+2 Digital Identity Model
---+2.1 Overview
---+2.2 Identity Proofing and Enrollment
------+2.2.1 Subscriber Accounts
---+2.3 Authentication and Authenticator Management
------+2.3.1 Authenticators
------+2.3.2 Authentication Process
---+2.4 Federation and Assertions
---+2.5 Examples of Digital Identity Models
------+2.5.1 Non-Federated Digital Identity Model
------+2.5.2 Federated Digital Identity Model With General-Purpose IdP
------+2.5.3 Federated Digital Identity Model with Subscriber-Controlled Wallet

2 Digital Identity Model

This section is informative.

1. Przegląd

Tytuł Norma
2.1 Overview

These guidelines use digital identity models that reflect technologies and architectures that are currently available in the market. These models have a variety of entities and functions and vary in complexity. Simple models group functions (e.g., creating subscriber accounts, providing attributes) under a single entity. More complex models separate these functions among multiple entities.

The roles and functions found in these digital identity models include:

Subject: In these guidelines, a subject is a person and is represented by one of three roles, depending on where they are in the digital identity process.

Applicant — A subject to be identity-proofed and enrolled.
Subscriber — A subject who has successfully completed the identity proofing and enrollment process or who has been successfully authenticated to an online service.
Claimant — A subject “making a claim” to be eligible for authentication.

Service provider: Service providers can perform any combination of functions involved in granting access to and delivering online services, such as a credential service provider, relying party, verifier, and identity provider.

Credential service provider (CSP): CSP functions include identity proofing applicants, enrolling them into their identity service, establishing subscriber accounts, and binding authenticators to those accounts. A subscriber account is the CSP’s established record of the subscriber, the subscriber’s attributes, and associated authenticators. CSP functions may be performed by an independent third party.

Relying party (RP): RPs provide online transactions and services and rely upon a verifier’s assertion of a subscriber’s identity to grant access to those services. When using federation, the RP accesses the information in the subscriber account through assertions from an identity provider (IdP).

Verifier: A verifier confirms the claimant’s identity by verifying the claimant’s possession and control of one or more authenticators using an authentication protocol. To do this, the verifier needs to confirm the binding of the authenticators with the subscriber account and check that the subscriber account is active.

Identity provider (IdP): When using federation, the IdP manages the subscriber’s primary authenticators and issues assertions derived from the subscriber account.

While presented as separate roles, the functions of the CSP, verifier, and IdP may be performed by a single entity or distributed across multiple entities, depending on the implementation (see Sec. 2.5).

2.2 Identity Proofing and Enrollment

[SP800-63A], Digital Identity Guidelines: Identity Proofing and Enrollment, provides general guidance information and normative requirements for the identity proofing and enrollment processes as well as IAL-specific requirements.

[SP800-63A] provides general information and normative requirements for the identity proofing and enrollment processes as well as requirements that are specific to IALs.

Figure 1 illustrates a common transaction sequence for the identity proofing and enrollment functions.

Identity proofing and enrollment begin when an applicant initiates identity proofing, often by attempting to access an online application served by the CSP. The CSP or its component service requests identity evidence and attributes from the applicant, which the applicant submits via an online or in-person transaction. The CSP resolves the user (i.e., uniquely distinguishes the user), validates the accuracy and authenticity of the evidence, and validates the accuracy of the attributes. If the applicant is successfully identity-proofed, they are enrolled in the identity service as a subscriber of that CSP. A unique subscriber account is then created, and one or more authenticators are registered to that account.

Subscribers have a responsibility to maintain control of their authenticators (e.g., guard against theft) and comply with CSP policies to remain in good standing with the CSP.

Fig. 1. Sample identity proofing and enrollment digital identity model

Sequence diagram of identity proofing and enrollment showing the parties involved and the major steps in the process.

2.3 Authentication and Authenticator Management

[SP800-63B], Authentication and Authenticator Management, provides normative descriptions of permitted authenticator types, their characteristics (e.g., phishing resistance), and authentication processes appropriate for each AAL.

2.4 Federation and Assertions

Normative requirements can be found in [SP800-63C], Federation and Assertions.

Section III of OMB [M-19-17], Enabling Mission Delivery through Improved Identity, Credential, and Access Management, directs agencies to support cross-government identity federation and interoperability. The term federation can be applied to several different approaches that involve the sharing of information between different trust domains, and may differ based on the kind of information that is being shared between the domains. These guidelines address the federation processes that allow for the conveyance of identity and authentication information based on trust agreements across a set of networked systems through federation assertions.

There are many benefits to using federated architectures including, but not limited to:

Enhancing user experience (e.g., a subject can be identity-proofed once but their subscriber account used at multiple RPs)
Reducing costs for both the subscriber (e.g., reduction in authenticators) and the organization (e.g., reduction in information technology infrastructure and a streamlined architecture)
Minimizing data exposed to RPs by using pseudonymous identifiers and derived attribute values instead of copying account values to each application
Supporting mission success, since organizations will need to focus fewer resources on complex identity management processes

While the federation process is generally the preferred approach to authentication when the RP and IdP are not administered together under a common security domain, federation can also be applied within a single security domain for a variety of benefits, including centralized account management and technical integration.

These guidelines are agnostic to the identity proofing, authentication, and federation architectures that an organization selects, and they allow organizations to deploy a digital identity scheme according to their own requirements. However, there are scenarios in which federation could be more efficient and effective than establishing identity services that are local to the organization or individual applications, such as:

Potential users already have an authenticator at or above the required AAL.
Multiple types of authenticators are required to cover all possible user communities.
An organization does not have the necessary infrastructure to support the management of subscriber accounts (e.g., account recovery, authenticator issuance, help desk).
There is a desire to allow primary authenticators to be added and upgraded over time without changing the RP’s implementation.
There are different environments to be supported, since federation protocols are network-based and allow for implementation on a wide variety of platforms and languages.
Potential users come from multiple communities, each with its own existing identity infrastructure.
The organization needs the ability to centrally manage account life cycles, including account revocation and the binding of new authenticators.
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An organization might want to consider accepting federated identity attributes if any of the following apply:

Pseudonymity is required, necessary, feasible, or important to stakeholders accessing the service.
Access to the service requires a defined list of attributes.
Access to the service requires at least one derived attribute value.
The organization is not the authoritative or issuing source for required attributes.
Attributes are required temporarily during use (e.g., to make an access decision), and the organization does not need to retain the data.
2.5 Examples of Digital Identity Models

The entities and interactions that comprise the non-federated digital identity model are illustrated in Fig. 3. The general-purpose federated digital identity model is illustrated in Fig. 4, and a federated digital identity model with a subscriber-controlled wallet is illustrated in Fig. 5.

In the two cases described in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the verifier does not always need to communicate in real time with the CSP to complete the authentication activity (e.g., digital certificates can be used). Therefore, the line between the verifier and the CSP represents a logical link between the two entities. In some implementations, the verifier, RP, and CSP functions are distributed. However, if these functions reside on the same platform, the interactions between the functions are signals between applications or application modules that run on the same system rather than using network protocols.

1.1 Odwołania

1.2 Zidentyfikowane wymagania

1.3 Powiązane regulacje

2. Zidentyfikowane wymagania

Wymagania
Źródło Wymaganie

3. Powiązane regulacje

Regulacje
Źródło Regulacja
  • NIST -

    EN: Publications of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, from their electronic versions (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 from its HTML version, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Works of NIST employees are not subject to copyright protection in the United States (17 U.S.C. § 105); the OSCAL content is dedicated to the public domain worldwide (CC0 1.0); outside the United States NIST grants the right to reprint its technical series publications in all formats (NIST copyright statement). Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; each document names its citation. Divided into sections and converted into the GRCA format, the wording unchanged. Only the versions published by NIST are authoritative.

    DE: Veröffentlichungen des National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Commerce, https://www.nist.gov/, aus ihren elektronischen Fassungen (OSCAL; SP 800-63-4 aus ihrer HTML-Fassung, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/). Werke von NIST-Beschäftigten sind in den USA urheberrechtlich nicht geschützt (17 U.S.C. § 105); die OSCAL-Inhalte sind weltweit gemeinfrei gestellt (CC0 1.0); außerhalb der USA räumt das NIST das Recht ein, seine Technical-Series-Publikationen in allen Formaten neu zu veröffentlichen (Copyright-Hinweis des NIST). „Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology“; jedes Dokument nennt seine Zitierangabe. In Abschnitte aufgeteilt und in das GRCA-Format umgewandelt, der Wortlaut unverändert. Maßgeblich sind allein die vom NIST veröffentlichten Fassungen.