The adversary is trying to steal data.

Exfiltration consists of techniques that adversaries may use to steal data from your network. Once they’ve collected data, adversaries often package it to avoid detection while removing it. This can include compression and encryption. Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission.

Subtichete

Legături
Titlu Descriere
Exfiltration Over Web Service

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Scheduled Transfer

Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.[1]

When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel or Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.

References

  1. JavaThinking. (n.d.). How to Delay Code Execution in Java: A Comprehensive Guide. Retrieved September 2, 2026.
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium

Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.

Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.

Automated Exfiltration

Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.[1]

When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.

References

  1. Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.[1]

References

  1. Karen Patel, CEO. (2025, October 26). INTRODUCTION TO C2 FRAMEWORKS: HOW ATTACKERS OPERATE. Retrieved September 2, 2026.
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP.[1] On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.[2]

Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.

References

  1. Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  2. Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
Data Transfer Size Limits

An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.[1]

References

  1. Requestly. (n.d.). Chunked Transfer Encoding Explained. Retrieved September 2, 2026.
Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.

A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.[1]

Adversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.[2]

Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.[3]

References

  1. Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
  2. Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.
  3. Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium

Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.[1],[2],[3]

References

  1. Crowdstrike. (2026, January 21). Small Devices, Big Risk: USB Drives Threaten Enterprise Security. Retrieved September 3, 2026.
  2. Trend Micro: Joey Chen. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s USBferry Targets Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved September 3, 2026.
  3. Zscaler: Seongsu Park. (2026, February 26). APT37 Adds New Capabilities for Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved September 3, 2026.
AI-Enabled Exfiltration

Adversaries may utilize Direct Prompt Injection, Indirect Prompt Injection or other methods to instruct enterprise AI agents to exfiltrate data.[1],[2] When enterprise systems incorporate the use of AI assistants or other AI agents, adversaries may abuse these systems to weaponize sanctioned tools available to the agent.[3]

As an AI agent processes queries or ingests data, an injected prompt can cause the agent to use its tool connections in unauthorized or unintended ways. When AI agents are induced to exfiltrate data, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration to Code Repository or Exfiltration Over Web Service.[4],[5]

References

  1. Md Habibur Rahman and Jaeho Kim. (2026, August 27). The Framing Gap: Indirect Prompt-Injection Exfiltration Defeats Surface-Level Defenses in Tool-Using Agents. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
  2. Anthropic Threat Intelligence Team. (2026, September 10). Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
  3. Thomas Brunner, Yu-Han Liu, and Moni Pande. (2026, April 23). AI threats in the wild: The current state of prompt injections on the web. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
  4. Google Cloud Security. (2026, September). AI risk and resilience | A Mandiant special report. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
  5. Guruprasad Kenja. (2026, October 6). Threat Spotlight: Email attacks target both humans and AI in the same message. Retrieved October 8, 2026.

Tichete legate

Legături
Tip de legătură Tichet
is related to Tactics
is part of Enterprise ATT&CK