Article 19d 2.

preserve incentives for the power-generating facility to operate and participate efficiently in the electricity markets, in particular to reflect market circumstances;

prevent any distortive effect of the support scheme on the operation, dispatch and maintenance decisions of the power-generating facility or on bidding behaviour in day-ahead, intraday, ancillary services and balancing markets;

ensure that the level of the minimum remuneration protection and of the upward limit to excess remuneration are aligned with the cost of the new investment and the market revenues, to guarantee the long-term economic viability of the power-generating facility while avoiding overcompensation;

avoid undue distortions to competition and trade in the internal market, in particular by determining remuneration amounts through an open, clear, transparent and non-discriminatory competitive bidding process; where no such competitive bidding process can be conducted, two-way contracts for difference or equivalent schemes with the same effects, and the applicable strike prices, shall be designed to ensure that the distribution of revenues to undertakings does not create undue distortions to competition and trade in the internal market;

avoid distortions to competition and trade in the internal market resulting from the distribution of revenues to undertakings;

include penalty clauses applicable in the case of undue unilateral early termination of the contract.