+3.6 Identifiers and Cryptographic Key Management for CSPs, IdPs, and RPs
---+3.6.1 Cryptographic Key Rotation
---+3.6.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
---+3.6.3 Software Attestations
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3.6 Identifiers and Cryptographic Key Management for CSPs, IdPs, and RPs
While a trust agreement establishes permission to federate, it does not facilitate the secure connection of parties in the federation.
In order to communicate over a federation protocol, the CSP, IdP, and RP need to be able to identify each other in a secure fashion with the ability to associate identifiers with cryptographic keys and related security artifacts.
In this way, an RP can ensure that an assertion is coming from the intended IdP or that an attribute bundle is coming from the intended CSP. Likewise, an IdP can ensure that it is sending an assertion to the intended RP. The process of an RP establishing identifiers and cryptographic keys for an IdP or CSP is known as discovery. The process of an IdP establishing identifiers and cryptographic keys for the RP is known as registration. Both the discovery and registration processes can happen prior to any federation transaction or inline as part of the transaction itself. Additionally, both the discovery and registration processes can happen directly between parties or be facilitated through the use of a third-party service, as defined in the trust agreement. These processes can use a combination of manual distribution of keys and identifiers between the IdP, CSP, and RP or associate these entities with sources in which cryptographic key material and metadata can be fetched through automated processes. Different federation protocols and processes have different processes for establishing these identifiers and cryptographic keys, but the end result is that each party can properly identify others as necessary within the protocol. The discovery and registration processes SHALL be established in a secure fashion, as defined by the trust agreement that governs the federation transaction. In many cases, the identifier is associated with a trusted source of cryptographic key material and not the key material itself. For example, a URL hosted by an IdP can serve the public signing keys for that IdP. Even if the RP is manually configured with this association, the RP can fetch the actual cryptographic key material at runtime. Protocols that require the transfer of cryptographic key information SHALL use an authenticated protected channel to exchange the cryptographic key information needed to operate the federated relationship, including any shared secrets or public keys. Any symmetric keys used in this relationship SHALL be unique to a pair of federation participants. CSPs, IdPs (including subscriber-controlled wallets), and RPs MAY have multiple identifiers and cryptographic keys to serve different purposes within a trust agreement or different trust agreements. For example, an IdP could use one set of assertion signing keys for all FAL1 and FAL2 transactions and use a separately managed set of signing keys for FAL3 transactions that are stored in a higher security container. When domain names, URIs, or other structured identifiers are used to identify parties, wildcards SHALL NOT be used. For example, if an RP is deployed at “www.example.com”, “service.example.com”, and “gateway.example.com”, then each of these identifiers would have to be registered for the RP. A wildcard of “*.example.com” cannot be used, as it would unintentionally allow access to “user.example.com” and “unknown.example.com” under the same RP identifier.
1. Ħarsa ġenerali
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3.6.1 Cryptographic Key Rotation
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Over time, it can be desirable or necessary to update the cryptographic key associated with a CSP, IdP, or RP. The allowable update process for any identifiers and cryptographic keys SHALL be defined by the trust agreement and SHALL be executed using an authenticated protected channel, as in the initial cryptographic key establishment. For example, if the IdP is identified by a URL, the IdP could publish its current public key set at a location underneath that URL. The IdP can update which keys are published at that location as needed. RPs can then fetch the public key from the known location as needed and obtain updated public keys as they are made available.
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3.6.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
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CSPs, IdPs (including subscriber-controlled wallets), and RPs SHALL store all signing keys, decryption keys, and symmetric keys in a secure fashion. Cryptographic key storage is subject to applicable [FIPS140] requirements, including applicable tamper resistance requirements. Some circumstances require the cryptographic keys to be stored in a non-exportable manner, such as reaching FAL3 with a subscriber-controlled wallet on a subscriber’s device (see Sec. 5.4.1). To be considered non-exportable, key storage SHALL either be a separate piece of hardware or an embedded processor or execution environment, such as a secure element, trusted execution environment (TEE), or trusted platform module (TPM). These hardware modules or embedded processors are separate from a host processor, such as the CPU on a laptop or mobile device. Non-exportable key storage SHALL be designed to prohibit the export of the secret keys to the host processor and SHALL NOT be capable of being reprogrammed by the host processor to allow the secret keys to be extracted.
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3.6.3 Software Attestations
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Software and device attestations can augment the establishment of identifiers and cryptographic keys, especially in dynamic and distributed systems. Attestations in this usage are cryptographically bound statements that a particular piece of software, device, or runtime system meets a set of agreed-upon parameters. The attestation is presented by the software in the context of establishing the identity of the software, device, or system with which the receiver is interacting. The attestation allows the receiver to verify the request with a higher degree of certainty than they would be able to otherwise. For example, a specific distribution of subscriber-controlled wallet software can be signed by its distributor to allow RPs to recognize individual instances of that software. Alternatively, an RP could be issued an attestation from a federation authority to allow IdPs to recognize the RP as part of the federation. When attestations are required by the trust agreement or requested as part of the federation protocol, received attestations SHALL be validated by the receiver. See [RFC7591] Sec. 2.3 for more information about software statements, which are a means for OAuth and OpenID Connect RPs to communicate a signed set of software attributes during dynamic client registration.
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1.1 Referenzi
1.2 Rekwiżiti identifikati
1.3 Regolamenti relatati
2. Rekwiżiti identifikati
3. Regolamenti relatati
Regolamenti
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Regolamentazzjoni |
- NIST -
EN: Publications of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, from their electronic versions (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 from its HTML version, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Works of NIST employees are not subject to copyright protection in the United States (17 U.S.C. § 105); the OSCAL content is dedicated to the public domain worldwide (CC0 1.0); outside the United States NIST grants the right to reprint its technical series publications in all formats (NIST copyright statement). Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; each document names its citation. Divided into sections and converted into the GRCA format, the wording unchanged. Only the versions published by NIST are authoritative.
DE: Veröffentlichungen des National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, aus ihren elektronischen Fassungen (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 aus ihrer HTML-Fassung, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Werke von NIST-Beschäftigten sind in den USA urheberrechtlich nicht geschützt (17 U.S.C. § 105); die OSCAL-Inhalte sind weltweit gemeinfrei gestellt (CC0 1.0); außerhalb der USA räumt das NIST das Recht ein, seine Technical-Series-Publikationen in allen Formaten neu zu veröffentlichen (Copyright-Hinweis des NIST). „Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology“; jedes Dokument nennt seine Zitierangabe. In Abschnitte aufgeteilt und in das GRCA-Format umgewandelt, der Wortlaut unverändert. Maßgeblich sind allein die vom NIST veröffentlichten Fassungen.
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