+3.2 SBOM General Risks
|
3.2 SBOM General Risks
Complementary to the identification of threats, this section presents some general risks that jeopardise the SBOM accuracy, integrity and operationalisation. Table 6 lists indicative risk scenarios, their potential impact and suggested mitigation activities. | Risk | Risk Scenario | Potential impact | I | ndicative Mitigation |
Activities | Non-standardised SBOM Format | SBOMs generated using | Reduced interoperability between producers and consumers. | - Generate SBOMs using established standards, such as SPDX or CycloneDX
| Generate SBOMs | | a proprietary, custom, | | | using established | | unstructured, or | | | standards, such as | | otherwise non- | | | SPDX or CycloneDX |
interoperable format. | SBOM in a Non-Machine-Readable Format | SBOMs provided only in | Reduced automation | - SBOMs in a machine-readable format suitable for automated processing
| | a format intended | and scalability of SBOM | | | primarily for human | consumption and | | | consumption. | inability to automatically correlate components | |
with vulnerability databases. | Incomplete SBOM | Components or dependencies are not fully covered by the SBOM. | Vulnerabilities remain undiscovered and software inventory is incomplete. | |
at release - CI/CD integration
- Documented treatment
of known unknowns and missing metadata | Outdated SBOM | The SBOM no longer reflects the current version of the software. | Insufficient vulnerability | - Regenerate SBOMs based on the above identified triggers
|
management and inaccurate risk assessment. | Poor component identification | Components are not uniquely identified across ecosystems. | Inaccurate vulnerability correlation and matching. | Use standardised |
ecosystem-aware component identifiers. from upstream source repository, OR combined with namespace, exact version, and cryptographic hashes where applicable OR naming convention consistently with namespace, exact version and cryptographic hashes where applicable | Insufficient SBOM Accuracy | SBOM generation tools | Excessive vulnerability alerts and alert fatigue due to false-positive components, missed vulnerabilities due to omitted or incorrectly identified components and/ or incorrect vulnerability matching. | - Select appropriate SBOM generation techniques according to the software ecosystem, build process, artifact type, and intended SBOM use case,
- Validate generated SBOMs against S/W artifacts,
- Perform completeness and accuracy checks,
- Validate component identifiers
|
relying on heuristic analysis to identify components and dependencies, generate SBOMs that may contain components that are not actually present or used (false positives), omit components that are present (false negatives), or incorrectly report versions, dependency relationships, or identifiers. | Weak SBOM-to-Artifact Binding | SBOMs not strongly and | Incorrect SBOM may be used for vulnerability analysis increasing false positives or false negatives in vulnerability matching. | | | unambiguously | | the SBOM to the exact | | associated with the | | artifact using a | | exact software artifact, | | cryptographic hash or | | build, release, container | | immutable digest | | image, or package that it | | | | describes. | | artifact association |
| Limited SBOM operationalization | SBOMs are generated but not integrated into the SDLC. | Reduced value from SBOM adoption and ineffective vulnerability management. | |
asset management, vulnerability management, license compliance etc. | Insufficient SBOM Retention and Lifecycle Evidence | Failure to retain historical SBOMs and their associated evidence (e.g. previous SBOM versions, build identifiers, artifact digests, signatures, VEX documents) for an adequate period. | Inability to determine whether historical or deployed software versions contain a newly discovered vulnerable component. | |
retention policy release history artifact traceability disposal procedures | Lack of vulnerability prioritization | Every vulnerability identified through the SBOM is treated equally without considering exploitability. | Vulnerability overflooding and delayed remediation of highly targeted vulnerabilities. | |
with VEX to assess exploitability and reachability criticality and exposure vulnerability prioritization process Table 6 - SBOM General Risks
1. Pregled
1.1 Sklici
1.2 Ugotovljene zahteve
1.3 Povezani predpisi
2. Ugotovljene zahteve
3. Povezani predpisi
|