Assessment Objectives
In addition to relevant policies, standards and procedures, the assessor shall examine, interview, and/or test to determine if appropriately scoped evidence exists to support the claim that:
- TDA-20.1_A01 information concerning impact, environment of operations, known or assumed threats and acceptable risk levels to be used as contextual information for threat modeling and vulnerability analyses is defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[01] - TDA-20.1_A02 the tools and methods to be employed for threat modeling and vulnerability analyses are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[02] - TDA-20.1_A03 the breadth and depth of threat modeling to be conducted is defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[03] - TDA-20.1_A04 the breadth and depth of vulnerability analyses to be conducted is defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[04] - TDA-20.1_A05 acceptance criteria to be met by produced evidence for threat modeling are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[05] - TDA-20.1_A06 acceptance criteria to be met by produced evidence for vulnerability analyses are defined.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)_ODP[06] - TDA-20.1_A07 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during development of the system, component, or service that uses organization-defined information.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(a)[01] - TDA-20.1_A08 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during development of the system, component, or service that uses organization-defined information.
Assessment rigor: 1
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(a)[02] - TDA-20.1_A09 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that uses organization-defined information.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(a)[03] - TDA-20.1_A10 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that uses organization-defined information.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(a)[04] - TDA-20.1_A11 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during development of the system, component, or service that employs organization-defined tools and methods.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(b)[01] - TDA-20.1_A12 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that employs organization-defined tools and methods.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(b)[02] - TDA-20.1_A13 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during development of the system, component, or service that employs organization-defined tools and methods.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(b)[03] - TDA-20.1_A14 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that employs organization-defined tools and methods.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(b)[04] - TDA-20.1_A15 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling per an organization-defined breadth and depth during development of the system, component or service.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(c)[01] - TDA-20.1_A16 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that conducts modeling and analyses per an organization-defined breadth and depth.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(c)[02] - TDA-20.1_A17 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during development of the system, component, or service that produces evidence that meets organization-defined acceptance criteria.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(d)[01] - TDA-20.1_A18 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform threat modeling during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that produces evidence that meets organization-defined acceptance criteria.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(d)[02] - TDA-20.1_A19 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during development of the system, component, or service that produces evidence that meets organization-defined acceptance criteria.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(d)[03] - TDA-20.1_A20 the developer of the system, system component, or system service is required to perform vulnerability analyses during the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that produces evidence that meets organization-defined acceptance criteria.
Assessment rigor: 3
Origin: 53A_R5_SA-11(02)(d)[04]
Gekoppelde issues
| Koppelingstype | Issue |
|---|---|
| blocks | Developer Threat Analysis & Flaw Remediation |
- Secure Controls Framework -
The Secure Controls Framework® (SCF)
"The SCF is the Common Controls Framework™ (CCF), the world's most comprehensive cybersecurity and data privacy metaframework - it is also free to use. The entire concept is building secure, compliant and resilient capabilities in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.
The SCF is more than just a unified control catalog, since its included content creates a playbook for Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) capabilities. Used globally by organizations of every size, the SCF is a robust and scalable solution for security, compliance and resilience controls. As a comprehensive security framework, the SCF maps 1,400+ controls across 200+ laws, regulations, and industry frameworks so you can implement once and comply everywhere.
Like it or not, cybersecurity is a protracted war on an asymmetric battlefield, where the threats are everywhere and as defenders we have to make the effort to work together to help improve cybersecurity and data privacy practices, since we all suffer when massive data breaches occur or when cyber attacks have physical impacts. Hackers share information on attack methods with other hackers, so why shouldn’t the good guys share information on how to best protect an organization? We decided to take action and make a difference, since we feel it is too important to wait for someone else to fix the problems that exist.
The SCF is made up of volunteers, mainly specialists within the cybersecurity profession, who focus on GRC and the cybersecurity side of data privacy. These are auditors, engineers, architects, incident responders, consultants and other specialists who live and breathe these topics on a daily basis. The end product is "expert-derived content" that makes up the SCF." https://securecontrolsframework.com/Terms & Conditions
The SCF End User License Agreement (EULA) governs the use of the Secure Controls Framework® (SCF) under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License.