CRD – Article 94 Variable elements of remuneration

Article 94 1.

For variable elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92(2):

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(a)

i gcás ina mbaineann an luach saothair le feidhmíocht, tá méid iomlán an luacha saothair bunaithe ar mheascán den mheasúnú ar fheidhmíocht an duine aonair agus an aonaid gnó lena mbaineann agus de thorthaí foriomlána na hinstitiúide agus nuair a dhéantar measúnú ar an bhfeidhmíocht aonair, cuirtear critéir airgeadais agus critéir eile nach iad san áireamh, lena n-áirítear láimhseáil na rioscaí dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 76(2);

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(b)

the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks;

(c)

the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base;

(d)

guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans;

(e)

guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment;

(f)

fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;

(g)

institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply:

(i)

the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage;

(ii)

Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.

Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure:

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the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base;

—

shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented;

—

the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought;

—

the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations;

—

the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected;

—

staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution;

(iii)

Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.

EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years;

(h)

payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct;

(i)

remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements;

(j)

the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;

(k)

the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks;

(l)

a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following:

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(i)

scaireanna nó, faoi réir struchtúr dlíthiúil na hinstitiúide lena mbaineann, leasanna úinéireachta coibhéiseacha; nó ionstraimí atá nasctha le scaireanna, nó, faoi réir struchtúr dlíthiúil na hinstitiúide lena mbaineann, ionstraimí neamhairgid coibhéiseacha;

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(ii)

where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.

The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;

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(m)

iarchuirtear sciar nach suaill, agus 40 % ar a laghad i ngach cás, de chomhpháirt inathraithe an luacha saothair thar tréimhse nach giorra ná 4 nó 5 de bhlianta, arna thabhairt ar comhréir mar is ceart le nádúr an ghnó gona rioscaí agus le gníomhaíochtaí na mball foirne lena mbaineann. I gcás chomhaltaí an bhoird bainistíochta agus na hardbhainistíochta in institiúidí nach beag a dtábhacht i ngeall ar a méid, ar a n-eagar inmheánach, ar nádúr, raon agus castacht a gcuid gníomhaíochtaí, níor cheart gur giorra ná 5 bliana an tréimhse iarchuir.

Luach saothair is iníoctha faoi shocruithe iarchuir, ní íocfar sin níos sciobtha ná ar bhonn pro rata. I gcás comhpháirt inathraithe an luacha saothair a bheith ag gabháil le suim thar a bheith ard, ní mór 60 % ar a laghad de a iarchur. Is i gcomhréir leis an timthriall tráchtála, le cineál an ghnó aige gona rioscaí, agus le gníomhaíochtaí an bhaill foirne lena mbaineann a bhunófar fad na tréimhse iarchuir;

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(n)

the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned.

Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements.

Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member:

(i)

participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution;

(ii)

failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;

(o)

the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution.

If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period;

(p)

staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements;

(q)

variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Article 94 2.

Forbróidh ÚBE dréachtchaighdeáin theicniúla rialála chun na cineálacha ionstraimí a shonrú a chomhlíonann na coinníollacha a leagtar amach i bpointe (l)(ii) de mhír 1.

Cuirfidh ÚBE na dréachtchaighdeáin theicniúla rialála sin faoi bhráid an Choimisiúin faoin 31 Márta 2014.

Chun baill foirne a shainaithint a bhfuil tionchar ábhartha ag a ngníomhaíochtaí gairmiúla ar phróifíl riosca na hinstitiúide amhail dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 92(3), ach amháin maidir le baill foirne i ngnólachtaí infheistíochta, forbróidh ÚBE dréachtchaighdeáin theicniúla rialála ina leagfar amach na critéir chun an méid seo a leanas a shainiú:

(a)

freagracht bainistíochta agus feidhmeanna rialálaithe inmheánaigh;

(b)

aonad gnó ábhartha agus tionchar suntasach ar phróifíl riosca an aonaid gnó ábhartha; agus

(c)

catagóirí eile foirne nach dtagraítear go sainráite dóibh in Airteagal 92(3) a bhfuil tionchar ag a ngníomhaíochtaí gairmiúla ar phróifíl riosca na hinstitiúide, ar tionchar é atá chomh hábhartha céanna le tionchar na gcatagóirí foirne dá dtagraítear sa mhír sin.

Cuirfidh ÚBE na dréachtchaighdeáin theicniúla rialála sin faoi bhráid an Choimisiúin faoin 28 Nollaig 2019.

Déantar cumhacht a tharmligean chuig an gCoimisiún chun an Treoir seo a fhorlíonadh trí na caighdeáin theicniúla rialála dá dtagraítear sa mhír seo a ghlacadh i gcomhréir le hAirteagail 10 go 14 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1093/2010. Maidir leis na caighdeáin theicniúla rialála a bhfuil feidhm acu maidir le gnólachtaí infheistíochta mar a shainmhínítear i bpointe (2) d’Airteagal 4(1) de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 575/2013, leanfaidh an cumhachtú a leagtar síos in Airteagal 94(2) den Treoir seo arna leasú le Treoir (AE) 2018/843 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle ( 33 ), d’fheidhm a bheith aige go dtí an 26 Meitheamh 2021.

Article 94 3.

De mhaolú ar mhír 1, ní bheidh feidhm ag na ceanglais a leagtar amach i bpointe (l), (m) agus sa dara mír de phointe (o) den mhír sin maidir leis an méid seo a leanas:

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(a)

institiúid nach institiúid mhór í agus a bhfuil luach a sócmhainní ar an meán agus ar bhonn aonair, i gcomhréir leis an Treoir seo agus le Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 575/2013, cothrom le EUR 5 bhilliún, nó níos lú ná sin, thar an tréimhse 4 bliana díreach roimh an mbliain airgeadais reatha;

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(b)

ball foirne nach airde a luach saothair inathraitheach bliantúil ná EUR 50 000 agus nach ionann agus níos mó ná aon trian de luach saothair iomlán bliantúil an bhaill foirne sin.

Article 94 4.

De mhaolú ar phointe (a) de mhír 3, is ceadmhach don Bhallstát an tairseach dá dtagraítear ansiúd a ísliú nó a ardú, ar choinníoll:

(a)

nach institiúid mhór, mar a shainmhínítear i bpointe (146) d'Airteagal 4(1) de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 575/2013, a bhaineann úsáid as an bhforáil seo, agus i gcás ina n-ardaítear an tairseach:

(i)

go gcomhlíonann an institiúid na critéir a leagtar amach i bpointí (145)(c), (d) agus (e) d'Airteagal 4(1) de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 575/2013; agus

(ii)

nach airde an tairseach ná EUR 15 billiún;

(b)

gurb iomchuí an tairseach a ardú i gcomhréir leis an mír seo, á chur san áireamh cineál na hinstitiúide gona raon agus castacht gníomhaíochta, a heagar inmheánach nó, i gcás inarb iomchuí, saintréithe an ghrúpa lena mbaineann sí.

Article 94 5.

De mhaolú ar phointe (b) de mhír 3, féadfaidh an Ballstát a chinneadh nach mbeidh baill foirne, a bhíonn i dteideal luach saothair inathraitheach bliantúil is ísle ná an tairseach agus an sciar dá dtagraítear sa phointe sin i bpointe (b), nach mbeidh siad faoi réir na díolúine a leagtar amach ansiúd i ngeall ar shonraíochtaí an mhargaidh náisiúnta i dtéarmaí cleachtas luacha saothair nó mar gheall ar chineál na bhfreagrachtaí nó ar phróifíl an phoist atá ag na baill foirne sin.

Article 94 6.

Faoin 28 Meitheamh 2023, déanfaidh an Coimisiún, i ndlúthchomhar le ÚBE, athbhreithniú agus cuirfidh sé tuarascáil i dtoll a chéile ar chur i bhfeidhm mhíreanna 3 agus 5 agus cuirfidh sé an tuarascáil sin, agus togra reachtach, más iomchuí, faoi bhráid Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus na Comhairle.

Article 94 7.

Eiseoidh ÚBE treoirlínte, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 16 de Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1093/2010, d'éascú ar chur chun feidhme mhíreanna 3, 4 agus 5 agus chun a áirithiú go gcuirtear i bhfeidhm go comhsheasmhach iad.

Article 94 Variable elements of remuneration

1. Forbhreathnú

1.1 Tagairtí

1.2 Ceanglais aitheanta

1.3 Caighdeáin ghaolmhara

2. Ceanglais aitheanta

3. Caighdeáin ghaolmhara