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+3.15 Holder-of-Key Assertions |
3.15 Holder-of-Key AssertionsA holder-of-key assertion (Fig. 3) SHALL include a unique identifier for an authenticator that can be verified independently by the RP, such as the public key of a certificate controlled by the subscriber. The RP SHALL verify that the subscriber possesses the authenticator identified by the assertion. Holder-of-key assertions are most often used when the authenticator technology is tied to a public-key infrastructure (PKI) trusted by both the IdP and RP. Fig. 3. Holder-of-key assertions
The authenticator identified in a holder-of-key assertion MAY be distinct from the primary authenticator that the subscriber uses to authenticate to the IdP. The authenticator identified in a holder-of-key assertion SHALL be phishing-resistant, as defined by Sec. 3.2.5 of [SP800-63B]. When the RP encounters an authenticator in a holder-of-key assertion for the first time, the RP SHALL ensure that the authenticator can be uniquely resolved to the RP subscriber account, as discussed in Sec. 3.8.2. A holder-of-key assertion SHALL NOT include an unencrypted private key or symmetric key to be used as an authenticator. Assertions from subscriber-controlled wallets that run on a subscriber’s device can be considered holder-of-key assertions. Section 9.6 provides a more complete example of the use of a mutual TLS connection to provide the proof of possession of a certificate on a smart card that is listed by the assertion. Since the authenticators used in holder-of-key assertions could be presented to multiple parties, and these authenticators often contain identity attributes, there are additional privacy considerations to address, as discussed in Sec. 7. 1. Apžvalga
1.1 Nuorodos1.2 Nustatyti reikalavimai1.3 Susiję teisės aktai2. Nustatyti reikalavimai
3. Susiję teisės aktai
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