenticator secret is the canonical example of a long-term authentication secret, while the authenticator output — if it is different from the authenticator secret — is usually a short-term authentication secret.
- authenticator
- Something that the subscriber possesses and controls (e.g., a cryptographic module or password) and that is used to authenticate a claimant’s identity. See authenticator type and multi-factor authenticator.
- authenticator binding
- The establishment of an association between a specific authenticator and a subscriber account that allows the authenticator to authenticate the subscriber associated with the account, possibly in conjunction with other authenticators.
- authenticator output
- The output value generated by an authenticator. The ability to generate valid authenticator outputs on demand proves that the claimant possesses and controls the authenticator. Protocol messages sent to the verifier depend on the authenticator output, but they may or may not explicitly contain it.
- authenticator type
- A category of authenticators with common characteristics, such as the types of authentication factors they provide and the mechanisms by which they operate.
- authenticity
- The property that data originated from its purported source.
- authorize
- A decision to grant access, typically automated by evaluating a subject’s attributes.
- biometric sample
- An analog or digital representation of biometric characteristics prior to biometric feature extraction, such as a record that contains a fingerprint image.
- biometrics
- Automated recognition of individuals based on their biological or behavioral characteristics. Biological characteristics include but are not limited to fingerprints, palm prints, facial features, iris and retina patterns, voice prints, and vein patterns. Behavioral characteristics include keystroke cadence, the angle of holding a smartphone, screen pressure, typing speed, mouse or mobile phone movements, and gyroscope position, among others.
- blocklist
- A documented list of specific elements that are blocked, per policy decision. This concept has historically been known as a “blacklist.”
- challenge-response protocol
- An authentication protocol in which the verifier sends the claimant a challenge (e.g., a random value or nonce) that the claimant combines with a secret (e.g., by hashing the challenge and a shared secret together or by applying a private-key operation to the challenge) to generate a response that is sent to the verifier. The verifier can independently verify the response generated by the claimant (e.g., by recomputing the hash of the challenge and the shared secret and comparing it to the response or performing a public-key operation on the response) and establish that the claimant possesses and controls the secret.
- claimant
- A subject whose identity is to be verified using one or more authentication protocols.
- claimed identity
- An applicant’s declaration of unvalidated and unverified personal attributes.
- credential
- An object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity — via an identifier — and (optionally) additional attributes to at least one authenticator that is possessed and controlled by a subscriber. A credential is issued, stored, and maintained by the CSP. Copies of information from the credential can be possessed by the subscriber, typically in the form of one or more digital certificates that are often contained in an authenticator along with their associated private keys.
- credential service provider (CSP)
- A trusted entity whose functions include identity proofing applicants to the identity service and registering authenticators to subscriber accounts. A CSP may be an independent third party.
- cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
- An attack in which a subscriber who is currently authenticated to an RP and connected through a secure session browses an attacker’s website, causing the subscriber to unknowingly invoke unwanted actions at the RP. For example, if a bank website is vulnerable to a CSRF attack, it may be possible for a subscriber to unintentionally authorize a large money transfer by clicking on a malicious link in an email while a connection to the bank is open in another browser window.
- cross-site scripting (XSS)
- A vulnerability that allows attackers to inject malicious code into an otherwise benign website. These scripts acquire the permissions of scripts that are generated by the target website to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data transfers between the website and clients. Websites are vulnerable if they display user-supplied data from requests or forms without sanitizing the data so that it is not executable.
- cryptographic authenticator
- An authenticator that proves possession of an authentication secret through direct communication with a verifier through a cryptographic authentication protocol.
- cryptographic key
- A value used to control cryptographic operations, such as decryption, encryption, signature generation, or signature verification. For the purposes of these guidelines, key requirements shall meet the minimum requirements stated in Table 2 of [SP800-57Part1]. See asymmetric keys or symmetric keys.
- cryptographic module
- A set of hardware, software, or firmware that implements approved security functions, including cryptographic algorithms and key generation.
- digital authentication
- The process of establishing confidence in user identities that are digitally presented to a system. In previous editions of SP 800-63, this was referred to as “electronic authentication.”
- digital identity
- An attribute or set of attributes that uniquely describes a subject within a given context.
- digital signature
- An asymmetric key operation in which the private key is used to digitally sign data, and the public key is used to verify the signature. Digital signatures provide authenticity protection, integrity protection, and non-repudiation support but not confidentiality or replay attack protection.
- digital transaction
- A discrete digital event between a user and a system that supports a business or programmatic purpose.
- endpoint
- Any device that is used to access a digital identity on a network, such as laptops, desktops, mobile phones, tablets, servers, Internet of Things devices, and virtual environments.
- enrollment
- The process through which a CSP/IdP provides a successfully identity-proofed applicant with a subscriber account and binds authenticators to grant persistent access.
- entropy
- The amount of uncertainty that an attacker faces to determine the value of a secret. Entropy is usually stated in bits. A value with n bits of entropy has the same degree of uncertainty as a uniformly distributed n-bit random value.
- factor
- See authentication factor.
- Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
- Standards for adoption and use by federal departments and agencies that are developed by NIST, a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. FIPS address topics in information technology to achieve common levels of quality, security, and interoperability. FIPS documents are available online on the FIPS home page: https://www.nist.gov/itl/fips.cfm.
- federation
- A process that allows for the conveyance of identity and authentication information across a set of networked systems.
- federation assurance level (FAL)
- A category that describes the process used in a federation transaction to communicate authentication events and subscriber attributes to an RP.
- hash function
- A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed-length bit string. Approved hash functions satisfy the following properties:
One-way — It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified output.
Collision-resistant — It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
- identifier
- A data object that is associated with a single, unique entity (e.g., individual, device, or session) within a given context and is never assigned to any other entity within that context.
- identity
- See digital identity.
- identity assurance level (IAL)
- A category that conveys the degree of confidence that the subject’s claimed identity is their real identity.
- identity evidence
- Information or documentation that supports the real-world existence of the claimed identity. Identity evidence may be physical (e.g., a driver’s license) or digital (e.g., a mobile driver’s license or digital assertion). Evidence must support both validation (i.e., confirming authenticity and accuracy) and verification (i.e., confirming that the applicant is the true owner of the evidence).
- identity proofing
- The processes used to collect, validate, and verify information about a subject to establish assurance in the subject’s claimed identity.
- identity provider (IdP)
- The party in a federation transaction that creates an assertion for the subscriber and transmits the assertion to the RP.
- injection attack
- An attack in which an attacker supplies untrusted biometric information or media into a program or process. For example, this could include injecting a falsified image of identity evidence, a forged video of a user, or a morphed image to defeat evidence validation technology or biometric and visual comparisons for user verification.
- manageability
- Providing the capability for the granular administration of personal information, including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure. [NISTIR8062]
- memorized secret
- See password.
- message authentication code (MAC)
- A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of the data. MACs provide authenticity and integrity protection but not non-repudiation protection.
- mobile code
- Executable code that is normally transferred from its source to another computer system for execution. This transfer is often through the network (e.g., JavaScript embedded in a web page) but may transfer through physical media as well.
- multi-factor authentication (MFA)
- An authentication system that requires more than one distinct type of authentication factor for successful authentication. MFA can be performed using a multi-factor authenticator or by combining single-factor authenticators that provide different types of factors.
- multi-factor authenticator
- An authenticator that provides more than one distinct authentication factor, such as a cryptographic authentication device with an integrated biometric sensor that is required to activate the device.
- network
- An open communications medium, typically the internet, used to transport messages between the claimant and other parties. Unless otherwise stated, networks are assumed to be open and subject to active (e.g., impersonation, session hijacking) and passive (e.g., eavesdropping) attacks at any point between the parties (e.g., claimant, verifier, CSP, RP).
- nonce
- A value used in security protocols that is never repeated with the same key. For example, nonces used as challenges in challenge-response authentication protocols must not be repeated until authentication keys are changed. Otherwise, there is a possibility of a replay attack. Using a nonce as a challenge is a different requirement than a random challenge because a nonce is not necessarily unpredictable.
- non-repudiation
- The capability to protect against an individual falsely denying having performed a particular transaction.
- offline attack
- An attack in which the attacker obtains some data (e.g., by eavesdropping on an authentication transaction or by penetrating a system and stealing security files) that the attacker is able to analyze in a system of their own choosing.
- online attack
- An attack against an authentication protocol in which the attacker either assumes the role of a claimant with a genuine verifier or actively alters the authentication channel.
- online guessing attack
- An attack in which an attacker performs repeated logon trials by guessing possible values of the authenticator output.
- passphrase
- A password that consists of a sequence of words or other text that a claimant uses to authenticate their identity. A passphrase is similar to a password in usage but is generally longer for added security.
- password
- A type of authenticator consisting of a character string that is intended to be memorized or memorable by the subscriber to permit the claimant to demonstrate something they know as part of an authentication process. Passwords were referred to as memorized secrets in the initial release of SP 800-63B.
- personal identification number (PIN)
- A password that typically consists of only decimal digits.
- personal information
- Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.
- pharming
- An attack in which an attacker causes the subscriber to be redirected to a fraudulent website, typically a fraudulent verifier/RP in the context of authentication. This could cause the subscriber to reveal sensitive information (e.g., a password) to the attacker, download harmful software, or contribute to a fraudulent act. This may be accomplished by corrupting an infrastructure service (e.g., the DNS) or the subscriber’s endpoint.
- phishing
- An attack in which the subscriber is lured (usually through an email) to interact with a counterfeit verifier/RP and tricked into revealing information that can be used to masquerade as that subscriber to the real verifier/RP.
- phishing resistance
- The ability of the authentication protocol to prevent the disclosure of authentication secrets and valid authenticator outputs to an impostor verifier without reliance on the vigilance of the claimant.
- physical authenticator
- An authenticator that the claimant proves possession of as part of an authentication process.
- possession and control of an authenticator
- The ability to activate and use the authenticator in an authentication protocol.
- predictability
- Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about personal information and its processing by an information system. [NISTIR8062]
- presentation attack
- Presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system.
- presentation attack detection (PAD)
- Automated determination of a presentation attack. A subset of presentation attack determination methods (i.e., liveness detection) involves the measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or voluntary or involuntary reactions to determine whether a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject that is present at the point of capture.
- Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
- A method of analyzing how personal information is collected, used, shared, and maintained. PIAs are used to identify and mitigate privacy risks throughout the development life cycle of a program or system. They also help ensure that handling information conforms to legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy.
- private key
- A cryptographic key used with a public-key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and is not made public. In an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptosystem, the private key has a corresponding public key. Depending on the algorithm, the private key may be used to:
Compute the corresponding public key,
Compute a digital signature that may be verified by the corresponding public key,
Decrypt keys that were encrypted by the corresponding public key, or
Compute a shared secret during a key-agreement transaction.
- protected session
- A session in which messages between two participants are encrypted and integrity is protected using a set of shared secrets called “session keys.” A protected session is said to be authenticated if one participant proves possession of one or more authenticators in addition to the session keys and if the other party can verify the identity associated with the authenticators during the session. If both participants are authenticated, the protected session is said to be mutually authenticated.
- pseudonym
- A name other than a legal name.
- pseudonymous identifier
- A meaningless but unique identifier that does not allow the RP to infer anything regarding the subscriber but that does permit the RP to associate multiple interactions with a single subscriber.
- public key
- A cryptographic key used with a public-key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that may be made public. In an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptosystem, the public key has a corresponding private key. The public key may be known by anyone and, depending on the algorithm, may be used to:
Verify a digital signature that was generated using the corresponding private key,
Encrypt keys that can be decrypted using the corresponding private key, or
Compute a shared secret during a key-agreement transaction.
- public-key certificate
- A digital document issued and digitally signed by the private key of a certificate authority that binds an identifier to a subscriber’s public key. The certificate indicates that the subscriber identified in the certificate has sole control of and access to the private key. See also [RFC5280].
- public-key infrastructure (PKI)
- A set of policies, processes, server platforms, software, and workstations used to administer certificates and public-private key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, and revoke public-key certificates.
- reauthentication
- The process of confirming the subscriber’s continued presence and intent to be authenticated during an extended usage session.
- relying party (RP)
- An entity that relies on a verifier’s assertion of a subscriber’s identity, typically to process a transaction or grant access to information or a system.
- remote
- A process or transaction that is conducted through connected devices over a network rather than in person.
- replay attack
- An attack in which the attacker is able to replay previously captured messages between a legitimate claimant and a verifier to masquerade as that claimant to the verifier or vice versa.
- replay resistance
- The property of an authentication process to resist replay attacks, typically by the use of an authenticator output that is only valid for a specific authentication.
- restricted authenticator
- An authenticator type, class, or instantiation that has additional risk of false acceptance associated with its use and is therefore subject to additional requirements.
- risk assessment
- The process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing risks to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, and other organizations that result from the operation of a system. A risk assessment is part of risk management, incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls that are planned or in place. It is synonymous with “risk analysis.”
- risk management
- The program and supporting processes that manage information security risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, and other organizations and that include (i) establishing the context for risk-related activities, (ii) assessing risk, (iii) responding to risk once determined, and (iv) monitoring risk over time.
- salt
- A non-secret value used in a cryptographic process, usually to ensure that the results of computations for one instance cannot be reused by an attacker.
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)
- Person responsible for ensuring that an agency complies with privacy requirements, manages privacy risks, and considers the privacy impacts of all agency actions and policies that involve personal information.
- session
- A persistent interaction between a subscriber and an endpoint, either an RP or a CSP. A session begins with an authentication event and ends with a session termination event. A session is bound by the use of a session secret that the subscriber’s software (e.g., browser, application, OS) can present to the RP to prove association of the session with the authentication event.
- session hijack attack
- An attack in which the attacker is able to insert themselves between a claimant and a verifier after a successful authentication exchange between the latter two parties. The attacker is able to pose as a subscriber to the verifier or vice versa to control session data exchange. Sessions between the claimant and the RP can be similarly compromised.
- shared secret
- A secret used in authentication that is known to the subscriber and the verifier.
- side-channel attack
- An attack enabled by the leakage of information from a physical cryptosystem. Characteristics that could be exploited in a side-channel attack include timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, and acoustic emissions.
- single-factor
- A characteristic of an authentication system or an authenticator that requires only one authentication factor (i.e., something you know, something you have, or something you are) for successful authentication.
- single sign-on (SSO)
- An authentication process by which one account and its authenticators are used to access multiple applications in a seamless manner, generally implemented with a federation protocol.
- social engineering
- The act of deceiving an individual into revealing sensitive information, obtaining unauthorized access, or committing fraud by associating with the individual to gain confidence and trust.
- subject
- A person, organization, device, hardware, network, software, or service. In these guidelines, a subject is a natural person.
- subscriber
- An individual enrolled in the CSP identity service.
- subscriber account
- An account established by the CSP for each subscriber enrolled in its identity service that contains information about the subscriber and a record of any authenticators registered to the subscriber.
- symmetric key
- A cryptographic key used to perform both the cryptographic operation and its inverse (e.g., to encrypt and decrypt or to create a message authentication code and verify the code).
- sync fabric
- Any on-premises, cloud-based, or hybrid service used to store, transmit, or manage authentication keys generated by syncable authenticators that are not local to the user’s device.
- syncable authenticators
- Software or hardware cryptographic authenticators that allow authentication keys to be cloned and exported to other storage to sync those keys to other authenticators (i.e., devices).
- system of record (SOR)
- A collection of records that contain information about individuals and are under the control of an agency. The records can be retrieved by the individual’s name, an identifying number, a symbol, or other identifier.
- System of Records Notice (SORN)
- A notice that federal agencies publish in the Federal Register to describe their system of record.
- token
- See authenticator.
- transaction
- See digital transaction.
- Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- An authentication and security protocol that is widely implemented in browsers and web servers. TLS provides confidentiality, certificate-based authentication of the receiving (server) endpoint, and certificate-based authentication of the originating (client) endpoint. TLS is specified in [RFC8446] and [SP800-52].
- usability
- The extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of use. [ISO/IEC9241-11]
- validation
- The process or act of checking and confirming that the evidence and attributes supplied by an applicant are authentic, accurate, and associated with a real-life identity. See attribute validation.
- verification
- The process or act of confirming that the applicant undergoing identity proofing holds the claimed real-life identity represented by the validated identity attributes and associated evidence. Synonymous with identity verification.
- verifier
- An entity that confirms the claimant’s identity by verifying the claimant’s possession and control of one or more authenticators using an authentication protocol. To do this, the verifier needs to confirm the binding of the authenticators with the subscriber account and check that the subscriber account is active.
- verifier impersonation
- See phishing.
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E Change Log
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This appendix is informative. This appendix provides an overview of the changes made to SP 800-63B since its initial release.
Removes Purpose, Definitions, and Abbreviations numbered sections and renumbers sections accordingly. The section numbers referenced below are the new section numbers.
Changes the name of memorized secrets to passwords
Section 2: Describes the use of fraud indicators rather than pre-authentication checks
Section 2.3.2: Reduces required FIPS 140 validation level for authenticators at AAL3
Section 2.3.2: Requires a non-exportable cryptographic authenticator rather than a hardware-based authenticator at AAL3
Section 3.1.1.2: Increases the minimum length of passwords used as a single authentication factor
Section 3.1.3: Disallows the comparison of secrets from primary and secondary channel for out-of-band authentication
Section 3.1.3.1: Removes the prohibition on the use of VoIP phone numbers for out-of-band authentication
Section 3.1.3.4: Recognizes multi-factor out-of-band authenticators that require an activation factor
Section 3.1.4 and Sec. 3.1.5: Removes “devices” from the authenticator name to recognize OTP applications
Section 3.1.6 and Sec. 3.1.7: Removes “software” and “device” distinction from the authenticator name and refers to them as “authenticator characteristics”
Section 3.1.7.3: Adds requirements for authentication using subscriber-controlled wallets
Section 3.1.7.4 and Appendix B: Adds requirements for syncable authenticators
Section 3.2.3: Updates biometric performance requirements and metrics
Section 3.2.3.2: Requires PAD for facial recognition and prohibits biometric comparison based on voice
Section 3.2.5: Adds a definition and updates requirements for phishing-resistant authenticators
Section 3.2.10: Establishes separate requirements for locally verified memorized secrets known as activation secrets
Section 3.2.11: Adds requirements for authenticators that are connected via wireless technologies, such as NFC and Bluetooth
Section 3.2.11.3: Recognizes hybrid connections as a class of connected authenticators
Section 3.2.12: Centralizes the requirements for random values used throughout the document
Section 3.2.13: Adds a new section on requirements for the non-exportability of authenticator secrets
Section deleted: Removes verifier compromise resistance as a distinctly named requirement because it is generally a characteristic of the chosen authenticator type
Section 4: Renames section to “Authenticator Event Management”
Section 4.1.1: Moves binding at enrollment to SP 800-63A
Section 4.1.2.1: Generalizes binding an additional authenticator to all AALs
Section 4.1.2.2: Adds requirements for binding authenticators that are not connected to an endpoint
Section 4.2: Revises the requirements and methods for account recovery
Section 4.6: Revises the requirements for notifications sent to subscribers
Section 5.1: Recognizes the use of device-bound session credentials
Section 5.1.1: Adds requirements for browser cookies used for session maintenance
Section 5.2: Revises reauthentication requirements to define the overall structure of reauthentication here and specify timeout values in the AAL requirements
Section 5.3: Adds guidelines for the use of session monitoring (continuous authentication)
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1.1 Références
1.2 Exigences identifiées
1.3 Réglementations associées
2. Exigences identifiées
Exigences
| Source |
Exigence |
3. Réglementations associées
Réglementations
| Source |
Réglementation |
Tickets liés
- NIST -
EN: Publications of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, from their electronic versions (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 from its HTML version, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Works of NIST employees are not subject to copyright protection in the United States (17 U.S.C. § 105); the OSCAL content is dedicated to the public domain worldwide (CC0 1.0); outside the United States NIST grants the right to reprint its technical series publications in all formats (NIST copyright statement). Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; each document names its citation. Divided into sections and converted into the GRCA format, the wording unchanged. Only the versions published by NIST are authoritative.
DE: Veröffentlichungen des National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, aus ihren elektronischen Fassungen (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 aus ihrer HTML-Fassung, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Werke von NIST-Beschäftigten sind in den USA urheberrechtlich nicht geschützt (17 U.S.C. § 105); die OSCAL-Inhalte sind weltweit gemeinfrei gestellt (CC0 1.0); außerhalb der USA räumt das NIST das Recht ein, seine Technical-Series-Publikationen in allen Formaten neu zu veröffentlichen (Copyright-Hinweis des NIST). „Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology“; jedes Dokument nennt seine Zitierangabe. In Abschnitte aufgeteilt und in das GRCA-Format umgewandelt, der Wortlaut unverändert. Maßgeblich sind allein die vom NIST veröffentlichten Fassungen.
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