Adversaries may create or generate content to support targeting and operations. This content may be used to establish personas, impersonate known individuals or organizations, and support Social Engineering, fraud, or influence activities. Written materials, audio, images, video, or other media may be developed and tailored to the target and objective.[1]

Content development may occur prior to or during an operation. Adversaries may develop or generate content in-house, source it through third parties, or produce it using AI-assisted tools. Adversaries may use AI to research targets, develop pretexts, and better understand the organizations and individuals they intend to target or deceive prior to generating content (i.e., Query Public AI Services); for obtaining access to AI tools used in content generation, see Artificial Intelligence.

Content may be leveraged in support of techniques such as Phishing, Phishing for Information, Social Engineering, Financial Theft, or Establish Accounts. Generated or developed content does not include malicious code or scripts (i.e., Develop Capabilities and Artificial Intelligence).

References

  1. Tim Mucci. (n.d.). What is AI-Generated Content?. Retrieved April 22, 2026.

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Written Content

Adversaries may create or tailor written materials to support targeting and malicious operations. Content may include phishing lures, fraudulent financial communications, fabricated job postings, fabricated employment credentials and documentation, decoy documents, social media persona content, and supporting narratives used to sustain fabricated personas over time.[1],[2] Content may be authored manually, commissioned through third parties, or produced using AI-assisted tools.

Written materials may impersonate legitimate government correspondence, diplomatic communications, or internal organizational documents to support targeting efforts. AI-assisted tools may also be used to tailor content to specific targets, industries, or regions. For example, adversaries may leverage AI to translate content into a target's native language or mimic the communication style of trusted senders.

Written content produced through these methods may be used in support of other techniques, such as Phishing, Spearphishing via Service, Phishing for Information, Internal Spearphishing, Social Engineering, Financial Theft, or Establish Accounts.

Written content does not include malicious code or scripts; for development of malicious code and scripts, see Develop Capabilities.

References

  1. Adaptive Team. (2025, August 29). Generative AI Phishing: How to Defend in 2025. Retrieved March 26, 2026.
  2. Google Threat Intelligence Group . (2026, February 12). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, Experimentation, and (Continued) Integration of AI for Adversarial Use. Retrieved March 25, 2026.
Audio-Visual Content

Adversaries may create or manipulate audio, image, and video content to support targeting and malicious operations. Adversaries may also use synthetic voice recordings, real-time altered audio or video during live interactions, fabricated profile photos and identity documents, or video content depicting fabricated or impersonated individuals.[1]

Content may be produced manually through editing tools, generated using AI-assisted tools, or produced using third-party synthetic services.[2],[3] AI-assisted tools have enabled adversaries to produce synthetic media at scale and generate content that is more difficult to identify as inauthentic.

Audio-visual content produced through these methods may be used in support of other techniques, such as Phishing, Spearphishing via Service, Phishing for Information, Internal Spearphishing, Social Engineering, Financial Theft, or Establish Accounts.

References

  1. Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2025, November 5). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Advances in Threat Actor Usage of AI Tools. Retrieved March 31, 2026.
  2. Internet Crime Complaint Center, FBI. (2025). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report, 2025. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
  3. Europol. (2022). FACING REALITY? LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEEPFAKES. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

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