+Artikolu 4 Definizzjonijiet
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Artikolu 4 Definizzjonijiet
Artikolu 4
Għall-finijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament:
(1)
“data personali” tfisser kwalunkwe informazzjoni relatata ma' persuna fiżika identifikata jew identifikabbli (“suġġett tad-data”); persuna fiżika identifikabbli hija persuna li tista' tiġi identifikata, direttament jew indirettament, b'mod partikolari b'referenza għal mezz ta' identifikazzjoni bħal isem, numru ta' identifikazzjoni, data ta' lokalizzazzjoni, identifikatur online jew għal fattur wieħed jew aktar speċifiċi għall-identità fiżika, fiżjoloġika, ġenetika, mentali, ekonomika, kulturali jew soċjali ta' dik il-persuna fiżika;
(2)
“ipproċessar” tfisser kwalunkwe attività jew sett ta' attivitajiet li jitwettqu fuq data personali jew fuq settijiet ta' data personali, sew jekk b'mezzi awtomatizzati u sew jekk mingħajrhom, bħalma huma l-ġbir, ir-reġistrazzjoni, l-organizzazzjoni, l-istrutturar, il-ħażna, l-adattament jew il-bidliet, l-irkupru, il-konsultazzjoni, l-użu, l-iżvelar bi trażmissjoni, it-tixrid jew it-tqegħid għad-dispożizzjoni b'xi mezz ieħor, l-allinjament jew it-taħlita, ir-restrizzjoni, it-tħassir jew il-qerda;
(3)
“restrizzjoni tal-ipproċessar” tfisser l-immarkar ta' data personali maħżuna bil-għan li jiġi limitat l-ipproċessar tagħha fil-ġejjieni;
(4)
“tfassil tal-profil” tfisser kwalunkwe forma ta' pproċessar awtomatizzat ta' data personali li jikkonsisti fl-użu ta' data personali biex jiġu evalwati ċerti aspetti personali relatati ma' persuna fiżika, b'mod partikolari biex jiġu analizzati jew imbassra aspetti rigward il-prestazzjoni fuq ix-xogħol, is-sitwazzjoni ekonomika, is-saħħa, il-preferenzi personali, l-interessi, l-affidabbiltà, l-imġiba, il-lokalizzazzjoni jew il-movimenti ta' dik il-persuna fiżika;
(5)
“psewdonimizzazzjoni” tfisser l-ipproċessar ta' data personali b'tali mod li d-data personali ma tkunx tista' tibqa' tiġi attribwita għal suġġett tad-data speċifiku mingħajr l-użu ta' informazzjoni addizzjonali, dment li tali informazzjoni addizzjonali tinżamm separatament u tkun soġġetta għal miżuri tekniċi u organizzattivi biex jiġi żgurat li d-data personali ma tiġix attribwita għal persuna fiżika identifikata jew identifikabbli;
(6)
“sistema ta' arkivjar” tfisser kwalunkwe sett strutturat ta' data personali li tkun aċċessibbli skont kriterji speċifiċi, sew jekk ċentralizzat, deċentralizzat jew mifrux fuq bażi funzjonali jew ġeografika;
(7)
“kontrollur” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika, awtorità pubblika, aġenzija jew kwalunkwe korp ieħor li, waħdu jew flimkien ma' oħrajn, jiddetermina l-għanijiet u l-mezzi tal-ipproċessar ta' data personali; fejn l-għanijiet u l-mezzi tal-ipproċessar ikunu ddeterminati mil-liġi tal-Unjoni jew ta' Stat Membru, il-kontrollur jew il-kriterji speċifiċi għall-ħatra tiegħu jistgħu jiġu determinati mil-liġi tal-Unjoni jew ta' Stat Membru;
(8)
“proċessur” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika, awtorità pubblika, aġenzija jew korp ieħor li jipproċessa data personali f'isem il-kontrollur;
(9)
“riċevitur” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika, awtorità pubblika, aġenzija jew korp ieħor, li lilha tiġi żvelata d-data personali, irrispettivament milli huwiex parti terza jew le. Madankollu, l-awtoritajiet pubbliċi li jistgħu jirċievu data personali fil-qafas ta' inkjesta partikolari f'konformità mal-liġi tal-Unjoni jew ta' Stat Membru m'għandhomx jitqiesu bħala riċevituri; l-ipproċessar ta' dik id-data minn dawk l-awtoritajiet pubbliċi għandu jkun f'konformità mar-regoli ta' protezzjoni tad-data applikabbli skont il-finijiet tal-ipproċessar;
(10)
“parti terza” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika, awtorità pubblika, aġenzija jew korp għajr is-suġġett tad-data, il-kontrollur, il-proċessur u l-persuni li, taħt l-awtorità diretta tal-kontrollur jew tal-proċessur, ikunu awtorizzati li jipproċessaw id-data personali;
(11)
“kunsens” tas-suġġett tad-data tfisser kwalunkwe indikazzjoni tax-xewqat tas-suġġett tad-data mogħtija b'mod liberu, speċifika, infurmata u mhux ambigwa li permezz tagħha s-suġġett tad-data, permezz ta' dikjarazzjoni jew permezz ta' azzjoni affermattiva ċara, juri li jaqbel mal-ipproċessar ta' data personali relatata miegħu;
(12)
“ksur ta' data personali” tfisser ksur tas-sigurtà li jwassal għal qerda aċċidentali jew illegali, telf, bidliet, żvelar mhux awtorizzat ta', jew aċċess għal, data personali trażmessa, maħżuna jew ipproċessata b'xi mod ieħor;
(13)
“data ġenetika” tfisser id-data personali relatata mal-karatteristiċi ġenetiċi ta' persuna fiżika li jkunu ntirtu jew inkisbu li tagħti informazzjoni unika dwar il-fiżjoloġija jew is-saħħa ta' dik il-persuna fiżika, u li tirriżulta, b'mod partikolari, minn analiżi ta' kampjun bijoloġiku mill-persuna fiżika inkwistjoni;
(14)
“data bijometrika” tfisser data personali li tirriżulta mill-ipproċessar tekniku speċifiku relatat mal-karatteristiċi fiżiċi, fiżjoloġiċi jew tal-imġiba ta' persuna fiżika, li tippermetti jew tikkonferma l-identifikazzjoni unika ta' dik il-persuna fiżika, bħall-immaġnijiet tal-wiċċ jew id-data dattiloskopika;
(15)
“data dwar is-saħħa” tfisser data personali relatata mas-saħħa fiżika jew mentali ta' persuna fiżika, inkluża l-provvista ta' servizzi tal-kura tas-saħħa, li tiżvela informazzjoni rigward l-istat ta' saħħitha;
(16)
“stabbiliment ewlieni” tfisser:
(a)
fir-rigward ta' kontrollur bi stabbilimenti f'aktar minn Stat Membru wieħed, il-post tal-amministrazzjoni ċentrali tiegħu fl-Unjoni, għajr jekk id-deċiżjonijiet dwar l-għanijiet u l-mezzi tal-ipproċessar tad-data personali jittieħdu fi stabbiliment ieħor tal-kontrollur fl-Unjoni u dan l-istabbiliment tal-aħħar ikollu s-setgħa li jesiġi l-implimentazzjoni ta' tali deċiżjonijiet, u f'dan il-każ l-istabbiliment li jkun ħa tali deċiżjonijiet għandu jitqies bħala l-istabbiliment ewlieni;
(b)
fir-rigward ta' proċessur bi stabbilimenti f'aktar minn Stat Membru wieħed, il-post tal-amministrazzjoni ċentrali tiegħu fl-Unjoni, jew, jekk il-proċessur ma jkollu l-ebda amministrazzjoni ċentrali fl-Unjoni, l-istabbiliment tal-proċessur fl-Unjoni fejn isiru l-attivitajiet ta' pproċessar ewlenin fil-kuntest tal-attivitajiet ta' stabbiliment tal-proċessur sa fejn il-proċessur ikun soġġett għal obbligi speċifiċi taħt dan ir-Regolament;
(17)
“rappreżentant” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika stabbilita fl-Unjoni li, maħtura bil-miktub mill-kontrollur jew mill-proċessur skont l-Artikolu 27, tirrappreżenta l-kontrollur jew il-proċessur fir-rigward tal-obbligi rispettivi skont dan ir-Regolament;
(18)
“impriża” tfisser persuna fiżika jew ġuridika involuta f'attività ekonomika, irrispettivament mill-forma legali tagħha, inkluż sħubiji jew assoċjazzjonijiet regolarment involuti f'attività ekonomika;
(19)
“grupp ta' impriżi” tfisser impriża li tikkontrolla u l-impriżi kkontrollati minnha;
(20)
“regoli korporattivi vinkolanti” tfisser politiki ta' protezzjoni tad-data personali li jiġu sodisfatti minn kontrollur jew proċessur stabbilit fit-territorju ta' Stat Membru għal trasferimenti jew sett ta' trasferimenti ta' data personali lil kontrollur jew proċessur f'pajjiż terz wieħed jew aktar fi grupp ta' impriżi, jew grupp ta' intrapriżi involuti f'attività ekonomika konġunta;
(21)
“awtorità superviżorja” tfisser awtorità pubblika indipendenti li tiġi stabbilita minn Stat Membru skont l-Artikolu 51;
(22)
“awtorità superviżorja kkonċernata” tfisser awtorità superviżorja li tkun ikkonċernata bl-ipproċessar ta' data personali peress li:
(a)
il-kontrollur jew il-proċessur ikun stabbilit fit-territorju tal-Istat Membru ta' dik l-awtorità superviżorja;
(b)
is-suġġetti tad-data li jgħixu fl-Istat Membru ta' dik l-awtorità superviżorja jiġu affettwati sostanzjalment jew x'aktarx li jkunu ser jiġu affettwati sostanzjalment mill-ipproċessar; jew
(c)
ikun tressaq ilment quddiem dik l-awtorità superviżorja;
(23)
“ipproċessar transkonfinali” tfisser jew:
(a)
l-ipproċessar ta' data personali li jsir fil-kuntest tal-attivitajiet ta' stabbilimenti f'iktar minn Stat Membru wieħed ta' kontrollur jew proċessur fl-Unjoni fejn il-kontrollur jew il-proċessur ikun stabbilit f'iktar minn Stat Membru wieħed; jew
(b)
l-ipproċessar ta' data personali li jsir fil-kuntest tal-attivitajiet ta' stabbiliment uniku ta' kontrollur jew proċessur fl-Unjoni li madankollu jaffettwa sostanzjalment lil suġġetti tad-data f'aktar minn Stat Membru wieħed, jew li x'aktarx li ser jaffettwahom sostanzjalment.
(24)
“oġġezzjoni rilevanti u motivata” tfisser oġġezzjoni għal abbozz ta' deċiżjoni dwar jekk ikunx hemm ksur ta' dan ir-Regolament, jew jekk azzjoni maħsuba fir-rigward tal-kontrollur jew il-proċessur tkunx konformi ma' dan ir-Regolament, li turi b'mod ċar is-sinifikat tar-riskji maħluqa mill-abbozz ta' deċiżjoni rigward id-drittijiet u l-libertajiet fundamentali tas-suġġetti tad-data u fejn applikabbli, iċ-ċirkolazzjoni libera ta' data personali fi ħdan l-Unjoni;
(25)
“servizz tas-soċjetà tal-informazzjoni” tfisser servizz kif definit fil-punt (b) tal-Artikolu 1(1) tad-Direttiva (UE) 2015/1535 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (
1
);
(26)
“organizzazzjoni internazzjonali” tfisser organizzazzjoni u l-korpi subordinati tagħha rregolati mid-dritt internazzjonali pubbliku jew kwalunkwe korp ieħor li jiġi stabbilit bi ftehim bejn żewġ pajjiżi jew aktar, jew abbażi tiegħu.
1. Ħarsa ġenerali
| Titlu |
Regolamentazzjoni |
,
1.1 Referenzi
1.2 Rekwiżiti identifikati
1.3 Standards relatati
2. Rekwiżiti identifikati
3. Standards relatati
Standards
| Sors |
Rekwiżit |
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SCF
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Achieving Security, Compliance & Resilience Requirements
Description
Mechanisms exist to design Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) so that required capabilities continue to operate in a controlled and acceptable manner, when conditions are both routine and degraded.
Possible Solutions & Considerations
Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2
∙ Defined "secure engineering principles" (e.g., alignment with NIST 800-160)
Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4
∙ Defined "secure engineering principles" (e.g., alignment with NIST 800-160)
Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6
∙ Defined "secure engineering principles" (e.g., alignment with NIST 800-160)
Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8
∙ Defined "secure engineering principles" (e.g., alignment with NIST 800-160)
Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9
∙ Defined "secure engineering principles" (e.g., alignment with NIST 800-160)
SCR-CMM
Level 0 Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 Performed Informally
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with SEA domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Security engineering-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use an informal process to design, build and maintain secure, compliant and resilient solutions.
Level 2 Planned Tracked
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Secure engineering and architecture-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ Secure engineering and architecture management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel define entity-specific secure engineering practices to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Safety (CIAS) of the entity's TAASD.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel align secure engineering practices with the entity's broader IT architecture practices.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use secure engineering practices to influence Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC).
Level 3 Well Defined
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ A cybersecurity engineering / architecture team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain RSK domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of secure engineering management operations (e.g., project management solution).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce the secure engineering principles on all applicable Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS).
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations.
Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
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SCF
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Standardized Terminology
Description
Mechanisms exist to standardize technology and process terminology to reduce confusion amongst groups and departments.
Possible Solutions & Considerations
Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2
∙ Follow secure coding basics when developing software
Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4
∙ Secure coding guidelines for developers
∙ Basic security review before release
Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6
∙ Formal security engineering principles
∙ Secure design patterns
∙ Threat modeling
Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8
∙ Enterprise security engineering program
∙ Formal threat modeling
∙ Security architecture standards
Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9
∙ Enterprise security architecture framework (SABSA)
∙ Formal threat modeling program
∙ Security design patterns library
SCR-CMM
Level 0 Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control:
▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process.
▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 Planned Tracked
Secure Engineering & Architecture (SEA) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with SEA domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with SEA domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with SEA domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Secure engineering and architecture-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ Secure engineering and architecture management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel define entity-specific secure engineering practices to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Safety (CIAS) of the entity's TAASD.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel align secure engineering practices with the entity's broader IT architecture practices.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel use secure engineering practices to influence Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC).
Level 3 Well Defined
Cybersecurity & Data Protection Governance (GOV) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with GOV domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with GOV domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain GOV domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of governance, risk management and compliance operations (e.g., GRC platform).
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to standardize technology and process terminology to reduce confusion amongst groups and departments.
Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
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