+DER.2.2 Provisions for IT Forensics
---+DER.2.2.G1. Violation of legal framework conditions
---+DER.2.2.G2. Failure to Secure Evidence due to Incorrect or Incomplete Methods
---+DER.2.2.A1 Examination of Legal and Regulatory Framework Conditions for Acquisition and Evaluation [Data Protection Officer, Top Management] (B)
---+DER.2.2.A2 Drawing Up a Guide for Initial Measures in Case of an IT Security Incident (B)
---+DER.2.2.A3 Pre-Selection of Forensic Service Providers (B)
---+DER.2.2.A4 Identifying Common Areas Between IT Forensics and Crisis/Business Continuity Management (S)
---+DER.2.2.A5 Drawing Up a Guide to Securing Evidence in Case of IT Security Incidents (S)
---+DER.2.2.A6 Training Personnel on Forensic Securing of Evidence (S)
---+DER.2.2.A7 Selecting Tools for Forensics (S)
---+DER.2.2.A8 Selection and Order of Evidence to Be Secured [Process Owner] (S)
---+DER.2.2.A9 Pre-Selection of Forensically Relevant Data [Process Owner] (S)
---+DER.2.2.A10 Forensic Securing of IT Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
---+DER.2.2.A11 Documentation of Securing Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
---+DER.2.2.A12 Secure Storage of Original Storage Media and Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
---+DER.2.2.A13 Framework Agreements with External Service Providers (H)
---+DER.2.2.A14 Specifying Standard Procedures for Securing Evidence (H)
---+DER.2.2.A15 Conducting Drills on Securing Evidence (H)
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DER.2.2 Provisions for IT Forensics
IntroductionIT forensics involves the strictly methodical data analysis of storage media and data networks that is needed to get to the bottom of security incidents in IT systems. Forensic investigation of IT security incidents is always necessary to assess damage, avert attacks and prevent them in the future, and identify attackers. Whether or not an IT security incident requires forensic examination is determined whilst handling the incident. In the context of this module, IT forensic examination consists of the following phases: - Strategic preparation: During this phase, processes are planned and established to ensure that an organisation is able to forensically analyse IT security incidents. It is also required if the organisation does not have its own forensics experts.
- Initialisation: Once the responsible employees have decided to forensically examine an IT security incident, the processes planned in advance are triggered. The examination framework is also specified and the initial measures are implemented.
- Securing evidence: Here, the evidence to be secured is selected, and the data is secured forensically. In this regard, a differentiation is made between live forensics and post-mortem forensics. Live forensics ensures that the affected IT system's volatile data (in terms of network connections or RAM, for example) is secured. During post-mortem forensics, forensic copies of storage media are created.
- Analysis: The collected data is analysed forensically. In this regard, data is considered both individually and in the overall context at hand.
- Presentation of results: The relevant examination results are processed and communicated to meet the needs of specific target groups.
ObjectiveThis module covers the safeguards required to conduct forensic IT examinations. The main focus is on how to prepare and carry out evidence recovery. If providers of forensics services secure evidence either partially or entirely on their own, the requirements of this module also apply to them. Contractual arrangements and tests can be used to ensure that a service provider will comply with such requirements. Scoping and ModellingModule DER.2.2 Provisions for IT Forensics must be applied once to the entire information domain under consideration. This module addresses safeguards that are essential for later forensic IT examinations. The actual performance of forensic analysis is thus not part of this module. It does not describe requirements that are designed to ensure that attacks will be detected. These are included in module DER.1 Detecting Security-Relevant Events and are a prerequisite of this module. In addition, this module does not address criteria and processes used by the persons in charge to decide whether an IT security incident must be forensically examined. This decision will be made during the handling of each security incident (see DER.2.1 Security Incident Handling). The module also not cover forensic IT investigations of criminal offences. Finally, this module does not address how IT infrastructures can be cleaned after being attacked (see DER.2.3 Clean-Up of Extensive Security Incidents). The activities described in DER.2.3 can, however, be supported significantly by the results of forensic IT examinations. Useful ResourcesThe BSI provides further information on this subject in “Leitfaden IT-Forensik” [BSI Guide for IT Forensics], which also serves as a reference work for individual problems that can arise in practice. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) provides guidelines for conducting forensic analyses in the standards ISO/IEC 27042:2015 and 27043:2015 01:2013. “The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security” published by the Information Security Forum (ISF) provides guidelines for conducting forensic analyses (section TM 2.4, "Forensic Investigations"). Request for Comments (RFC) 3227, “Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving”, provides information on basic procedure in securing forensic evidence.
1. Panoramica
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Standard |
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DER.2.2.A1 Examination of Legal and Regulatory Framework Conditions for Acquisition and Evaluation [Data Protection Officer, Top Management] (B)
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If data is acquired and evaluated for forensic examinations, all the legal and regulatory framework conditions MUST be identified and met (see ORP.5 Compliance Management). Internal regulations and agreements with employees MUST NOT be violated. To that end, the supervisory/personnel board and the Data Protection Officer MUST be involved.
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DER.2.2.A2 Drawing Up a Guide for Initial Measures in Case of an IT Security Incident (B)
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A guide MUST be drawn up for the IT systems used that describes the initial measures that must be carried out in the event of an IT security incident in order to destroy as little evidence as possible. This guide MUST also describe the actions that could destroy potential evidence and how they can be avoided.
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DER.2.2.A3 Pre-Selection of Forensic Service Providers (B)
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If an organisation does not have its own forensics team, suitable providers of forensic services MUST be identified during the preparatory phase. The eligible providers of forensic services MUST be documented.
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DER.2.2.A4 Identifying Common Areas Between IT Forensics and Crisis/Business Continuity Management (S)
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The areas in which forensic IT examinations and crisis / business continuity management overlap SHOULD be defined and documented. The employees responsible for specific tasks and the channels to be used to communicate with them SHOULD be specified. Furthermore, it SHOULD be ensured that the responsible contact persons are always available.
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DER.2.2.A5 Drawing Up a Guide to Securing Evidence in Case of IT Security Incidents (S)
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A guide describing how evidence is to be secured SHOULD be drawn up. This guide SHOULD specify procedures, technical tools, legal framework conditions, and documentation requirements.
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DER.2.2.A6 Training Personnel on Forensic Securing of Evidence (S)
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All the employees responsible SHOULD know how to secure evidence and use forensic tools correctly. In this regard, suitable training SHOULD be carried out.
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DER.2.2.A7 Selecting Tools for Forensics (S)
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It SHOULD be ensured that tools for securing and analysing evidence forensically are suitable for these purposes. Before using a tool for forensics, it SHOULD be checked that it works properly. It SHOULD also be verified and documented that it has not been manipulated.
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DER.2.2.A8 Selection and Order of Evidence to Be Secured [Process Owner] (S)
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A forensic examination SHOULD always start by defining the goals or assignment in question. The goals SHOULD be formulated as precisely as possible. All the required data sources SHOULD then be identified. The order in which data is to be secured and a detailed process for doing so SHOULD also be specified. The order SHOULD be based on the volatility of the data to be secured. Highly volatile data SHOULD be secured promptly. Non-volatile data such as read-only memory SHOULD only be secured afterwards, followed by backups.
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DER.2.2.A9 Pre-Selection of Forensically Relevant Data [Process Owner] (S)
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The method and time period for storing secondary data (e.g. log data or traffic transcripts) within the scope of the legal framework conditions for forensic measures to secure evidence SHOULD be specified.
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DER.2.2.A10 Forensic Securing of IT Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
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Storage media SHOULD be forensically duplicated as completely as possible. If this is not possible (e.g. in the case of volatile data in RAM or SAN partitions), a method that changes as little data as possible SHOULD be selected. The original storage media SHOULD sealed and retained. Cryptographic checksums that are documented in writing SHOULD be created from the storage media. These SHOULD be kept separately and in multiple copies. In addition, it SHOULD be ensured that the checksums documented in this way cannot be changed. A witness SHOULD confirm the corresponding procedure and certify the checksums so that the data is admissible in court. Only trained personnel (see DER.2.2.A6 Training Personnel on Forensic Securing of Evidence) or a provider of forensic services (see DER.2.2.A3 Pre-Selection of Forensic Service Providers) SHOULD be assigned to secure evidence.
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DER.2.2.A11 Documentation of Securing Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
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When evidence is secured forensically, all the steps carried out SHOULD be documented. The documentation SHOULD provide seamless proof of how secured original evidence has been handled. In addition, the employed methods and the reasons why the persons in charge used them SHOULD be documented.
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DER.2.2.A12 Secure Storage of Original Storage Media and Evidence [Process Owner] (S)
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All secured original storage media SHOULD be stored physically in such a way that only investigating employees known by name can access them. If original storage media and evidence are stored, the period for which they are to be retained SHOULD be specified. After this period expires, it SHOULD be checked whether the storage media and evidence must be stored further. After the end of the storage period, evidence SHOULD be securely deleted or destroyed, and original storage media SHOULD be returned.
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DER.2.2.A13 Framework Agreements with External Service Providers (H)
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An organisation SHOULD conclude call-off agreements or framework contracts with forensic service providers in order to have possible IT security incidents forensically investigated more quickly.
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DER.2.2.A14 Specifying Standard Procedures for Securing Evidence (H)
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Standard procedures that make it possible to forensically secure volatile and non-volatile data as completely as possible SHOULD be created for applications, IT systems, and IT system groups with increased protection needs, as well as for distributed system configurations. The relevant system-specific standard procedures SHOULD be implemented by proven (and preferably automated) processes. Furthermore, they SHOULD be supported by checklists and auxiliary technical resources—for example, by software, software tools on mobile storage media, and forensic IT hardware such as write-blockers.
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DER.2.2.A15 Conducting Drills on Securing Evidence (H)
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All the employees involved in forensic analyses SHOULD take part in regular drills that provide training on how to secure evidence should an IT security incident occur.
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1.1 Riferimenti
1.2 Requisiti identificati
1.3 Regolamentazioni correlate
2. Requisiti identificati
Requisiti
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Requisito |
3. Regolamentazioni correlate
Regolamentazioni
| Fonte |
Regolamentazione |
Ticket collegati
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