+Time To Remediate / Benchmarks For Corrective Action
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Time To Remediate / Benchmarks For Corrective Action
Description
Mechanisms exist to track the effectiveness of remediation operations through metrics reporting.
Possible Solutions & Considerations
Micro-Small Business (<10 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 1-2
∙ Define and track time-to-remediate goals by severity
Small Business (10-49 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 3-4
∙ Vulnerability remediation SLAs by severity level
Medium Business (50-249 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 5-6
∙ Formal remediation SLA policy with benchmark tracking
Large Business (250-999 staff) / BLS Firm Size Classes 7-8
∙ Enterprise remediation SLA management and benchmarking program
Enterprise (> 1,000 staff) / BLS Firm Size Class 9
∙ Enterprise vulnerability management platform with SLA tracking and reporting (e.g., Tenable.io, Qualys)
SCR-CMM
Level 0 Not Performed
Practices are non-existent, based on the inability to demonstrate an implemented and operational capability. A reasonable person would conclude the control is not being performed.
Level 1 Performed Informally
SCR-CMM Level 1 criteria definitions are not available for this control: ▪ A reasonable person would conclude this control requires a structured process. ▪ At this level of maturity, the "ad hoc" nature of performing a capability informally would indicate the intent of the control is not met due to a lack of consistency and formality.
Level 2 Planned Tracked
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities are requirements-driven, but are not standardized across the entity (e.g., local/regional level consistency). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with VPM domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with VPM domain capabilities are documented and maintained by process owners. ▪ IT and/or cybersecurity personnel work with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with VPM domain capabilities to address applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). ▪ Vulnerability management-related controls are primarily administrative and preventative in nature (e.g., policies, standards and procedures & guidelines). ▪ Vulnerability management may be a defined function (e.g., team or department) or assigned as an additional duty to existing IT and/or cybersecurity personnel.
Level 3 Well Defined
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities are standardized across the entity for applicability to People, Processes, Technologies, Data and/or Facilities (PPTDF) to ensure consistency for Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD). Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Policies and standards associated with VPM domain capabilities are formally documented and centrally-managed by the entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function. ▪ Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP) associated with VPM domain capabilities are well-documented and kept current by process owners. ▪ A vulnerability management team, or similar function, is appropriately staffed and supported to implement and maintain VPM domain capabilities. ▪ Technology is leveraged to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of vulnerability management operations (e.g., patch management solution and vulnerability scanning solution). ▪ The entity's Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) team, or similar function, works with business stakeholders and process owners to appropriately scope and reasonably implement cybersecurity and data protection controls associated with VPM domain capabilities to address Minimum Compliance Requirements (MCR) (e.g., applicable statutory, regulatory and/or contractual requirements) and Discretionary Security Requirements (DSR) (e.g., entity-required controls). ▪ An implemented and operational capability exists to track the effectiveness of remediation operations through metrics reporting.
Level 4 Quantitatively Controlled
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). ▪ Metrics reporting includes quantitative analysis of Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). ▪ Scope of metrics, KPIs and KRIs covers organization-wide cybersecurity and data protection controls, including functions performed by third-parties. ▪ Organizational leadership maintains a formal process to objectively review and respond to metrics, KPIs and KRIs (e.g., monthly or quarterly review). ▪ Based on metrics analysis, process improvement recommendations are submitted for review and are handled in accordance with change control processes. ▪ Business and technical stakeholders are involved in reviewing and approving proposed changes to evolve capabilities.
Level 5 Continuously Improving
Vulnerability & Patch Management (VPM) capabilities, in addition to being standardized across the entity and centrally managed to ensure consistency across Technology Assets, Applications, Services and/or Data (TAASD), efforts are metrics driven to provide sufficient insight for decision makers to predict optimal performance, ensure continued operations and/or identify areas for improvement. Capability criteria associated with this control reasonably expect the following criteria to exist: ▪ Applicable SCR-CMM Level 3 (Well Defined) capabilities are implemented and operational. ▪ Based on predictive analysis, process improvements are implemented according to “continuous improvement” practices that affect process changes. ▪ Stakeholders make time-sensitive decisions to support operational efficiency, which may include automated remediation actions via Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Machine Learning (ML) technologies.
1. Oversigt
1.1 Referencer
1.2 Identificerede krav
1.3 Relaterede reguleringer
2. Identificerede krav
3. Relaterede reguleringer
Reguleringer
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Regulering |
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 1
1. Finansielle enheder, der hverken er enheder som omhandlet i artikel 16, stk. 1, første afsnit, eller mikrovirksomheder, og som er identificeret i overensstemmelse med nærværende artikels stk. 8, tredje afsnit, foretager mindst hvert tredje år avancerede test ved hjælp af TLPT. På grundlag af den finansielle enheds risikoprofil og under hensyntagen til de operationelle omstændigheder kan den kompetente myndighed om nødvendigt anmode den finansielle enhed om at reducere eller øge denne hyppighed.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 2
2. Hver trusselsbaseret penetrationstest skal omfatte flere eller samtlige kritiske eller vigtige funktioner hos en finansiel enhed og foretages på live-produktionssystemer, der understøtter sådanne funktioner.
De finansielle enheder identificerer alle relevante underliggende IKT-systemer, -processer og -teknologier, der understøtter kritiske eller vigtige funktioner og alle relevante IKT-tjenester, herunder dem, der understøtter kritiske eller vigtige funktioner og tjenester, der er blevet outsourcet eller udliciteret til tredjepartsudbydere af IKT-tjenester.
De finansielle enheder vurderer, hvilke kritiske eller vigtige funktioner, der skal være omfattet af TLPT. Resultatet af denne vurdering bestemmer det nøjagtige omfang af TLPT og valideres af de kompetente myndigheder.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 3
3. Hvis tredjepartsudbydere af IKT-tjenester medtages i TLPT's anvendelsesområde, træffer den finansielle enhed de nødvendige foranstaltninger og sikkerhedsforanstaltninger for at sikre deltagelse af sådanne tredjepartsudbydere af IKT-tjenester i TLPT, og den har til enhver tid det fulde ansvar for at sikre overholdelse af denne forordning.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 4
4. Uden at det berører stk. 2, første og andet afsnit, kan den finansielle enhed og tredjepartsudbyderen af IKT-tjenester, hvis deltagelse af en tredjepartsudbyder af IKT-tjenester i TLPT som omhandlet i stk. 3 med rimelighed kan forventes at have en negativ indvirkning på kvaliteten eller sikkerheden af de tjenester, som tredjepartsudbyderen af IKT-tjenester leverer til kunder, der er enheder, som ikke henhører under denne forordnings anvendelsesområde, eller på fortroligheden af data forbundet med sådanne tjenester, skriftligt aftale, at tredjepartsudbyderen af IKT-tjenester direkte indgår kontraktlige ordninger med en ekstern tester med henblik på under ledelse af en udpeget finansiel enhed at foretage en samlet TLPT, der omfatter flere finansielle enheder (samlet test), som tredjepartsudbyderen af IKT-tjenester leverer IKT-tjenester til.
Denne samlede test skal omfatte en relevant vifte af IKT-tjenester, der understøtter kritiske eller vigtige funktioner, som de finansielle enheder har udliciteret til den pågældende tredjepartsudbyder af IKT-tjenester. Den samlede test betragtes som en TLPT, som gennemføres af de finansielle enheder, der deltager i den samlede test.
Antallet af finansielle enheder, der deltager i den samlede test, afpasses behørigt under hensyntagen til kompleksiteten og typen af de involverede tjenester.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 5
5. De finansielle enheder anvender i samarbejde med tredjepartsudbydere af IKT-tjenester og andre involverede parter, herunder testere, men med undtagelse af de kompetente myndigheder, effektive risikostyringskontroller for at mindske risici for potentielle virkninger på data, skade på aktiver og forstyrrelser af kritiske eller vigtige funktioner, tjenester eller operationer i den finansielle enhed selv, hos dens modparter eller i den finansielle sektor.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 6
6. Efter afslutning af testen, og efter at der er opnået enighed om rapporter og udbedringsplaner, forelægger den finansielle enhed og, hvor det er relevant, de eksterne testere den myndighed, der er udpeget i overensstemmelse med stk. 9 eller 10, en sammenfatning af de relevante resultater, udbedringsplanerne og den dokumentation, som viser, at TLPT er blevet gennemført i overensstemmelse med kravene.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 7
7. Myndighederne forelægger de finansielle enheder en erklæring, der bekræfter, at testen er blevet gennemført i overensstemmelse med de krav, der fremgår af dokumentationen, for at give mulighed for gensidig anerkendelse af trusselsbaserede penetrationstest mellem de kompetente myndigheder. Den finansielle enhed underretter den relevante kompetente myndighed om erklæringen, sammenfatningen af de relevante resultater og udbedringsplanerne.
Med forbehold af denne erklæring har de finansielle enheder til enhver tid fortsat det fulde ansvar for virkningen af de i stk. 4 omhandlede test.
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EULAW
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Artikel 26 8
8. De finansielle enheder indgår en kontrakt med testere med henblik på at gennemføre TLPT i overensstemmelse med artikel 27. Hvis de finansielle enheder anvender interne testere med henblik på at gennemføre TLPT, skal de indgå kontrakt med eksterne testere ved hver tredje test.
Kreditinstitutter, som er klassificeret som signifikante i overensstemmelse med artikel 6, stk. 4, i forordning (EU) nr. 1024/2013, må kun anvende eksterne testere i overensstemmelse med artikel 27, stk. 1, litra a)-e).
De kompetente myndigheder identificerer finansielle enheder, som pålægges at gennemføre TLPT under hensyntagen til kriterierne i artikel 4, stk. 2, på grundlag af en vurdering af følgende:
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a)
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virkningsrelaterede faktorer, navnlig i hvilket omfang de tjenester, der leveres, og de aktiviteter, der udføres af den finansielle enhed, indvirker på den finansielle sektor
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b)
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eventuelle betænkeligheder vedrørende finansiel stabilitet, herunder den finansielle enheds systemiske karakter på EU-plan eller nationalt plan, alt efter hvad der er relevant
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c)
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den finansielle enheds specifikke IKT-risikoprofil, grad af IKT-modenhed eller de teknologiske kendetegn, der er involveret.
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EULAW
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Artikel 10 Sårbarheds- og korrektionsstyring
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Linkede sager
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