+Contingency Plan Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned

Contingency Plan Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned

Description

Mechanisms exist to conduct a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and "lessons learned" activity every time the contingency plan is activated.

Possible Solutions & Considerations

Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2

∙ Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (After Action Review (AAR), lessons learned, etc.)

Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4

∙ Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (After Action Review (AAR), lessons learned, etc.)

Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6

∙ Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (After Action Review (AAR), lessons learned, etc.)

Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8

∙ Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (After Action Review (AAR), lessons learned, etc.)

Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9

∙ Root Cause Analysis (RCA) (After Action Review (AAR), lessons learned, etc.)

SCR-CMM

Level 0 Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 Performed Informally

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with BCD domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Contingency management-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
▪ Limited technologies exist to support near real-time network infrastructure failover (e.g., redundant ISPs and redundant power).

Level 2 Planned Tracked

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ BC/DR may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.

Level 3 Well Defined

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ A Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain BCD domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of BC/DR operations (e.g., BC/DR planning software, Disaster Recovery as a Service (DRaaS), Orchestration and Automation Tools).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to conduct a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and "lessons learned" activity every time the contingency plan is activated.

Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Level 5 Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

1. Apžvalga

Pavadinimas Standartas

1.1 Nuorodos

1.2 Nustatyti reikalavimai

1.3 Susiję teisės aktai

2. Nustatyti reikalavimai

Reikalavimai
Šaltinis Reikalavimas

3. Susiję teisės aktai

Teisės aktai
Šaltinis Reguliavimas
EULAW 12 straipsnis 1

1.   Siekdami užtikrinti, kad IRT sistemos ir duomenys būtų atstatyti kuo greičiau, kuo mažiau sutrikdant ir patiriant kuo mažiau nuostolių, finansų sektoriaus subjektai, įgyvendindami savo IRT rizikos valdymo sistemą, parengia ir dokumentais pagrindžia:

a)

atsarginių kopijų politiką ir procedūras, kuriose nurodoma duomenų, kurių atsarginės kopijos daromos, apimtis ir minimalus atsarginių kopijų darymo dažnumas, remiantis ypatinga informacijos svarba arba duomenų konfidencialumo lygiu;

b)

atstatymo ir atkūrimo procedūras ir metodus.

EULAW 12 straipsnis 2

2.   Finansų sektoriaus subjektai sukuria atsargines sistemas, kurios gali būti aktyvuotos pagal atsarginių kopijų politiką ir procedūras, taip pat atstatymo ir atkūrimo procedūras ir metodus. Atsarginių sistemų aktyvavimas turi nekelti pavojaus tinklų ir informacinių sistemų saugumui arba duomenų prieinamumui, autentiškumui, vientisumui ir konfidencialumui. Periodiškai atliekamas atsarginių kopijų procedūrų ir atstatymo bei atkūrimo procedūrų ir metodų testavimas.

EULAW 21 straipsnis Kibernetinio saugumo rizikos valdymo priemonės
-
EULAW 25 straipsnis IRT veiklos tęstinumo planų testavimas
-
EULAW 26 straipsnis IRT reagavimo ir veiklos atkūrimo planai
-
EULAW 39 straipsnis IRT veiklos tęstinumo plano komponentai
-
EULAW 40 straipsnis Veiklos tęstinumo planų testavimas
-
EULAW 13 straipsnis Mokymasis ir tobulėjimas
-
EULAW 13 straipsnis 2

2.   Finansų sektoriaus subjektai taiko peržiūras po su IRT susijusių incidentų, kurie vykdomi po to, kai sutrikdoma jų pagrindinė veikla dėl didelio su IRT susijusio incidento, ir kurių metu analizuojamos sutrikdymo priežastys ir nustatomi reikiami IRT operacijų ar 11 straipsnyje nurodytos IRT veiklos tęstinumo politikos patobulinimai.

Finansų sektoriaus subjektai, išskyrus labai mažas įmones, kompetentingų institucijų prašymu praneša joms apie pakeitimus, kurie buvo įgyvendinti atlikus peržiūras po su IRT susijusių incidentų, kaip nurodyta pirmoje pastraipoje.

Atliekant pirmoje pastraipoje nurodytas peržiūras po su IRT susijusių incidentų nustatoma, ar buvo laikomasi nustatytų procedūrų ir ar veiksmai, kurių imtasi, buvo veiksmingi, kiek tai susiję, be kita ko, su:

a)

tuo, kaip greitai sureaguota į saugumo įspėjimus ir nustatytas su IRT susijusių incidentų poveikis ir jų rimtumas;

b)

analitinės ekspertizės, kai ji buvo laikoma tikslinga, atlikimo kokybe ir greičiu;

c)

incidento sprendimo finansų sektoriaus subjekto viduje veiksmingumu;

d)

vidaus ir išorės komunikacijos veiksmingumu.

EULAW 13 straipsnis 3

3.   Į IRT rizikos vertinimo procesą nuolat tinkamai įtraukiama patirtis, įgyta vykdant skaitmeninės veiklos atsparumo testavimą pagal 26 ir 27 straipsnius ir reaguojant į realius su IRT susijusius incidentus, visų pirma kibernetinius išpuolius, taip pat į iššūkius, kilusius pradedant įgyvendinti IRT veiklos tęstinumo planus ir IRT reagavimo ir veiklos atkūrimo planus, ir atitinkama informacija, kuria keistasi su partneriais ir kuri įvertinta priežiūrinio tikrinimo metu. Tų nustatytų pastebėjimų pagrindu tinkamai peržiūrimi atitinkami 6 straipsnio 1 dalyje nurodytos IRT rizikos valdymo sistemos komponentai.

Susietos užduotys

Saitai
Saito tipas Užduotis
is related to Quarterly
is related to relative Control Weighting = 10
is related to Technology
is related to Protect
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 1 STRATEGIC
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 2 OPERATIONAL
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 3 TACTICAL
blocks Unauthorized Retention / Inability to Dispose of Data
blocks Business / Service Interruption
blocks Reduced Operational Productivity
blocks System / Data Compromise (Technical Vector)
blocks System / Data Compromise (Non-Technical Vector)
blocks Revenue Loss
blocks Contractual Default / Termination
blocks Loss of Competitive Advantage
blocks Reputational Harm / Loss of Stakeholder Trust
blocks Regulatory / Legal / Contractual Financial Liability
blocks Failure to Support Business / Mission Objectives
blocks OS Credential Dumping
blocks NTDS
blocks Data from Local System
blocks Data from Removable Media
blocks Indicator Removal
blocks Clear Mailbox Data
blocks Automated Collection
blocks Data Destruction
blocks Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion
blocks Data Encrypted for Impact
blocks Inhibit System Recovery
blocks Defacement
blocks Internal Defacement
blocks External Defacement
blocks Disk Wipe
blocks Disk Content Wipe
blocks Disk Structure Wipe
blocks Data Manipulation
blocks Stored Data Manipulation
blocks Runtime Data Manipulation
is related to Annual
is related to relative Control Weighting = 09
is related to Process
is related to Detect
blocks Failure to Achieve Strategic / Mission Objectives
blocks Uncontrolled Internal Security / Privacy Exposure
blocks Lack of oversight of internal controls
blocks Inability to Demonstrate Due Diligence / Due Care
blocks Unreliable Assurance / Decision Information
blocks Loss of Investigative / Evidentiary Capability
blocks Delayed Containment / Increased Incident Impact
blocks Incident Persistence / Recurrence
blocks Incident Response / Recovery Cost
blocks Recovery Failure / Unacceptable Recovery Delay
blocks Loss of Critical Knowledge / Capability
blocks Drought & Water Shortage
blocks Earthquakes
blocks Fire & Wildfires
blocks Floods
blocks Hurricanes & Tropical Storms
blocks Landslides & Debris Flow
blocks Pandemic (Disease) Outbreaks
blocks Severe Weather
blocks Space Weather
blocks Thunderstorms & Lightning
blocks Tornadoes
blocks Tsunamis
blocks Volcanoes
blocks Winter Storms & Extreme Cold
blocks Civil or Political Unrest
blocks Hazardous Materials Emergencies
blocks Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons
blocks Physical Crime
blocks Terrorism & Armed Attacks
blocks Utility Service Disruption
blocks Dysfunctional Management Practices
blocks Human Error
blocks Technical / Mechanical Failure
blocks Statutory / Regulatory / Contractual Change
blocks Data Quality Degradation / Data Poisoning
blocks Conflict of Interest (COI) / Undue Influence / Insider Misconduct
blocks Economic Shock / Market Disruption
blocks Hazardous / Degraded Operational Environment
blocks Workforce Shortage / Loss of Critical Skills / Labor Disruption
blocks Infrastructure Failure / Degradation
blocks BCM-01.02B
blocks BCM-03.01B
blocks BCM-04.02B
is blocked by BCD-11 Contingency Plan Root Cause Analysis (RCA) & Lessons Learned – Assessment Procedure
blocks CP-04 Contingency Plan Testing
blocks CP-04 [L] Contingency Plan Testing
blocks CP-04 [M] Contingency Plan Testing
blocks CP-04 [H] Contingency Plan Testing
blocks ID.IM-02 Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties
blocks ID.IM-03 Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities
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