+03.13.15E Separate Subnets to Isolate System Components and Functions

03.13.15E Separate Subnets to Isolate System Components and Functions

Statement

Implement {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.01 }} separate subnetworks to isolate the following critical system components and functions: {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.02 }}.

Guidance

Separating critical system components and functions from other noncritical system components and functions through separate subnetworks may be necessary to reduce susceptibility to a catastrophic or debilitating breach or compromise that results in system failure. For example, physically separating the command-and-control function from the in-flight entertainment function through separate subnetworks in a commercial aircraft provides an increased level of assurance in the trustworthiness of critical system functions. This requirement enhances SP 800-171 requirement 03.13.01.

Statement

  • (includes preempt) Ensure that the threat event does not have an impact.

    • Reduce likelihood of occurrence and/or reduce likelihood of impact.

    • The adversary’s efforts or resources cannot be applied or are wasted.

  • (includes exert) Make it more difficult for threat events to cause adverse impacts or consequences.

    • Reduce likelihood of impact and reduce level of impact.

    • Adversary activities are restricted in scope, fail to achieve full effect, do not take place in accordance with adversary timeline, or require greater resources than adversary had planned.

  • (includes reduce) Restrict the consequences of realized threat events by limiting the damage or effects they cause in terms of time, system resources, and/or mission or business impacts.

    • Reduce level of impact and reduce likelihood of impact of subsequent events in the same threat scenario.

    • The adversary’s effectiveness is restricted.

Assessment objective

subnetworks are separated {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.01 }} to isolate {{ insert: param, A.03.13.15E.ODP.02 }}.

Assessment method

  • System and communications protection policy procedures addressing boundary protection system design documentation system hardware and software system architecture system configuration settings and associated documentation criticality analysis system audit records system security plan other relevant documents or records

Assessment method

  • System/network administrators organizational personnel with information security responsibilities system developer organizational personnel with boundary protection responsibilities

Assessment method

  • Mechanisms separating critical system components and functions

1. Ħarsa ġenerali

Titlu Standard

1.1 Referenzi

1.2 Rekwiżiti identifikati

1.3 Regolamenti relatati

2. Rekwiżiti identifikati

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3. Regolamenti relatati

Regolamenti
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