Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.

Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.

In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).

Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.^[1],[2],[3] There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.

This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.^{[4],[5],[6],[7]}

Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.

References

1. Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
2. Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
3. Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
4. Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
5. Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
6. HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
7. Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

Länkade ärenden

• MITREATTACK -

  EN: MITRE ATT&CK®, https://attack.mitre.org/. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. License: The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use ATT&CK® for research, development, and commercial purposes. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy. See the Terms of Use for the disclaimers. ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Converted into the GRCA format.

  DE: MITRE ATT&CK®, https://attack.mitre.org/. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE erlaubt die Nutzung für Forschung, Entwicklung und kommerzielle Zwecke, wenn jede Kopie den Urheberrechtsvermerk und die Lizenz enthält; maßgeblich ist der englische Wortlaut der Lizenz oben und die Terms of Use mit den Haftungsausschlüssen. ATT&CK® ist eine eingetragene Marke der MITRE Corporation. In das GRCA-Format umgewandelt.