+Anomalous Behavior
---+Unusual Transactions
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Anomalous Behavior
Description
Mechanisms exist to utilize User & Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) and/or User Activity Monitoring (UAM) solutions to detect and respond to anomalous behavior that could indicate account compromise or other malicious activities.
Possible Solutions & Considerations
Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2
∙ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
∙ Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
∙ Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4
∙ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
∙ Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
∙ Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
∙ Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6
∙ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
∙ Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
∙ Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
∙ Extended Detection and Response (XDR)
∙ Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8
∙ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
∙ Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
∙ Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
∙ Extended Detection and Response (XDR)
∙ Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9
∙ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
∙ Indicators of Exposure (IoE)
∙ Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)
∙ Extended Detection and Response (XDR)
∙ Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP)
SCR-CMM
Level 0 Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 Performed Informally
Continuous Monitoring (MON) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with MON domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Event monitoring-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
▪ Monitoring is primarily reactive in nature, focused on identifying incidents that occurred.
▪ Event log reviews primarily rely on manual processes to identify anomalous behaviors.
Level 2 Planned Tracked
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with MON domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Continuous monitoring-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ Continuous monitoring may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
Level 3 Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Cybersecurity personnel use a structured process via Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to review and analyze logs.
▪ A Security Operations Center (SOC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain MON domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of continuous monitoring operations (e.g., Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to utilize User & Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) and/or User Activity Monitoring (UAM) solutions to detect and respond to anomalous behavior that could indicate account compromise or other malicious activities.
Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
1. Yleiskatsaus
| Otsikko |
Standardi |
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Unusual Transactions
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Description
Mechanisms exist to define "normal business activities" to identify anomalous transaction activities that can reduce the opportunity for sending (outbound) and/or receiving (inbound) hostile and/or fraudulent actions.
Possible Solutions & Considerations
Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2
∙ Indicators of Fraud (IoF) (e.g., fraud "red flags")
Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4
∙ Indicators of Fraud (IoF) (e.g., fraud "red flags")
Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6
∙ Indicators of Fraud (IoF) (e.g., fraud "red flags")
Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8
∙ Indicators of Fraud (IoF) (e.g., fraud "red flags")
Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9
∙ Indicators of Fraud (IoF) (e.g., fraud "red flags")
SCR-CMM
Level 0 Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control:
▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process.
▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 Planned Tracked
Data Classification & Handling (DCH) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with DCH domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with DCH domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with DCH domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Data classification and handling-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ Data classification and handling management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
▪ A formalized data classification scheme exists to identify categories of data, based on protection requirements from applicable laws, regulations and/or contractual obligations.
Level 3 Well Defined
Continuous Monitoring (MON) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with MON domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Cybersecurity personnel use a structured process via Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) to review and analyze logs.
▪ A Security Operations Center (SOC) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain MON domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of continuous monitoring operations (e.g., Security Incident Event Manager (SIEM)).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with MON domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ Secure Baseline Configurations (SBC) enforce security event logging to contain sufficient information to establish necessary details of activity and allow for forensics analysis.
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to establish organization-defined "normal business activities" to identify anomalous transaction activities that can reduce the opportunity for sending (outbound) and/or receiving (inbound) fraudulent actions.
Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Level 5 Continuously Improving
Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
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1.1 Viittaukset
1.2 Tunnistetut vaatimukset
1.3 Liittyvät säädökset
2. Tunnistetut vaatimukset
Vaatimukset
| Lähde |
Vaatimus |
3. Liittyvät säädökset
Säädökset
| Lähde |
Sääntely |
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EULAW
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10 artikla 1
1. Finanssiyhteisöillä on oltava käytössään mekanismit, joiden avulla ne voivat nopeasti havaita poikkeavan toiminnan 17 artiklan mukaisesti, mukaan lukien TVT-verkon suorituskykyyn liittyvät ongelmat ja TVT:hen liittyvät poikkeamat, ja yksilöidä potentiaaliset olennaiset vikakohdat.
Kaikki ensimmäisessä alakohdassa tarkoitetut havaitsemismekanismit on testattava säännöllisesti 25 artiklan mukaisesti.
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EULAW
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22 artikla TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien hallinnan toimintaperiaatteet
22 artikla
TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien hallinnan toimintaperiaatteet
Finanssiyhteisöjen on osana mekanismeja, joilla havaitaan poikkeavaa toimintaa, mukaan lukien TVT-verkon suorituskykyyn liittyvät ongelmat ja TVT:hen liittyvät poikkeamat, laadittava, dokumentoitava ja otettava käyttöön TVT:hen liittyviä poikkeamia koskevat toimintaperiaatteet, joiden avulla niiden on
a)
dokumentoitava asetuksen (EU) 2022/2554 17 artiklassa tarkoitettu TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien hallintaprosessi;
b)
laadittava luettelo sisäisissä toiminnoissa ja ulkoisissa sidosryhmissä olevista yhteyspisteistä, jotka osallistuvat suoraan TVT-toimien turvallisuuteen, mukaan lukien
i)
kyberuhkien havaitsemiseen ja seurantaan;
ii)
poikkeavan toiminnan havaitsemiseen;
iii)
haavoittuvuuksien hallintaan;
c)
laadittava, toteutettava ja käytettävä teknisiä, organisatorisia ja operatiivisia mekanismeja, joilla tuetaan TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien hallintaprosessia, mukaan lukien mekanismit, joiden avulla voidaan nopeasti havaita poikkeava toiminta ja käyttäytyminen tämän asetuksen 23 artiklan mukaisesti;
▼C1
d)
säilytettävä komission delegoidun asetuksen (EU) 2024/1772 (
2
) 8 artiklan 2 kohdan ja unionin oikeuden nojalla mahdollisesti sovellettavien säilyttämisvaatimusten mukaisesti kaikki TVT:hen liittyviin poikkeamiin liittyvä näyttö tietyn ajan, joka ei saa olla pidempi kuin on tarpeen niihin tarkoituksiin, joita varten tiedot on kerätty, ja joka on oikeassa suhteessa asianomaisten liiketoimintojen, tukiprosessien sekä TVT- ja tieto-omaisuuden kriittisyyteen;
▼B
e)
laadittava ja otettava käyttöön mekanismit, joilla analysoidaan merkittäviä tai toistuvia TVT:hen liittyviä poikkeamia ja TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien lukumäärässä ja esiintymistiheydessä esiintyviä kaavoja.
Sovellettaessa d alakohtaa finanssiyhteisöjen on säilytettävä kyseisessä alakohdassa tarkoitettu näyttö tietoturvallisesti.
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EULAW
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23 artikla Poikkeavan toiminnan havaitseminen ja kriteerit TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien havaitsemiseen ja niihin reagointiin
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EULAW
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23 artikla Poikkeavan toiminnan havaitseminen ja kriteerit TVT:hen liittyvien poikkeamien havaitsemiseen ja niihin reagointiin
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EULAW
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34 artikla TVT-toimien turvallisuus
34 artikla
Asetuksen (EU) 2022/2554 16 artiklan 1 kohdassa tarkoitettujen finanssiyhteisöjen on osana järjestelmiään, protokolliaan ja välineitään sekä kaiken TVT-omaisuuden osalta
a)
seurattava ja hallittava kaiken TVT-omaisuuden elinkaarta;
b)
seurattava tarvittaessa, tukevatko finanssiyhteisöjen TVT-palveluntarjoajana olevat kolmannet osapuolet niiden TVT-omaisuutta;
c)
määritettävä TVT-omaisuutensa kapasiteettivaatimukset ja toimenpiteet, joilla ylläpidetään ja parannetaan TVT-järjestelmien saatavuutta ja tehokkuutta ja ennaltaehkäistään TVT-kapasiteettivajeita;
d)
suoritettava TVT-omaisuuden automatisoitu haavoittuvuuskartoitus ja automatisoidut arvioinnit, jotka ovat oikeassa suhteessa niiden 30 artiklan 1 kohdassa tarkoitettuun luokitteluun ja TVT-omaisuuden yleiseen riskiprofiiliin, ja paikattava havaitut haavoittuvuudet korjauspäivityksillä;
e)
hallittava vanhentuneeseen, tukemattomaan tai aiemman sukupolven TVT-omaisuuteen liittyviä riskejä;
f)
kirjattava lokiin tapahtumat, jotka liittyvät loogiseen ja fyysiseen pääsynvalvontaan, TVT-toimiin, mukaan lukien järjestelmä- ja verkkoliikennetoiminnot, ja TVT-muutosten hallintaan;
g)
määritettävä ja toteutettava toimenpiteitä, joilla seurataan ja analysoidaan tietoja poikkeavasta toiminnasta ja käyttäytymisestä kriittisissä tai tärkeissä TVT-toimissa;
h)
toteutettava toimenpiteitä kyberuhkia koskevien merkityksellisten ja ajantasaisten tietojen seuraamiseksi;
i)
toteutettava toimenpiteitä, joilla tunnistetaan mahdolliset tietovuodot, haitalliset koodit ja muut turvallisuusuhat sekä yleisesti tunnetut haavoittuvuudet ohjelmistoissa ja laitteistoissa, ja tarkistetaan, onko niihin liittyen saatavilla uusia turvallisuuspäivityksiä.
Sovellettaessa f alakohtaa finanssiyhteisöjen on sovitettava lokitietojen yksityiskohtaisuus niiden käyttötarkoitukseen ja kyseiset lokitiedot tuottavan TVT-omaisuuden käyttötarkoitukseen.
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EULAW
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10 artikla Havaitseminen
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Linkitetyt tehtävät
- Secure Controls Framework -
"The SCF is the Common Controls Framework™ (CCF), the world's most comprehensive cybersecurity and data privacy metaframework - it is also free to use. The entire concept is building secure, compliant and resilient capabilities in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.
The SCF is more than just a unified control catalog, since its included content creates a playbook for Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) capabilities. Used globally by organizations of every size, the SCF is a robust and scalable solution for security, compliance and resilience controls. As a comprehensive security framework, the SCF maps 1,400+ controls across 200+ laws, regulations, and industry frameworks so you can implement once and comply everywhere.
Like it or not, cybersecurity is a protracted war on an asymmetric battlefield, where the threats are everywhere and as defenders we have to make the effort to work together to help improve cybersecurity and data privacy practices, since we all suffer when massive data breaches occur or when cyber attacks have physical impacts. Hackers share information on attack methods with other hackers, so why shouldn’t the good guys share information on how to best protect an organization? We decided to take action and make a difference, since we feel it is too important to wait for someone else to fix the problems that exist.
The SCF is made up of volunteers, mainly specialists within the cybersecurity profession, who focus on GRC and the cybersecurity side of data privacy. These are auditors, engineers, architects, incident responders, consultants and other specialists who live and breathe these topics on a daily basis. The end product is "expert-derived content" that makes up the SCF." https://securecontrolsframework.com/
Terms & Conditions
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