+Business Continuity Management System (BCMS)
---+Defined Operational Resilience Requirements

Business Continuity Management System (BCMS)

Description

Mechanisms exist to operate a Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) to achieve resilient Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) during:
(1) Routine operations; and
(2) Adverse conditions.

Possible Solutions & Considerations

Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2

∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
∙ Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Criticality assessments

Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4

∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
∙ Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Criticality assessments

Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6

∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
∙ Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Criticality assessments

Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8

∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
∙ Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Criticality assessments

Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9

∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
∙ Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Criticality assessments

SCR-CMM

Level 0 Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 Performed Informally

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with BCD domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Contingency management-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
▪ Limited technologies exist to support near real-time network infrastructure failover (e.g., redundant ISPs and redundant power).
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel develop limited Disaster Recovery Plans (DRP) to recover business-critical Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) and services.

Level 2 Planned Tracked

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ BC/DR may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
▪ Business stakeholders and process owners identify business-critical TAASD and External Service Providers (ESPs).
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to identify single points of failure from a TAASD perspective.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to develop BC/DR plans to recover business-critical TAASD.
▪ Data/process owners conduct a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) at least annually, or after any major technology or process change, to identify TAASD that are critical to the business, as well as single points of failure.
▪ Business stakeholders and process owners designate alternative decision-makers if primary decision-makers are unavailable.

Level 3 Well Defined

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ A Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain BCD domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of BC/DR operations (e.g., BC/DR planning software, Disaster Recovery as a Service (DRaaS), Orchestration and Automation Tools).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).
▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to facilitate the implementation of contingency planning controls to help ensure resilient Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) (e.g., Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) or BC/DR playbooks).

Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.
Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational.
▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).
▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs).
▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties.
▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review).
▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes.
▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.

Level 5 Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

1. Oversigt

Defined Operational Resilience Requirements

Description

Mechanisms exist to define operational resilience requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD) to operate in a controlled and acceptable manner during:
(1) Routine operations; and
(2) Adverse conditions.

Possible Solutions & Considerations

Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2

∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Documented RTO/RPO for critical systems

Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4

∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Documented RTO/RPO/MTD for critical systems
∙ Business Continuity Plan (BCP)

Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6

∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ Documented resilience requirements per system in the CMDB

Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8

∙ Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
∙ Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
∙ BC/DR platform (e.g., Fusion Risk Management, Castellan)
∙ Resilience requirements traced to architecture and backup design

Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9

∙ Enterprise operational resilience program (e.g., aligned with ISO 22301 and DORA)
∙ BC/DR platform (e.g., Fusion Risk Management, ServiceNow BCM)
∙ Resilience requirements traced to architecture, backup and failover design
∙ Annual requirements recertification

SCR-CMM

Level 0 Not Performed

Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.

Level 1 Performed Informally

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) domain capabilities are ad hoc and inconsistent. Capability criteria associated with this control may include:
▪ Policies, standards & procedures associated with BCD domain capabilities provide limited coverage due to the depth and breadth of the existing documentation.
▪ Contingency management-related activities are decentralized (e.g., a localized/regionalized function) and uses non-standardized methods to implement secure, resilient and compliant practices.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel develop limited Disaster Recovery Plans (DRP) to recover business-critical Technology Assets, Applications and/or Services (TAAS) and services.
▪ Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) and/or Recovery Point Objectives (RPOs) are not formally planned for or resourced to meet.

Level 2 Planned Tracked

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners.
▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD).
▪ Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines).
▪ BC/DR may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.

Level 3 Well Defined

Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BCD) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist:
▪ Policies and standards associated with BCD domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function.
▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with BCD domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners.
▪ A Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain BCD domain capabilities.
▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of BC/DR operations (e.g., BC/DR planning software, Disaster Recovery as a Service (DRaaS), Orchestration and Automation Tools).
▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with BCD domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls).

Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 4 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a quantitatively-controlled process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ While it may be possible to develop “metrics-driven” capabilities for this control, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

Level 5 Continuously Improving

Utilize SCR-CMM Level 3 or Level 4 (if available) criteria definitions:
▪ There are no defined Level 5 criteria, since it is reasonable to assume a continuously-improving process is not necessary to operationalize this control.
▪ Level 5 capabilities should be considered “world-class” where the control builds on Level 4 capabilities, but are continuously improving through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
▪ While it may be possible to develop responsive capabilities for this control through the use of AI and/or ML technologies, the criteria would be organization-specific to define.

1.1 Referencer

1.2 Identificerede krav

1.3 Relaterede reguleringer

2. Identificerede krav

Krav

3. Relaterede reguleringer

Reguleringer
EULAW Artikel 8 4

4.   De finansielle enheder identificerer alle informationsaktiver og IKT-aktiver, herunder på eksterne steder, netværksressourcer og hardwareudstyr, og kortlægger dem, der anses for kritiske. De kortlægger informationsaktivernes og IKT-aktivernes konfiguration samt forbindelserne og den indbyrdes forbundethed mellem de forskellige informationsaktiver og IKT-aktiver.
EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 24 Komponenter i politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 28 Forvaltning og organisation
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EULAW Artikel 28 Forvaltning og organisation
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EULAW Artikel 39 Komponenter i planen for IKT-driftsstabilitet
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EULAW Artikel 11 Indsats og genopretning
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EULAW Artikel 12 Politikker og procedurer for sikkerhedskopiering og procedurer og metoder for gendannelse og genopretning
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EULAW Artikel 32 Behandlingssikkerhed
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EULAW Artikel 21 Foranstaltninger til styring af cybersikkerhedsrisici
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EULAW Artikel 11 1

1.   Som led i den ramme for IKT-risikostyring, der er omhandlet i artikel 6, stk. 1, og baseret på de krav til identifikation, der er fastsat i artikel 8, indfører de finansielle enheder en omfattende politik for IKT-driftsstabilitet, som kan vedtages som en særlig specifik politik, der skal udgøre en integreret del af den finansielle enheds samlede politik for driftsstabilitet.
EULAW Artikel 11 2

2.   De finansielle enheder gennemfører politikken for IKT-driftsstabilitet ved hjælp af særlige, passende og veldokumenterede ordninger, planer, procedurer og mekanismer, der tager sigte mod:

a)

at sikre, at den finansielle enheds kritiske eller vigtige funktioner er stabile

b)

hurtigt, passende og effektivt at sætte ind over for og løse alle IKT-relaterede hændelser på en måde, der begrænser skaden og prioriterer genoptagelsen af aktiviteter og genopretningstiltag

c)

omgående at aktivere særlige planer, der gør det muligt at anvende inddæmningsforanstaltninger, -processer og -teknologier, der er egnede til de enkelte typer IKT-relaterede hændelser, og som forhindrer yderligere skade, samt skræddersyede indsats- og genopretningsprocedurer, der er fastlagt i henhold til artikel 12

d)

at anslå foreløbige virkninger, skader og tab

e)

at indføre kommunikations- og krisestyringstiltag, der sikrer, at ajourførte oplysninger videresendes til al relevant internt personale og eksterne interessenter i overensstemmelse med artikel 14, og at de indberettes til de kompetente myndigheder i overensstemmelse med artikel 19.
EULAW Artikel 11 3

3.   Som led i den ramme for IKT-risikostyring, der er omhandlet i artikel 6, stk. 1, gennemfører de finansielle enheder dertil knyttede planer for IKT-indsats og -genopretning, som for finansielle enheder, der ikke er mikrovirksomheder, underkastes uafhængige interne revisionsgennemgange.
EULAW Artikel 11 4

4.   De finansielle enheder indfører, vedligeholder og foretager regelmæssig testning af passende planer for IKT-driftsstabilitet, navnlig med hensyn til kritiske eller vigtige funktioner, som outsources eller udliciteres gennem ordninger, der er indgået med tredjepartsudbydere af IKT-tjenester.
EULAW Artikel 11 5

5.   Som led i den samlede politik for driftsstabilitet foretager de finansielle enheder en forretningskonsekvensanalyse (BIA) af deres eksponering for alvorlige driftsforstyrrelser. De finansielle enheder vurderer i forbindelse med BIA'en de potentielle virkninger af alvorlige driftsforstyrrelser ved hjælp af kvantitative og kvalitative kriterier ved anvendelse af interne og eksterne data og scenarieanalyser, alt efter hvad der er relevant. BIA'en skal tage hensyn til den kritiske betydning af identificerede og kortlagte forretningsfunktioner, støtteprocesser, tredjepartsafhængighed og informationsaktiver samt deres indbyrdes afhængighed. De finansielle enheder sikrer, at IKT-aktiver og -tjenester udformes og anvendes i fuld overensstemmelse med BIA'en, navnlig med hensyn til tilstrækkeligt at sikre alle kritiske komponenters redundans.
EULAW Artikel 11 6

6.   Som led i den omfattende IKT-risikostyring skal de finansielle enheder

a)

teste deres planer for IKT-driftsstabilitet og planer for IKT-indsats og -genopretning i forbindelse med IKT-systemer, der understøtter alle funktioner, mindst én gang om året og i tilfælde af væsentlige ændringer af IKT-systemer, der understøtter kritiske eller vigtige funktioner

b)

teste de krisekommunikationsplaner, der er udarbejdet i henhold til artikel 14.

Med henblik på første afsnit, litra a), medtager finansielle enheder, som ikke er mikrovirksomheder, cyberangrebsscenarier og omstillingsscenarier mellem den primære IKT-infrastruktur og redundante kapacitet, sikkerhedskopier og de redundante faciliteter, der er nødvendige for at opfylde de i artikel 12 fastsatte forpligtelser, i testplanerne.

De finansielle enheder gennemgår regelmæssigt deres politik for IKT-driftsstabilitet og planer for IKT-indsats og -genopretning under hensyntagen til resultaterne af de test, der er gennemført i overensstemmelse med første afsnit, og henstillinger, der bygger på revisionskontrol eller tilsynsmæssige gennemgange.
EULAW Artikel 11 7

7.   Finansielle enheder, som ikke er mikrovirksomheder, skal have en krisestyringsfunktion, som, hvis deres planer for IKT-driftsstabilitet og planer for IKT-indsats og -genopretning aktiveres, bl.a. skal indeholde klare procedurer for forvaltning af intern og ekstern krisekommunikation i overensstemmelse med artikel 14.
EULAW Artikel 11 8

8.   De finansielle enheder fører let tilgængelige registre over aktiviteter før og under driftsforstyrrelser, når deres planer for IKT-driftsstabilitet og planer for IKT-indsats og -genopretning aktiveres.
EULAW Artikel 11 9

9.   Værdipapircentraler forelægger kopier af resultaterne af test af IKT-driftsstabiliteten eller lignende aktiviteter for de kompetente myndigheder.
EULAW Artikel 11 10

10.   Finansielle enheder, som ikke er mikrovirksomheder, indberetter et overslag over de samlede årlige omkostninger og tab, der opstår som følge af større IKT-relaterede hændelser, til de kompetente myndigheder på deres anmodning.
EULAW Artikel 11 11

11.   I overensstemmelse med artikel 16 i forordning (EU) nr. 1093/2010, (EU) nr. 1094/2010 og (EU) nr. 1095/2010, udarbejder ESA'erne via Det Fælles Udvalg senest den 17. juli 2024 fælles retningslinjer for overslaget over de samlede årlige omkostninger og tab, der er omhandlet i stk. 10.
EULAW Artikel 12 1

1.   Med henblik på at sikre gendannelse af IKT-systemer og data med minimal nedetid, begrænsede forstyrrelser og tab udvikler og dokumenterer de finansielle enheder som led i deres ramme for IKT-risikostyring følgende:

a)

politikker og procedurer for sikkerhedskopiering, der præciserer omfanget af de data, der er genstand for sikkerhedskopiering, og minimumshyppigheden af sikkerhedskopiering baseret på oplysningernes kritiske betydning eller fortrolighedsniveauet for dataene

b)

procedurer og metoder for gendannelse og genopretning.

Linkede sager

Sagslinks
is related to Annual
is related to relative Control Weighting = 09
is related to Process
is related to Recover
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 3 TACTICAL
blocks Loss, Theft or Damage of Assets
blocks Unauthorized Modification / Loss of System Integrity
blocks Unauthorized Retention / Inability to Dispose of Data
blocks Business / Service Interruption
blocks Data Loss / Integrity Compromise
blocks Reduced Operational Productivity
blocks System / Data Compromise (Technical Vector)
blocks System / Data Compromise (Non-Technical Vector)
blocks Revenue Loss
blocks Contractual Default / Termination
blocks Loss of Competitive Advantage
blocks Reputational Harm / Loss of Stakeholder Trust
blocks Regulatory / Legal / Contractual Financial Liability
blocks Failure to Support Business / Mission Objectives
blocks Unaddressed Security / Compliance Exposure
blocks Unperformed / Unowned Control Responsibilities
blocks Uncontrolled Internal Security / Privacy Exposure
blocks Uncontrolled Third-Party Security / Privacy Exposure
blocks Loss of Investigative / Evidentiary Capability
blocks Delayed Containment / Increased Incident Impact
blocks Incident Persistence / Recurrence
blocks Incident Response / Recovery Cost
is related to relative Control Weighting = 10
is related to Govern
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 1 STRATEGIC
is related to SCRM Focus Tier 2 OPERATIONAL
blocks Data Destruction
blocks Data Encrypted for Impact
blocks Inhibit System Recovery
blocks Defacement
blocks Internal Defacement
blocks External Defacement
blocks Disk Wipe
blocks Disk Content Wipe
blocks Disk Structure Wipe
blocks Failure to Achieve Strategic / Mission Objectives
blocks Inability to Demonstrate Due Diligence / Due Care
blocks Unreliable Assurance / Decision Information
blocks Recovery Failure / Unacceptable Recovery Delay
blocks Concentration / Single-Point Dependency Failure
blocks Third-Party Dependency Failure
blocks Loss of Data / Service Availability
blocks Loss of Critical Knowledge / Capability
blocks Drought & Water Shortage
blocks Earthquakes
blocks Fire & Wildfires
blocks Floods
blocks Hurricanes & Tropical Storms
blocks Landslides & Debris Flow
blocks Pandemic (Disease) Outbreaks
blocks Severe Weather
blocks Space Weather
blocks Thunderstorms & Lightning
blocks Tornadoes
blocks Tsunamis
blocks Volcanoes
blocks Winter Storms & Extreme Cold
blocks Civil or Political Unrest
blocks Malicious Cyber Activity
blocks Hazardous Materials Emergencies
blocks Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons
blocks Physical Crime
blocks Terrorism & Armed Attacks
blocks Utility Service Disruption
blocks Dysfunctional Management Practices
blocks Human Error
blocks Technical / Mechanical Failure
blocks Statutory / Regulatory / Contractual Change
blocks Economic Shock / Market Disruption
blocks Supplier Financial Distress / Insolvency
blocks Workforce Shortage / Loss of Critical Skills / Labor Disruption
blocks Infrastructure Failure / Degradation
blocks PS-01.04B
blocks PS-02.02B
blocks OPS-21.01B
blocks SSO-06.02B
blocks BCM-01.01B
blocks BCM-01.02B
blocks BCM-03.01B
is blocked by BCD-02 Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) – Assessment Procedure
blocks CP-01 Policy and Procedures
blocks CP-02 Contingency Plan
blocks CP-10 System Recovery and Reconstitution
blocks IR-04(03) Continuity of Operations
blocks PM-08 Critical Infrastructure Plan
blocks CP-01 [L] Policy and Procedures
blocks CP-02 [L] Contingency Plan
blocks CP-10 [L] System Recovery and Reconstitution
blocks CP-01 [M] Policy and Procedures
blocks CP-02 [M] Contingency Plan
blocks CP-10 [M] System Recovery and Reconstitution
blocks CP-01 [H] Policy and Procedures
blocks CP-02 [H] Contingency Plan
blocks CP-10 [H] System Recovery and Reconstitution
blocks PM-08 [P] Critical Infrastructure Plan
blocks GV.SC-08 Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities
blocks ID.IM-04 Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved
blocks PR.IR-02 The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats
blocks PR.IR-03 Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
blocks RS.MA-05 The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied
blocks RC RECOVER
blocks RC.RP Incident Recovery Plan Execution
blocks RC.RP-02 Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed
blocks RC.RP-04 Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms
  • Secure Controls Framework -

    The Secure Controls Framework® (SCF)

    "The SCF is the Common Controls Framework™ (CCF), the world's most comprehensive cybersecurity and data privacy metaframework - it is also free to use. The entire concept is building secure, compliant and resilient capabilities in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.

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