4. Suunised,

I jaotis. Tasustamispoliitika

1. Kõigi töötajate tasustamise poliitika

2. Tasustamise juhtimine

2.1 Tasustamispoliitika vastutusalad, selle kavandamine, heakskiitmine ja järelevalve

44.Olenevalt finantsinstitutsiooni juriidilisest vormist ja kohaldatavast siseriiklikust õigusest võib suunata finantsinstitutsiooni tasustamispoliitika heakskiitmise ning asjakohasel juhul juhtorgani liikmete ja muude kindlaksmääratud töötajate tasustamisega seotud otsused kooskõlas siseriikliku äriühinguõigusega¹⁴ aktsionäride koosolekule. Aktsionäride hääl võib olla nõustav või siduv.

45.Kui juhtorgani üksikliikmete ja muude kindlaksmääratud töötajate tasu kinnitamine on aktsionäride ülesanne, peaksid aktsionärid kiitma heaks kõik tasu komponendid, sh lahkumishüvitised. Kui tasustamispoliitika heakskiitmine sõltub aktsionäride heakskiidust, peaksid aktsionärid samuti kas kiitma eelnevalt heaks maksete maksimumsummad, mida võib anda juhtorganile ja teistele kindlaksmääratud töötajatele töölepingu ennetähtaegsel lõpetamisel, või selliste summade määramise kriteeriumid.

46.Et aktsionärid saaksid teha teadlikke otsuseid kooskõlas punktidega 44 ja 45, peaks järelevalvefunktsioon tagama, et finantsinstitutsioon annab neile tasustamispoliitika kohta piisavalt teavet, mille eesmärk on aidata neil hinnata stiimulite struktuuri, riskivõtmise ja - kontrollimise ulatust ning tasustruktuuri üldist maksumust. See teave tuleks esitada piisavalt vara enne asjaomast aktsionäride koosolekut. Esitada tuleks tasustamispoliitika ja selle muudatuste, tasupaketi määramise menetluste ja otsustusprotsesside üksikasjalik teave, sh järgmine:

• a. tasu komponendid;
• b. tasupakettide peamised omadused ja eesmärgid ning nende kooskõla ettevõtlus- ja riskistrateegiaga, sh finantsinstitutsiooni riskivalmiduse ning ettevõtteväärtustega;
• c. kuidas tagatakse tasustamispoliitika sooneutraalsus;
• d. kuidas arvestatakse punktis b märgitut eel- ja järelkorrigeerimisel, eelkõige kindlaksmääratud töötajate korral.

47.Järelevalvefunktsioon vastutab nii aktsionäride koosolekule esitatud ettepanekute kui ka tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade mis tahes muudatuste tegeliku rakendamise ja järelevalve eest.

48.Kui aktsionäridelt taotletakse heakskiitu suuremale maksimaalsele tasu moodustava muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide suhtarvule kui 200%, tuleks kohaldada järgmist.

• a. Aktsionärid, kellel on õigus hääletada kavandatava tasu moodustava muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide suhtarvu maksimumtaseme suurendamise üle, on selle finantsinstitutsiooni aktsionärid, kus tegutsevad kindlaksmääratud töötajad, keda mõjutavad suuremad muutuvtasu maksimumtasemed. Finantsinstitutsioonist tütarettevõtjate korral on pädev otsustama tütarettevõtja üldkoosolek, mitte konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni üldkoosolek.
• b. Kui finantsinstitutsioon kasutab seoses tütarettevõtja piires tasu moodustava muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide suhtarvu maksimumtaseme suurendamisega oma hääleõigust tütarettevõtja aktsionärina, peaks olema täidetud üks järgmistest tingimustest:
• i. aktsiaid omava finantsinstitutsiooni järelevalvefunktsioon on korraldanud eelnevalt oma aktsionäride koosolekul hääletuse, kuidas kasutada seoses kõnealuse taseme suurendamisega hääleõigust oma tütarettevõtjates;
• ii. konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni aktsionäride koosolek on otsustanud konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitika osana, et tütarettevõtjad võivad kehtestada kõnealuse suhtarvu suurema maksimumtaseme.
• c. Kooskõlas direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunktiga ii peab aktsionäride koosolek tasu põhi- ja muutuvtasu komponentide suurema maksimaalse suhtarvu heakskiitmisel toimima üksikasjaliku soovituse alusel, milles selgitatakse eelkõige taotletava heakskiidu põhjusi, kaasatud töötajate arvu ja nende ülesandeid finantsinstitutsioonis ning kõnealuse suurema maksimaalse suhtarvu eeldatavat mõju nõudele säilitada tugev kapitalibaas. See teave tuleks esitada aktsionäridele piisavalt vara enne aktsionäride koosolekut.
• d. Iga selle suhtarvu maksimumtaseme suurendamise heakskiitmine peab toimuma kooskõlas direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunkti ii sätetega; selles artiklis nimetatud kvoorumi 50% künnis ning hääletuse korral nõutavad 66% ja 75% enamuse künnised tuleks kõik arvutada nii, et arvestatakse hääleõigusi, mis on seotud aktsiatega või finantsinstitutsiooni muude omandiõigustega.
• e. 75% künnis, mida kohaldatakse, kui aktsionäride koosolekul on esindatud alla 50% omandiõigustest, ning 66% künnis, mida kohaldatakse, kui esindatud on vähemalt 50% omandiõigustest, tuleks arvutada esindatud aktsionäride hääleõiguste, mitte aktsionäridest füüsiliste või juriidiliste isikute arvu suhtes.
• f. Kooskõlas kapitalinõuete direktiivi artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunkti 2 viimase taandega ei lubata töötajatel, keda otseselt mõjutavad muutuvtasu kõrgemad maksimumtasemed, kasutada otseselt või kaudselt mis tahes hääleõigusi, mis neil võivad olla. Sellest tulenevalt ei arvestata nende hääleõigusi protsendimäärade arvutamisel ei nimetajas ega lugejas.
• g. Aktsiaid peetakse esindatuks, kui aktsionäril on juriidiliselt võimalik kavandatava suhtarvu maksimumtaseme üle hääletada olenemata hääletamise viisist. Kooskõlas selle põhimõttega ning arvestades siseriiklikku äriühinguõigust, peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid kehtestama selliseks hääletamiseks oma esindatuse sisepoliitika.

49.Aktsionärid peaksid saama hääletada minevikus heaks kiidetud suurema maksimaalse suhtarvu vähendamise üle. Selliseks hääletamiseks on vaja aktsionäride häälteenamust kooskõlas siseriiklikus õiguses tavapäraste otsuste jaoks ettenähtud kohaldatavate eeskirjadega. Kui heakskiidetud suuremat maksimaalset suhtarvu vähendatakse, peaks finantsinstitutsioon edastama viie tööpäeva jooksul pädevale asutusele otsuse ja heakskiidetud suhtarvu.

¹⁴ Vt ka aktsionäride õiguste direktiiv 2007/36 (mida on muudetud direktiiviga 2017/828) artiklid 9a ja 9b.

50.Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunkti ii neljanda taande alusel pädevale asutusele aktsionäride koosolekule adresseeritud soovitusest teatades peaks finantsinstitutsioon andma pädevale asutusele kogu aktsionäridele esitatud teabe, sh kavandatava suurema maksimaalse suhtarvu ja selle põhjused, viie tööpäeva jooksul alates sellest, kui aktsionäridele teatati suurema suhtarvu heakskiidu taotlemisest.

51.Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunkti ii viienda taande alusel pädevale asutusele oma aktsionäride tehtud otsusest teatades esitab finantsinstitutsioon järgmise teabe:

• a. otsustamise tulemus ning heaks kiidetud suurem maksimaalne suhtarv, sh juhul, kui suhtarvud olenevad ärivaldkonnast või -funktsioonist, iga ärivaldkonna või funktsiooni suhtarvud kaardistatuna ärivaldkondade ja funktsioonide alusel, nagu on sätestatud EBA suunistes kõrgelt tasustatud isikuid käsitlevate andmete kogumise kohta ja EBA suunistes tasustamistavade võrdlemise kohta, mis mõlemad avaldati 16. juulil 2014¹⁵ ;
• b. kindlaksmääratud töötajate arv, keda mõjutavad suuremad maksimaalsed suhtarvud, ning kui suhtarvud olenevad ärivaldkonnast ja -funktsioonist, siis suhtarvu vastav suurus iga ärivaldkonna ja -funktsiooni kohta;
• c. analüüs, et kavandatav suurem suhtarv ei ole vastuolus finantsinstitutsiooni kohustustega, mis tulenevad direktiivist 2013/36/EL ja määrusest (EL) nr 575/2013, eelkõige arvestades finantsinstitutsiooni omavahenditega seotud kohustusi;
• d. 2. lisas olev teave, kasutades etteantud vormi;
• e. muu teave, mida võib pädev asutus nõuda.

¹⁵ Mõlema suunisega saab tutvuda järgmise lingi kaudu: http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/remuneration

52.Kooskõlas kapitalinõuete direktiivi artikliga 109 ja artikli 95 lõikega 1 peavad finantsinstitutsioonid, mis on üksikettevõtja, emaettevõtja ja konsolideerimisgrupi tasandit arvestades olulised, moodustama töötasukomitee. Tütarettevõtjad (nt investeerimisühingud, alternatiivse investeerimisfondi valitsejad või eurofondide valitsejad), kelle tegevust reguleeritakse konkreetsete valdkondlike õigusaktide abil, peaksid lähtuma nende suhtes kohaldatavatest konkreetsete valdkondlike õigusaktide eeskirjadest, et määrata, kas nad peavad moodustama töötasukomitee. Konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon peaks tagama töötasukomitee moodustamise, kui seda juriidiliselt nõutakse. 53.Kui töötasukomitee moodustatakse mitteolulises finantsinstitutsioonis, peaks finantsinstitutsioon täitma siin suunistes esitatud töötasukomiteed käsitlevaid sätteid, kuid võib ühendada töötasukomitee ülesandeid teiste ülesannetega, kui see ei tekita huvide konflikte.

54.Kui töötasukomiteed ei moodustata, tuleks siin suunistes esitatud töötasukomitee käsitlevaid sätteid mõista nõuetena, mis kehtivad järelevalvefunktsioonile.

55.Töötasukomitee peaks koosnema järelevalvefunktsiooni¹⁶ liikmetest, kes ei täida otsuste täitmise funktsiooni. Globaalsete süsteemselt oluliste ettevõtjate ja muude süsteemselt oluliste ettevõtjate korral peaks töötasukomiteesse kuuluvate liikmete enamus olema sõltumatu ja eesistujaks tuleks määrata sõltumatu liige. Muude pädevate asutuste või siseriikliku õiguse alusel oluliseks peetavate finantsinstitutsioonide töötasukomiteesse peaks kuuluma piisav arv sõltumatuid liikmeid.¹⁷ Kui siseriiklikus õiguses on sätestatud töötajate esindatus juhtorganis, peab komiteesse kuuluma üks või mitu töötajate esindajat.

56.Töötasukomitee liikmetel peaksid kollektiivselt olema asjakohased teadmised, asjatundlikkus ja töökogemus tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade, riskijuhtimise ja kontrollitegevuse valdkonnas, eelkõige seoses tasustamisstruktuuri finantsinstitutsiooni riski- ja kapitaliprofiiliga ühitamise mehhanismiga.

¹⁶ Euroopa riikides esineb mitmesuguseid juhtorganite struktuure. Mõnes riigis on tavaline üheosaline struktuur, st juhtorgani järelevalve- ja juhtimisfunktsiooni täidab sama organ. Teistes riikides on tavaline kaheosaline struktuur, millel on kaks sõltumatut organit, millest üks täidab juhtimisfunktsiooni ja teine teeb juhtimisfunktsiooni järelevalvet. Neil juhtudel peaks tasukomitee koosnema järelevalveorgani liikmetest.

¹⁷ Sõltumatus, nagu on sätestatud EBA sisemise juhtimissüsteemi suunistes, vt ka EBA ja ESMA ühissuunised juhtorgani liikmete ja võtmeisikute sobivuse hindamise kohta.

57.Töötasukomitee peaks

• a. vastutama järelevalvefunktsiooni tehtavate tasustamisotsuste koostamise eest eelkõige seoses juhtimisfunktsiooni täitvate juhtorgani liikmete ning teiste kindlaksmääratud töötajate tasustamisega;
• b. pakkuma tuge ja nõu järelevalvefunktsioonile finantsinstitutsiooni tasustamispoliitika kujundamisel, sh seoses sellega, et tasustamispoliitika oleks sooneutraalne ja toetaks eri soost töötajate võrdset kohtlemist;
• c. toetama järelevalvefunktsiooni tasustamispoliitika, -tavade ja -protsesside järelevalves ning tasustamispoliitika järgimisel;
• d. kontrollima, kas kehtiv tasustamispoliitika on endiselt ajakohane, ja tegema vajaduse korral muudatusettepanekuid;
• e. vaatama läbi väliste töötasukonsultantide määramise, keda järelevalvefunktsioon võib otsustada kasutada nõu või toetuse saamiseks;
• f. tagama aktsionäridele tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade kohta antava teabe piisavuse, eriti seoses põhi- ja muutuvtasu suhtarvu maksimaalse taseme suurendamise kavaga;
• g. hindama mehhanisme ja süsteeme, mis on võetud vastu eesmärgiga tagada, et tasustamissüsteem arvestaks nõuetekohaselt kõiki riskiliike, likviidsus- ja kapitalitasemeid ning üldine tasustamispoliitika oleks kooskõlas usaldusväärse ja tõhusa riskijuhtimisega ning toetaks seda ning oleks kooskõlas finantsinstitutsiooni äristrateegia, eesmärkide, ettevõttekultuuri ja -väärtuste, riskikultuuri ja pikaajaliste huvidega;
• h. hindama tulemuseesmärkide saavutamist ja hilisema riskiga korrigeerimise vajadust, sh muutuvtasu hilisema tagasinõudmise kohaldamist;
• i. vaatama läbi mitu võimalikku stsenaariumi testimaks, kuidas reageerivad tasustamispoliitika ja -tavad välis- ja sisesündmustele, ning järeltestima tasu andmise kriteeriume ja hilisemat riskiga korrigeerimist tegelike riskiväljundite alusel.

58.Kui finantsinstitutsioon on moodustanud töötasukomitee, peaks see tegema otseselt järelevalvet sõltumatutes kontrollifunktsioonides, sh riskijuhtimise ja vastavuskontrolli funktsioonis, kõrgema astme töötajate tasustamise üle. Töötasukomitee peaks andma järelevalvefunktsioonile soovitusi kontrollifunktsioone täitvate kõrgema astme töötajate tasustamispakettide kavandamise ja makstavate tasu summade kohta.

59.Töötasukomitee peaks

• a. omama juurdepääsu kõigile andmetele ja kogu teabele, mis on seotud järelevalvefunktsiooni otsustusprotsessiga tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade kavandamisel ning rakendamisel, järelevalvel ja läbivaatamisel;
• b. omama piisavalt rahalisi vahendeid ja takistamatut juurdepääsu sõltumatutelt kontrollifunktsioonidelt, sh riskijuhtimise funktsioonilt saadud teabele ja andmetele;
• c. tagama sõltumatute kontrollifunktsioonide ja muude vastavate oskusvaldkondade asjakohaste funktsioonide (nt personaliosakonna, õigusosakonna ja strateegilise planeerimise) piisava kaasamise ja küsima vajaduse korral nõu väljastpoolt.

60.Töötasukomitee peaks tegema koostööd teiste järelevalvefunktsiooni komiteedega, kelle tegevusel võib olla mõju tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade kavandamisele ja nõuetekohasele toimimisele (nt riski-, auditi- ja nomineerimiskomiteega), ning andma järelevalvefunktsioonile ja asjakohasel juhul aktsionäride koosolekule piisavalt teavet oma tegevusest. 61.Kui riskikomitee on moodustatud, peaks ta, ilma et see piiraks töötasukomitee ülesandeid, uurima, kas tasustamispoliitika ja -tavadega pakutavate stiimulid arvestavad finantsinstitutsiooni riski, kapitali, likviidsust ning tulude tõenäosust ja ajastust.

62.Mõlema komitee olemasolu korral peaks üks riskikomitee liige osalema asjakohasel juhul töötasukomitee koosolekutel ja vastupidi.

63.Järelevalvefunktsioon või (kui moodustatud) töötasukomitee peaks tagama, et finantsinstitutsiooni tasustamispoliitikat ja -tavasid vaadatakse organisatsioonisiseselt läbi tsentraalselt ja sõltumatult vähemalt kord aastas. Läbivaatus peaks hõlmama analüüsi, kas tasustamispoliitika on sooneutraalne.

64.Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid jälgima soolise palgalõhe arengut riigiti eraldi järgmistel juhtudel:

• a. kindlaksmääratud töötajad, v.a juhtorgani liikmed,
• b. juhtimisfunktsiooni juhtorgani liikmed,
• c. järelevalvefunktsiooni juhtorgani liikmed ja
• d. muud töötajad.

65.Kui mees- ja naistöötajate või juhtorgani mees- ja naisliikmete keskmine palk on oluliselt erinev, peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid dokumenteerima peamised põhjused ning võtma asjakohasel juhul asjakohaseid meetmeid või suutma tõendada, et erinevus ei tulene tasustamispoliitikast, mis ei ole sooneutraalne.

66.Reguleerivatele dokumentidele, konsolideerimisgrupi poliitikale, menetlustele ja sisekorrale vastavuse peaks keskselt läbi vaatama konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni siseauditi funktsioon.

67.Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid keskse ja sõltumatu läbivaatuse tegema üksikettevõtja tasandil. Konsolideerimisgrupis võivad tütarettevõtjatest mitteolulised finantsinstitutsioonid tugineda konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni tehtavale läbivaatusele, kui konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud alusel tehtav läbivaatus hõlmab finantsinstitutsiooni ja selle tulemused tehakse tema järelevalvefunktsioonile kättesaadavaks.

68.Olenemata juhtorgani vastutusest võivad finantsinstitutsioonid tasustamispoliitika perioodilise sõltumatu läbivaatamise ülesanded anda osaliselt või täielikult edasi, kui tegu ei ole olulise finantsinstitutsiooniga¹⁸ . Finantsinstitutsiooni võivad nimetatud ülesannete täitmisel täiendada ja toetada kvalifitseeritud ja sõltumatud väliskonsultandid¹⁹ . Läbivaatuse eest vastutab järelevalvefunktsioon. 69.Keskse ja sõltumatu sisekontrolli osana peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid hindama, kas üldine tasustamispoliitika, üldised tasustamistavad ja -protsessid

• a. toimivad ettenähtud viisil (eelkõige, et järgitakse heakskiidetud poliitikat, menetlusi ja sisekorda; et tasu väljamaksed on asjakohased ja kooskõlas äristrateegiaga; ning piisavalt arvestatakse finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili, pikaajalisi eesmärke ja muid eesmärke);
• b. vastavad siseriiklikele ja rahvusvahelistele eeskirjadele, põhimõtetele ja normidele ning
• c. on kogu konsolideerimisgrupis järjepidevalt rakendatavad, on kooskõlas direktiivi 2013/36/EL artiklitega 141 ja 141b ning direktiivi 2014/59/EL artikliga 16a ega piira finantsinstitutsiooni võimet hoida või taastada tugevat kapitalibaasi kooskõlas suuniste 6. jaoga.

70.Teised asjaomased ühingusisesed funktsioonid (nt personaliosakond, õigusosakond, strateegiline planeerimine jt) ja peamised järelevalvefunktsiooni komiteed (st auditi-, riski- ja nomineerimiskomitee) peaksid olema finantsinstitutsiooni tasustamispoliitika läbivaatamisse tihedalt kaasatud, et tagada kooskõla finantsinstitutsiooni riskijuhtimisstrateegia ja -raamistikuga.

71.Kui korralistel läbivaatamistel selgub, et tasustamispoliitika ei toimi soovitud või ettenähtud viisil, või kui tehakse soovitusi, peaks töötasukomitee (kui moodustatud) või järelevalvekomitee tagama, et tehakse korrigeerimise meetmete kava ettepanek, kiidetakse see heaks ja rakendatakse õigel ajal.

72.Tehtud siseläbivaatuse tulemused ja võimalike avastatud puuduste korrigeerimiseks võetavad meetmed tuleks dokumenteerida kas kirjalike aruannete või asjaomaste komiteede või järelevalvefunktsiooni koosolekuprotokollidena ning teha need kättesaadavaks juhtorganile, asjaomastele komiteedele ja ühingufunktsioonidele.

¹⁸ Vt EBA suunised tegevuse edasiandmise kohta.

¹⁹ Tegevuse edasiandmise lisateave on juhtimiskorraldust käsitlevates EBA suunistes.

73. Finantsinstitutsiooni tasustamispoliitika tuleks organisatsioonisiseselt avalikustada kõigile töötajatele ja see peaks olema neile pidevalt kättesaadav. Üksiktöötaja tasu konfidentsiaalsed aspektid ei ole organisatsioonisisese läbipaistvuse küsimus.

74.Töötajaid tuleks teavitada nende muutuvtasu omadustest ning protsessist ja kriteeriumidest, mille alusel hinnatakse nende kutsetegevuse mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile ja nende muutuvtasu. Eelkõige peaks isiku tulemuslikkuse hindamine olema nõuetekohaselt dokumenteeritud ja asjaomastele töötajatele kättesaadav.

75.Nende suuniste konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud tasandil kohaldamisel peaks konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon tagama, et suuniste sätteid kohaldatakse tema tütarettevõtjate töötajate ja kindlaksmääratud töötajate suhtes, kes on lõikes 9 sätestatud usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise kohaldamisalas. Konsolideerival või allkonsolideerival finantsinstitutsioonil peaks olema konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud tasandil kättesaadav ja nõudmisel pädevale asutusele esitatav teave tasustamispoliitika rakendamise kohta kooskõlas siinsete suunistega, sh usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise kohaldamisalas olevatel tütarettevõtjatel.

76.Konsolideeritud järelevalvet tegev asutus ja allkonsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni pädev asutus peaksid tõhusalt kontrollima eelmise punkti kohaldamist ja püüdma teha koostööd (sh järelevalvekolleegiumides) teiste liikmesriikide asutustega, mis vastutavad asjaomaste tütarettevõtjate järelevalve eest, ja kolmandate riikide asutustega, kui teostatav.

77.Konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud alusel peaksid konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon ja pädevad asutused tagama, et kõigis usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise kohaldamisala finantsinstitutsioonides ja teistes asutustes ning kõigis nende filiaalides rakendatakse kogu konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitikat ja seda järgitakse kõigi töötajate, sh kindlaksmääratud töötajate tasustamisel. Konsolideerimisgrupi tasandil tasustamispoliitika kehtestamisel tuleks arvestada tütarettevõtjate tasustamisnõudeid. Konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitika peaks olema kooskõlas usaldusväärse ja tõhusa riskijuhtimisega, seda edendama ja olema sooneutraalne.

78.Konsolideerimisgruppi kuuluvate finantsinstitutsioonide ja üksuste korral, mis asuvad mitmes liikmesriigis, peaks kogu konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitika täpsustama, kuidas tuleks selle rakendamisel käsitleda direktiivi 2013/36/EL tasunõuete riikliku rakendamise erinevusi, eelkõige seoses tasu muutuvkomponendi ja fikseeritud tasu maksimaalse suhte piiramisel 100%-ni (asjakohasel juhul aktsionäride nõusolekul kuni 200%-ni)²⁰ , võimalust kohaldada tinglikku diskontomäära²¹ , kõiki piiranguid instrumentide kasutamisel²² , direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 3 alusel vabastuse kohaldamist ja sama direktiivi artikli 109 lõikes 6 sätestatud siseriiklikku kaalutlusõigust, et hõlmata tütarettevõtjad, kelle suhtes kohaldatakse konkreetset tasustamisraamistikku sama direktiivi artiklite 92, 94 ja 95 konsolideeritud rakendamise kohaldamisalas.

79. Nõuete konsolideeritud kohaldamisel kehtivad tasustamisnõuded, mida kohaldatakse konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni asukohaliikmesriigis, sh kindlaksmääratud töötajatele, kellel on oluline mõju konsolideerimisgrupi riskiprofiilile, isegi kui konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni asukohaliikmesriik on rakendanud direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 nõudeid rangemalt. Samuti peavad direktiivi 2013/36/EL kohaldamisalas olevad tütarettevõtjad oma töötajate korral täitma siseriikliku õiguse kohaldatavaid nõudeid, isegi kui need on konsolideeritud nõuetest rangemad.

80.Kolmandas riigis asuva emaettevõtja töötajad, kes on lähetatud ELi tütarettevõtjasse, mis on finantsinstitutsioon või filiaal, ning kes kuuluksid siis, kui nad töötaksid vahetult ELi finantsinstitutsioonis või filiaalis, vastava ELi finantsinstitutsiooni või filiaali kindlaksmääratud töötajate määratluse alla, on kindlaksmääratud töötajad. Nimetatud lähetatud töötajate suhtes peaks kohaldama direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikleid 92, 93 ja 94 nii, nagu neid rakendatakse liikmesriigis, kus asub ELi finantsinstitutsioon või filiaal, ning kohaldatavaid regulatiivseid tehnilisi standardeid. Lühiajaliste lähetuste korral, nt kui isik viibib liikmesriigis ainult mõne nädala, et teha projektitööd, tuleks kohaldada tema suhtes neid sätteid ainult siis, kui ta oleks tuvastatav kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivse tehnilise standardi alusel, arvestades talle asjaomase ajavahemiku eest antavat tasu ning rolli ja ülesandeid lähetuse ajal.

81.Lühiajalisi lepinguid ja lähetusi ei tohi kasutada direktiivis 2013/36/EL sätestatud tasustamisnõuetest ega ühestki seonduvast standardist või suunisest kõrvalehoidmise vahendina.

82.Kolmandates riikides asuvate tütarettevõtjate korral, mis on konsolideeritud alusel hõlmatud direktiivi 2013/36/EL artiklite 92, 94 ja 95 kohaldamisel, peaks kogu konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitika sätestama tasu moodustava muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide maksimaalse suhtarvu kuni 100% (kohaldatavuse korral aktsionäride konsolideerimisgrupi tasandil heakskiidul kuni 200%), täpsustama, kas kohaldatakse tinglikku diskontomäära, ning tagama, et instrumente kasutatakse muutuvtasu maksmiseks kooskõlas siinsete suuniste ja komisjoni delegeeritud määrusega (EL) nr 527/2014²³ , v.a kui nende nõuete kohaldamine on selles kolmandas riigis ebaseaduslik. Selliste kolmandate riikide tütarettevõtjate tasustamispoliitika peaks olema kooskõlas kogu konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitikaga ja vastama direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõike 2, artikli 93 ja artikli 94 nõuetele vähemalt nende töötajate korral, kelle kutsetegevusel on oluline mõju konsolideerimisgrupi riskiprofiilile.

83.Pädevad asutused peaksid tagama, et kolmandas riigis tegevusloa saanud krediidiasutuste liikmesriigis asuvate filiaalide suhtes kohaldatakse samu nõudeid, mida kohaldatakse liikmesriikides asuvate finantsinstitutsioonide suhtes. Kui sellised filiaalid soovivad rakendada tasu moodustava muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide suhtarvu üle 100%, peaksid nad tõendama pädevale asutusele, et kolmandas riigis asuva finantsinstitutsiooni aktsionärid on suurema suhtarvu heaks kiitnud.

84.Direktiivis 2013/36/EL ja siin suunistes sätestatud tasustamisnõudeid kohaldatakse liikmesriikides finantsinstitutsioonide suhtes olenemata asjaolust, et nad võivad olla kolmandas riigis asuva emaettevõtjana tegutseva finantsinstitutsiooni tütarettevõtjad. Kui kolmandas riigis emaettevõtjana tegutseva finantsinstitutsiooni ELis asuv tütarettevõtja on konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon, ei hõlma usaldatavusnõuete kohane konsolideerimine kolmandas riigis emaettevõtjana tegutseva finantsinstitutsiooni tasandit ega selle finantsinstitutsiooni teisi otseseid tütarettevõtjaid. Konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon peaks tagama, et kolmandas riigis emaettevõtjana tegutseva finantsinstitutsiooni kogu konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitikat arvestatakse tema enda tasustamispoliitikas, kui see ei ole vastuolus asjakohastes ELi või siseriiklikus õiguses sätestatud nõuetega, sh siinsete suunistega.

²⁰ Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunktid i ja ii.

²¹ Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkti g alapunkt iii.

²² Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punkt l.

²³ Komisjoni 12. märtsi 2014. aasta delegeeritud määrus (EL) nr 527/2014, millega täiendatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi (EL) nr 2013/36/EL seoses regulatiivsete tehniliste standarditega, millega määratakse kindlaks instrumentide liigid, mis adekvaatselt kajastavad krediidiasutuse või investeerimisühingu krediidikvaliteeti pikemas perspektiivis ning on asjakohased kasutamiseks muutuvtasu maksmisel (ELT L 148, 20.5.2014, lk 21). Avaldatud aadressil http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_148_R_0006.

85.Direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõikes 2 sisalduva proportsionaalsuse põhimõtte eesmärk on viia tasustamispoliitika ja -tavad järjepidevalt kooskõlla konkreetse finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili, riskivalmiduse ja strateegiaga, et eesmärgid ja tasustamisnõuded tegelikult saavutada.

86.Tasustamisnõuete ja siinsete suuniste proportsionaalse kohaldamise korral peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid ning pädevad asutused kaalutlema kõigi järgmiste kriteeriumide kombinatsiooni:

• a. suurus,
• b. organisatsioonistruktuur ja
• c. finantsinstitutsiooni tegevuse iseloom, ulatus ja keerukus.

87.Selle hindamisel, mis on proportsionaalne, ning tasustamispoliitika ja riskimõõtmise lähenemiste nõutava keerukusastme määramisel peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid ning pädevad asutused arvestama kõigi ülaltoodud kriteeriumide kvalitatiivsete ja kvantitatiivsete aspektide kombinatsiooni. Näiteks võib äritegevus olla väikese ulatusega, kuid see võib siiski sisaldada keerukaid tegevusi ja riskiprofiile oma tegevuse iseloomu või toodete keerukuse tõttu.

88.Nendel põhjustel peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid ning pädevad asutused arvestama vähemalt järgmisi kriteeriume:

• a. kas finantsinstitutsioon vastab määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artikli 4 lõike 1 punktides 145 ja 146 sätestatud väikese ja mittekeeruka finantsinstitutsiooni või suure finantsinstitutsiooni kriteeriumidele;
• b. kas finantsinstitutsioon vastab kriteeriumidele ja künnistele, mis on sätestatud direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõigetes 3 ja 4 seoses muutuvtasu väljamaksmise protsessist loobumisega;
• c. finantsinstitutsiooni geograafiline kohalolek ning tehingute maht igas jurisdiktsioonis;
• d. juriidiline vorm ning kättesaadavad omakapitali- ja võlainstrumendid;
• e. luba kasutada kapitalinõuete mõõtmiseks organisatsioonisiseseid meetodeid (nt sisereitingute või täiustatud mõõtmismudeli põhiseid meetodeid);
• f. kas finantsinstitutsioon on osa konsolideerimisgrupist, ja kui on, siis kas on hinnatud selle konsolideerimisgrupi proportsionaalsust ja mis on konsolideerimisgrupi omadused;
• g. lubatud tegevuse ja teenuste liik (nt laenud ja hoiused, investeerimispangandus);
• h. aluseks olev äristrateegia;
• i. äritegevuse struktuur ning äritegevuse riskide ajavahemik, mõõdetavus ja prognoositavus;
• j. finantsinstitutsiooni rahastamisstruktuur;
• k. finantsinstitutsiooni sisekorraldus, sh muutuvtasu suurus, mida saab maksta kindlaksmääratud töötajatele;
• l. finantsinstitutsiooni kasumi ja kahjumi struktuur;
• m. klientide liik (nt jaekliendid, äriühingud, väikeettevõtted või avaliku sektori asutused);
• n. toodete või lepingute keerukus.

89.Tasustamisnõuete ja siin suunistes sätestatu proportsionaalsel kohaldamisel vastutavad finantsinstitutsioonid, et arvestavad oma riskiprofiili, riskivalmidust ja muid omadusi ning arendavad ja rakendavad tasustamispoliitikat ja -tavasid, mis on asjakohaselt kooskõlas finantsinstitutsiooni äristrateegia, eesmärkide, väärtuste ja pikaajaliste huvidega. Usaldusväärse ja tõhusa tasustamispoliitika ja -tavade kohustus kehtib siiski kõigile finantsinstitutsioonidele ning kõigi töötajate korral olenemata finantsinstitutsiooni eriomadustest.

90.Enne tasustamisnõuete ja siinsete suuniste sätete proportsionaalset kohaldamist tuleks tuvastada töötajad direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõikes 3 sätestatud kriteeriumide, direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 2 alusel antud komisjoni delegeeritud määruse ja täiendavate sisekriteeriumide kohaselt²⁴ .

91.Muutuv- ja põhitasu komponentide maksimaalse suhte piiramine 100%-ni (aktsionäride heakskiidul 200%-ni) peaks olema kohaldatud finantsinstitutsiooni kõigi kindlaksmääratud töötajate suhtes.

92.Kindlaksmääratud töötajate eri kategooriate suhtes suuniste 3. ja 4. jao kohaselt eri tasustamispoliitikat rakendades tuleks proportsionaalsuse põhimõtte kohaldamisel arvestada kindlaksmääratud töötajate kategooria mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile.

93.Pädevad asutused peaksid tagama, et finantsinstitutsioonid järgivad tasustamisnõudeid ja siinsete suuniste sätteid viisil, mis tagab eri finantsinstitutsioonidele võrdsed tingimused.

Muutuvtasu väljamaksmise protsessist loobumine

94.Piiramata direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 3 rakendamist liikmesriikides, ei ole finantsinstitutsioonid, mis ei ole määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artikli 4 lõike 1 punktis 146 määratletud suured finantsinstitutsioonid, ja mille koguvara on siseriiklikus õiguses määratletud piirmäärast väiksem, õigustatud kohaldama muutuvtasu edasilükkamise ja selle instrumentides väljamaksmise nõudeid, nagu on sätestatud direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 1 punktides l ja m ning punkti o teises lõigus. Finantsinstitutsioon, mis vastab ühele või mitmele määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artikli 4 lõike 1 punkti 146 kriteeriumile, on suur finantsinstitutsioon.

• a. Hinnang, kas finantsinstitutsioon on globaalne süsteemselt oluline ettevõtja või muu süsteemselt oluline ettevõtja, antakse kooskõlas direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 131 ja komisjoni delegeeritud määrusega (EL) 2016/1608, mis käsitleb regulatiivseid tehnilisi standardeid globaalsete süsteemselt oluliste ettevõtjate tuvastamise metoodika määratlemiseks ja globaalsete süsteemselt oluliste finantsinstitutsioonide alamkategooriate määratlemiseks, ning EBA suunisetega direktiivi 2013/36/EL (CRD) artikli 131 lõike 3 kohaldamistingimuste määratlemise kriteeriumide kohta seoses muude süsteemselt oluliste finantsinstitutsioonide hindamisega.
• b. Hinnates, kas konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon vastab määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artikli 4 lõike 1 punkti 146 alapunktis d sätestatud piirmäärale, on kriteeriumid täidetud, kui summa ületab künnise konsolideeritud tasandil.²⁵ Vajaduse korral tuleks summad teisendada eurodesse, kasutades komisjoni finantsplaneerimiseks avaldatud vahetuskurssi ja konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni majandusaasta viimase kuu eelarvet.

95.Töötajale makstava aastase muutuvkomponendi summa ja aastas makstava tasu muutuv- ning püsikomponendi suhte leidmisel artikli 94 lõike 3 punkti b tähenduses, st loobumise kohaldamine makse edasilükkamise ja väljamaksmise nõude kohaldamisel töötajatele instrumentides muutuvtasu maksmise korral, peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid arvestama punktides a ja b täpsustatud summasid ning kohaldama punktides c–f sätestatud täiendavaid tingimusi:

• a. antav aastane muutuvtasu tulemusperioodi eest, mis võrdub majandusaastaga, mille kohta see on määratud, kui loobumist saab kohaldada, ja kõik nimetatud majandusaastal lõppenud tulemusperioodid, olenemata nimetatud majandusaastal lõppenud aluseks olevate tulemusperioodide pikkusest, nt peaks sisaldama muutuvtasu täissummat, mis põhineb korduvatel ja mitteuuenevatel mitmeaastastel kogunemisperioodidel ning töötaja säilitamise preemial perioodiks, mis on pikem kui üks aasta, kui aluseks olev periood lõppes asjaomasel majandusaastal;
• b. aastane põhitasu majandusaasta eest, mille kohta võib loobumist kohaldada; finantsinstitutsioonid võivad arvutamisel välja jätta muud lõigetes 132 ja 133 määratletud põhitasu komponendid;
• c. summad peaksid põhinema siin suunistes oleval põhi- ja muutuvtasu määratlusel ning need tuleks arvutada antava brutotasu alusel;
• d. muutuvtasu peaks koosnema kõigist antava muutuvtasu vormidest, sh tulemuspõhisest muutuvtasust, tagatud muutuvtasuna makstud summadest, töötaja säilitamise preemiast, lahkumistasudest ja vabatahtlikest pensionihüvitistest;
• e. kui finantsinstitutsioonid määravad summad individuaalsel alusel, tuleks arvestada finantsinstitutsiooni antud tasu, kui summa määrab konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon konsolideeritud alusel, ning kogu tasu, mille on andnud finantseerimisasutused ja kõrvalteenuste osutajad usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise kohaldamisalas;
• f. kui tasu makstakse muus vääringus kui eurodes, tuleks summad teisendada eurodesse, kasutades komisjoni finantsplaneerimiseks avaldatud vahetuskurssi ja finantsinstitutsiooni majandusaasta viimase kuu eelarvet.

96.Varade väärtuse keskmise alusel arvutamisel jooksvale majandusaastale vahetult eelneval nelja-aastasel perioodil direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 3 punkti a kohaldamisel peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid kasutama nelja eelnenud majandusaasta lõpu väärtuse aritmeetilist keskmist. Kui raamatupidamisarvestust peetakse muus vääringus kui eurodes, tuleks summad teisendada eurodesse, kasutades komisjoni finantsplaneerimiseks avaldatud vahetuskurssi ja iga majandusaasta viimase kuu eelarvet.

97.Kui siseriikliku õiguse kohaselt on pädevatel asutustel õigus kehtestada individuaalsete finantsinstitutsioonide jaoks direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõike 3 ja artikli 94 lõike 4 kohased piirmäärad, peaksid pädevad asutused direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 94 lõigete 3 ja 4 kohaseid piirmääri vähendades või suurendades arvestama finantsinstitutsiooni tegevuse olemust, ulatust ja keerukust, sisekorraldust või asjakohasel juhul selle konsolideerimisgrupi tunnuseid, kuhu ta kuulub, samuti arvestama selles jaos sätestatud proportsionaalsuskriteeriume.

²⁴ Vt tuvastamisprotsessi suunised siin suuniste 5. jaos.

²⁵ Määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artiklit 19 kohaldatakse usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimine kohaldamisalas mitteolevate üksuste suhtes.

98.Finantsinstitutsiooni ülesanne on tuvastada töötajad, kelle kutsetegevus mõjutab oluliselt finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili. Kõik finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid tegema iga aasta enesehindamise, et tuvastada kõik töötajad, kelle kutsetegevus mõjutab või võib mõjutada oluliselt finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili. Tuvastamisprotsess peaks olema finantsinstitutsiooni üldise tasustamispoliitika osa.

99.Enesehindamine peaks põhinema direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõikes 3 sätestatud kvalitatiivsetel ja kvantitatiivsetel kriteeriumidel, kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivsetel tehnilistel standarditel, ning peaks – kui seda on vaja kõigi selliste töötajate täielikuks tuvastamiseks, kelle tegevus mõjutab oluliselt finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili – hõlmama finantsinstitutsiooni sätestatud lisakriteeriume, mis kajastavad finantsinstitutsiooni eri tegevuste riskitasemeid ning töötajate mõju riskiprofiilile.

100.Kui kohaldatakse töötajate tasul põhinevaid kvantitatiivseid kriteeriume, tuleks arvestada eelmisel majandusaastal antud põhitasu ja töötajatele eelmisel majandusaastal või eelmise majandusaasta eest antud muutuvtasu. Eelmisel majandusaastal antud muutuvtasu on eelmisel majandusaastal antud muutuvtasu viitega varasemale tulemuslikkusele. Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid oma tasustamispoliitikas määratlema kohaldatava meetodi. Töötajate tasustamisel põhinevaid kvantitatiivseid kriteeriume kohaldades peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid arvestama kõiki kutseliste teenuste eest antud rahalisi ja mitterahalisi tasu põhi- ja muutuvtasu komponente. Tavalisi tasupakette, mida ei arvestata üksiktöötaja tasandil, tuleks arvestada üldsumma alusel, mis jaotatakse üksiktöötajale objektiivsete kriteeriumide alusel.

101.Eurodes määratletud kvantitatiivsete kriteeriumide kohaldamisel peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid, mis annavad tasu muus vääringus kui euro, kohaldatavad künnised teisendama, kasutades kas raamatupidamise konsolideerimiseks kasutatavat asutusesisest vahetuskurssi või vahetuskurssi, mida komisjon kasutab finantsplaneerimisel ja tasu andmise kuul eelarve koostamiseks, või vahetuskurssi, mis kehtis finantsinstitutsiooni majandusaasta viimasel kuul.²⁶ Finantsinstitutsioon peaks tasustamispoliitikas dokumenteerima vahetuskursi määramise meetodi.

102.Enesehindamine peaks olema selge, järjepidev, nõuetekohaselt dokumenteeritud ja aasta jooksul korrapäraselt ajakohastatud, arvestades vähemalt direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõike 3 punktides a, b ja c või regulatiivsete tehniliste standardite artiklis 5 sätestatud kvalitatiivseid kriteeriume, kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivseid tehnilisi standardeid ja asjakohasel juhul ka finantsinstitutsioonide kriteeriume. Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid tagama, et töötajaid, kes vastavad või tõenäoliselt vastavad kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivse tehnilise standardi artiklis 3 sätestatud kriteeriumidele majandusaasta vältel vähemalt kolme kuu jooksul, käsitletakse kindlaksmääratud töötajatena.

103.Töötajate tuvastamisega seoses koostatavad enesehindamise dokumendid peaksid sisaldama vähemalt järgmist teavet:

• a. enesehindamise aluspõhjendused ja nende kohaldamise ulatus;
• b. finantsinstitutsiooni äristrateegiast ja tegevusest tulenevate riskide hindamise lähenemisviis, sh eri geograafilistes asukohtades;
• c. kuidas hinnatakse finantsinstitutsioonides või muudes konsolideerimise alla kuuluvates üksustes (sh kolmandates riikides asuvates üksustes, tütarettevõtjates ja filiaalides) töötajaid;
• d. enesehindamise protsessi kavandamisel, järelevalvel, läbivaatamisel ja kohaldamisel osalevate äriühingute ja sisefunktsioonide rollid ja vastutusalad ning
• e. tuvastamise tulemus.

104.Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid tuvastamisprotsessi ja selle tulemused dokumenteerima ning peaksid suutma tõendada pädevale järelevalveasutusele, kuidas tuvastati töötajad nii direktiivi 2013/36 EL artikli 92 lõikes 3, kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivsete tehniliste standardite sätestatud kvalitatiivsete ja kvantitatiivsete kriteeriumide kui ka finantsinstitutsioonis kasutatavate lisakriteeriumide alusel.

105.Enesehindamise dokumendid peaksid hõlmama vähemalt kindlaksmääratud töötajate arvu, sh esimest korda kindlaks määratud töötajate arvu, tööülesandeid ja tegevusi, nimesid või muud kordumatut tunnust, ning kindlaksmääratud töötajate jagunemist finantsinstitutsiooni ärivaldkondade kaupa ja võrdlust eelmise aasta enesehindamise tulemustega.

106.Samuti peaks dokumendid sisaldama töötajaid, kes on kindlaks määratud kvantitatiivsete kriteeriumide alusel, kuid kelle kutsetegevust hinnatakse kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivse tehnilise standardi alusel finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili oluliselt mittemõjutavana. Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid säilitama dokumente asjakohase ajavahemiku, mis võimaldaks läbivaatamist pädevate asutuste poolt.

²⁶ Vahetuskursid on avaldatud Euroopa Komisjoni veebilehel aadressil http://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/inforeuro/inforeuro_en.cfm.

107.Kui finantsinstitutsioon leiab kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivse tehnilise standardi alusel, et töötaja kutsetegevus ei mõjuta oluliselt finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiili, ja taotleb eelnevat heakskiitu, tuleks kohaldada järgmist.

• a. Juhtorgan peaks otsustama iga-aastase tuvastamisprotsessi raames tehtud analüüsi alusel, kas töötajal ei ole tõepoolest olulist mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile, ning teatama tehtud otsusest järelevalvefunktsioonile. Järelevalvefunktsioon või töötasukomitee, kui see on moodustatud, peaks vaatama läbi otsustamise kriteeriumid ja protsessi ning tehtavad väljajätmised heaks kiitma.²⁷
• b. Eelneva heakskiidu taotlemine peaks toimuma alati viivitusteta, kuid hiljemalt kuue kuu jooksul pärast eelmise majandusaasta lõppu. Pädev asutus peaks hindama taotlust ja kiitma selle heaks või lükkama tagasi võimaluse korral kolme kuu jooksul alates kõigi dokumentide kättesaamisest.
• c. Kui töötajale anti eelmisel majandusaastal kokku vähemalt 1 000 000 eurot tasu, peaks pädev asutus teatama saadud taotlusest kohe EBA-le ning andma oma esialgse hinnangu. Nõudmise korral peaks pädev asutus esitama kogu finantsinstitutsioonilt saadud teabe kohe EBA-le. Enne kui pädev asutus otsustab taotluse heakskiitmise või tagasilükkamise, vahetab EBA pädeva asutusega teavet tagamaks, et kõik sellised väljajätmised kiidetakse heaks järjepidevalt.

108.Kvantitatiivsete kriteeriumide järgi tuvastatavate töötajate väljajätmise eelnev heakskiit tuleks anda ainult piiratud ajavahemikuks. Kindlaksmääratud töötajate korral tuleks regulatiivse tehnilise standardi alusel eelneva heakskiidu taotlus esitada igal aastal. Töötajate korral, kelle kohta tehakse taotluse suhtes otsus esimest korda, peaks eelnev heakskiit hõlmama ainult majandusaastat, mil taotleti eelnevat heakskiitu, ja järgmist majandusaastat. Töötajate korral, kelle suhtes on väljajätmine selleks majandusaastaks juba heaks kiidetud, peaks eelnev heakskiit hõlmama ainult järgmist majandusaastat.

109.Kui kindlaksmääratud töötajad jäetakse välja tütarettevõtjates, mille suhtes direktiivi 2013/36/EL ei kohaldata, on pädevaks asutuseks emaettevõtjaks oleva finantsinstitutsiooni pädev asutus. Krediidiasutuste filiaalide korral, mille peakontor asub kolmandas riigis, on pädevaks asutuseks see pädev asutus, mis vastutab finantsinstitutsioonide järelevalve eest filiaali asukoha liikmesriigis.

110.Eelneva heakskiidu taotlustes peaks olema kõigi nende kindlaksmääratud töötajate nimed või muu kordumatu tunnus töötajale, kellele erand kohalduks, sisene kapitali eraldamise protsent direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 73 kohaselt äriüksusele, kus töötaja tegutseb, ning mõjuanalüüs iga kindlaksmääratud töötaja mõju kohta finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile. Kui kindlaksmääratud töötajad tegutsevad samas äriüksuses ja täidavad sama funktsiooni, tuleks teha ühine hindamine.

²⁷ Tasustamispoliitika erandite heakskiitmine: vt punkt 110.

111.Lõplik vastutus tuvastamisprotsessi ja asjaomase poliitika eest on juhtorganil. Juhtorgani järelevalvefunktsioon peaks

• a. kinnitama tuvastamisprotsessi poliitika tasustamispoliitika osana;
• b. osalema enesehindamise kavandamisel;
• c. tagama, et töötajate tuvastamiseks tehtav hindamine toimuks nõuetekohaselt ja kooskõlas direktiiviga 2013/36/EL, kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivsete tehniliste standarditega ja siinsete suunistega;
• d. pidevalt tegema tuvastamisprotsessi järelevalvet;
• e. heaks kiitma kõik vastu võetud poliitika olulised erandid või muudatused ning hoolikalt kaalutlema ja jälgima nende mõju;
• f. kiitma heaks töötajate väljaarvamisi kooskõlas kindlaksmääratud töötajate regulatiivsete tehniliste standarditega või tegema selle järelevalvet, kui finantsinstitutsioon leiab, et komisjoni delegeeritud määruses määratletud kvantitatiivsed kriteeriumid ei ole töötajate korral täidetud, sest neil ei ole tegelikult olulist mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile; ning
• g. vaatama heakskiidetud poliitika korrapäraselt läbi ja vajaduse korral seda muutma.

112.Kui töötasukomitee on moodustatud, peaks see aktiivselt osalema tuvastamisprotsessis seoses oma ülesannetega tasu käsitlevate otsuste ettevalmistamisel. Kui töötasukomiteed ei ole moodustatud, peaksid vastavaid ülesandeid täitma järelevalvefunktsiooni juhtorgani mittetegevjuhtidest liikmed ja võimaluse korral sõltumatud liikmed.

113.Sõltumatu riskijuhtimise ja vastavuskontrolli funktsioon, äritegevuse tugifunktsioonid (nt õigusosakond, personaliosakond) ning juhtorgani asjaomased komiteed (st riski-, nomineerimis- ja auditikomitee) peaksid tuvastamisprotsessis osalema kooskõlas igaühe rolliga ja pidevalt. Eelkõige peaks riskikomitee (kui see on moodustatud) osalema tuvastamisprotsessis, ilma et see piiraks töötasukomitee ülesannete täitmist. Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid tagama asjakohase teabevahetuse kõigi tuvastamisprotsessis osalevate organisatsioonisiseste üksuste ja funktsioonide vahel. Tuvastamisprotsessi ja selle tulemuse peaks sõltumatult läbi vaatama organisatsioonisisene või -väline üksus.

114.Kindlaksmääratud töötajate kvalitatiivseid ja kvantitatiivseid tuvastuskriteeriume, mis on direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 92 lõikes 3 ja regulatiivsetes tehnilistes standardites ning mille on täiendavalt kehtestanud finantsinstitutsioon, peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid kohaldama individuaalselt, kasutades üksiku finantsinstitutsiooni näitajaid ja arvestades tema olukorda, ning lisaks peaks neid kriteeriume kohaldama konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon konsolideeritud ja allkonsolideeritud alusel, nagu on määratletud määruse (EL) nr 575/2013 artikli 4 lõike 1 punktides 48 ja 49, järgides ka direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 109 lõigete 4 kuni 6 sätteid, hõlmates usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise alla kuuluvaid tütarettevõtjaid, kelle suhtes kapitalinõuete direktiivi ei kohaldata, kasutades konsolideeritud näitajaid ja arvestades konsolideeritud tasandi olukorda ning mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile konsolideeritud tasandil. Konsolideeritud tuvastamisprotsess peaks hõlmama direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 109 lõikes 5 määratletud töötajaid, isegi kui tütarettevõtjale, kus töötab see töötaja, ei kehti konsolideeritud tasandil direktiivi 2013/36/EL artiklite 92, 94 ja 95 nõuded ning tema suhtes ei kohaldata direktiivi 2013/36/EL individuaalselt.

115.Kvalitatiivsete tuvastuskriteeriumide kohaldamisel konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud tasandil hõlmatakse töötajaid ainult siis, kui nad vastutavad nendes kriteeriumides osutatud funktsioonide eest konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud tasandil. Näiteks tütarettevõtja töötaja, kes on tütarettevõtja juhtorgani liige, tuleks hõlmata kriteeriumiga (töötaja on juhtimisfunktsiooni täitva juhtorgani liige) ainult siis, kui ta on ka ELi emaettevõtjaks oleva finantsinstitutsiooni juhtorgani liige.

116.Kohaldatavaid kvantitatiivseid tuvastuskriteeriume tuleks kohaldada kogu finantsinstitutsiooni ja selle tütarettevõtjate töötajate suhtes, kelle suhtes kohaldatakse direktiivi 2013/36/EL artiklite 92, 94 ja 95 nõudeid konsolideeritud ja allkonsolideeritud tasandil, arvestades kogu tasu, mis on antud usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimine kohaldamise kogu ulatuses.

117.Kvalitatiivseid tuvastuskriteeriume kohaldades peaksid finantsinstitutsioonid tuvastama kvalitatiivsetes kriteeriumides nimetatud funktsioonide eest vastutavad töötajad; peamine tuvastuskriteerium ei ole funktsiooni nimetus, vaid funktsioonile omistatud volitus ja vastutus.

118.Piiramata kapitalinõuete direktiivi artikli 109 lõike 4 kohaldamist, peaks konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon tagama konsolideerimisgrupi tasustamispoliitika, sh tuvastamisprotsesside ja nõuetekohase rakendamise üldise järjepidevuse konsolideeritud, allkonsolideeritud ja individuaalsel tasandil.

119.Finantsinstitutsioonid, mis on konsolideeriva finantsinstitutsiooni tütarettevõtjad, peaksid rakendama oma tasustamispoliitika raames konsolideeriva emaettevõtjaks oleva finantsinstitutsiooni antud poliitikat ja töötajate tuvastamisprotsessi. Kõik tütarettevõtjad peaksid aktiivselt osalema konsolideeriva emaettevõtjaks oleva finantsinstitutsiooni tuvastamisprotsessis. Eelkõige peaksid kõik usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise alla kuuluvad tütarettevõtjad, sh need, kelle suhtes direktiivi 2013/36/EL ei kohaldata, esitama konsolideerivale finantsinstitutsioonile kogu teabe, mida on vaja, et nõuetekohaselt tuvastada kõik töötajad, kes avaldavad konsolideeritud või allkonsolideeritud tasandil olulist mõju finantsinstitutsiooni riskiprofiilile.

120.Tütarettevõtjad, kelle enda suhtes direktiiv 2013/36/EL ei kohaldu, ei pea individuaalsel tasandil tuvastamisprotsessi tegema, v.a kui nad peavad seda tegema sektoripõhiste tasustamisnõuete kohaselt. Nende tütarettevõtjate korral, kelle suhtes ei kohaldata direktiivi ega muid direktiivi 2013/36/EL artikli 109 lõikes 4 täpsustatud tasustamisnõudeid, peaks konsolideeriv finantsinstitutsioon tegema hindamise konsolideeritud ja allkonsolideeritud tasandil, tuginedes tütarettevõtja esitatud teabele. Direktiivi 2013/36/EL kohaldamisalasse kuuluvad finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid tegema enesehindamise töötajate tuvastamiseks individuaalsel tasandil. Väikesed ja vähem keerukad finantsinstitutsioonid, mis osalevad konsolideeritud tasandi tuvastamisprotsessis, võivad delegeerida tuvastamisprotsessi individuaalsel tasandil praktilise kohaldamise konsolideerivale finantsinstitutsioonile.

121.Kolmandas riigis peakontoriga finantsinstitutsioonide liikmesriigis asuvad filiaalid ning liikmesriikides asuvad finantsinstitutsioonid, mis on kolmandas riigis emaettevõtjana tegutsevad finantsinstitutsioonide tütarettevõtjad, peaksid rakendama tuvastamisprotsessi ning teatama oma emaettevõtjana tegutsevale finantsinstitutsioonile selle tulemused. Liikmesriigis asuvad finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid hõlmama oma hindamisega ka enda tütarettevõtjad, mis kuuluvad usaldatavusnõuete kohase konsolideerimise alla, ja kolmandates riikides asuvad filiaalid. Finantsinstitutsioonid peaksid teadma, et filiaalid moodustavad finantsinstitutsiooni mittesõltumatu osa.

122.Liikmesriikides asuvate kolmandate riikide filiaalide korral tuleks rakendada liikmesriikides asuvate funktsioonide, äritegevuste ja töötajate korral tuvastuskriteeriume nii, nagu neid rakendataks finantsinstitutsiooni suhtes individuaalselt.

123.Institutions and competent authorities should ensure that the award, pay out and vesting of variable remuneration, including the application of malus and clawback arrangements, under the institutions ’ remuneration policy is not detrimental to maintaining a sound capital base.

124.When assessing if the capital base is sound, the institution should take into account its overall own funds and in particular the Common Equity Tier 1 capital, the capital requirement, including the combined capital buffer requirement as defined in Article 128(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU, the leverage ratio buffer requirement as defined in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities as defined in Article 45c of Directive 2014/59/EU and any capital add on and the restrictions on distributions set out in Articles 141 and 141b of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 16a of Directive 2014/59/EU which applies to the variable remuneration of all staff as well as the result of the internal capital adequacy assessment process. The requirement to maintain a sound capital base and the restrictions on distributions apply also on a consolidated and sub-consolidated basis. Additionally, competent authorities should take into account the results of the supervisory review and evaluation process in line with the respective EBA guidelines. 125.Institutions should include the impact of variable remuneration – both upfront and deferred amounts – in their capital and liquidity planning and in their overall internal capital adequacy assessment process.

126.The total variable remuneration awarded by an institution must not limit the ability of the institution to maintain or restore a sound capital base in the long term and should consider the interests of shareholders and owners, depositors, investors and other stakeholders. Variable remuneration should not be awarded or paid out when the effect would be that the capital base of the institution would no longer be sound. The institution should consider these requirements, the results from the internal capital adequacy assessment process, its multi-year capital planning, the restrictions on distributions set out in Articles 141 and 141b of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 16a of Directive 2014/59/EU and recommendations on distributions by competent authorities and European Supervisory Authorities, when determining:

• a. the overall pool of variable remuneration that can be awarded for that year; and
• b. the amount of variable remuneration that will be paid out or will be vesting in that year.

127.Institutions which do not have a sound capital base or where the soundness of the capital base is at risk should take the following measures with regard to variable remuneration:

• a. Reduce the variable bonus pool in line with Articles 141 and 141b of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 16a of Directive 2014/59/EU, including the possibility to reduce it down to zero;
• b. Apply the necessary performance adjustment measures, in particular malus;
• c. Use the net profit of the institution for that year and potentially for subsequent years to strengthen the capital base. The institution should not compensate for any reduction of the variable compensation made in order to ensure a sound capital base in later years or by other payments, vehicles or methods which lead to a circumvention of this provision.

128.Competent authorities should intervene where the awarding of variable remuneration is detrimental to the maintenance of a sound capital base by requiring the institution to reduce or apply a cap to the overall pool of variable remuneration determined until the capital adequacy situation improves, and if necessary to apply performance adjustment measures, in particular malus, and require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own funds.

Title II - Structure of remuneration

129.Under Directive 2013/36/EU, remuneration is either fixed or variable remuneration; there is no third category of remuneration. Without prejudice to the national implementation of waivers under paragraphs (3) to (5) of Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU, where remuneration is variable and is paid to identified staff, all requirements of Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU have also to be met in addition to the general requirements contained in Article 92 thereof. For that purpose, institutions should allocate in line with these guidelines the components of remuneration to either fixed or variable remuneration and their remuneration policies should set out clear, objective, predetermined and transparent criteria to assign all remuneration components to either the fixed or variable categories in accordance with the criteria provided in Article 92(2)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU and these guidelines.

130.Where the clear allocation of a component to the fixed remuneration is not possible based on the criteria provided in these guidelines, it should be considered as variable remuneration.

131.Remuneration is fixed where the conditions for its award and its amount:

• a. are based on predetermined criteria;
• b. are non-discretionary reflecting the level of professional experience and seniority of staff;
• c. are transparent with respect to the individual amount awarded to the individual staff member;
• d. are permanent, i.e. maintained over a period tied to the specific role and organisational responsibilities;
• e. are non-revocable; the permanent amount is only changed via collective bargaining or following renegotiation in line with national criteria on wage setting;
• f. cannot be reduced, suspended or cancelled by the institution;
• g. do not provide incentives for risk assumption; and
• h. do not depend on performance.

132.Remuneration components that are either part of a general institution-wide policy where they meet the conditions listed in paragraph 131 or payments mandatory under national law are considered as fixed remuneration. This includes payments which form part of routine employment packages as defined in these guidelines.

133.The following remuneration components should also be considered as fixed, where all similar situations are treated in a consistent way:

• a. remuneration paid to expatriate staff considering the cost of living and tax rates in a different country;
• b. allowances used to increase the basic fixed salary in situations where staff work abroad and receive less remuneration than would be paid on the local employment market for a comparable position where all of the following specific conditions are met:
• i. the allowance is paid on a non-discriminatory basis to all staff in a similar situation;
• ii. the allowance is awarded because staff work temporarily abroad or in a different position with a remuneration level requiring adjustment to reflect pay levels in the relevant market;
• iii. the level of additional payments is based on predetermined criteria;
• iv. the duration of the allowance is tied to the duration of the situation referred to above.

8. Particular cases of remuneration components

134.The variable and fixed remuneration of institutions may consist of different components, including additional or ancillary payments or benefits. Institutions should analyse allowances³¹ and allocate them to the variable or fixed component of remuneration. The allocation should be based on the criteria in section 7.

135.In particular where allowances are considered as fixed remuneration, but show any of the following features, the institution should duly document the results of the assessments conducted under section 7:

• a. They are paid only to identified staff members³² .
• b. They are limited to cases where the ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration would otherwise exceed 100% (if applicable, up to 200% where approved by shareholders).
• c. The allowances are linked to indicators that could possibly be understood as proxies for performance. In that case, the institution should be able to demonstrate that these indicators are not linked to the performance of the institution, e.g. by analysing the correlation with the performance indicators used.

136.Where allowances are based on the role, function or organisational responsibility of staff, in order to be correctly mapped to the fixed component of remuneration, they should meet the criteria set out in paragraph 131, taking into account all of the following:

• a. the allowance is tied to a role or organisational responsibility and awarded as long as there are no material changes regarding the responsibilities and authorities of the role so that in fact the staff would have a different role or organisational responsibility;
• b. the amount does not depend on any factors other than fulfilling a certain role or having a certain organisational responsibility and the criteria in paragraph 203;
• c. any other staff member fulfilling the same role or having the same organisational responsibility and who is in a comparable situation would be entitled to a comparable allowance.

137.Competent authorities should ensure that allowances are not a vehicle or method that facilitates the non-compliance of institutions with the CRD.

³¹ The label may differ according to the institution: ‘ role-based pay, staff allowance, adjustable role allowance, fixed pay allowance ’, etc.

³² Being an identified staff member should not be considered as a role or function.

138.When the award of variable remuneration, including LTIPs, is based on past performance of at least one year, but also depends on future performance conditions, the following should apply:

• a. Institutions should clearly set out to staff the additional performance conditions that have to be met after the award for the variable remuneration to vest.
• b. Institutions should assess before the vesting of variable remuneration that the conditions for its vesting have been met.
• c. The additional forward-looking performance conditions should be set for a predefined performance period of at least one year.
• d. When the additional forward-looking performance conditions have not been met, up to 100% of the variable remuneration awarded under those conditions should be subject to malus arrangements.
• e. The deferral period should end at the earliest one year after the last performance condition has been assessed; all other provisions regarding the deferral of variable remuneration for identified staff set out in section 15 apply in the same way as to variable remuneration that is exclusively based on performance previous to its award.
• f. For the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration, the total amount of the variable remuneration awarded should be taken into account in the financial year for which the variable remuneration, including LTIPs, was awarded. This should also apply when the past performance was assessed in a multi-year accrual period.

139.Where a prospective remuneration plan for variable remuneration, including LTIPs, is exclusively based on future performance conditions (e.g. where new staff receive an LTIP at the beginning of the first year of employment), the amount should be considered as awarded after the performance conditions have been met, otherwise no award should be made. Awarded amounts should be taken into account for the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration in the financial year prior to their award. Where a specific number of instruments are awarded, they should exceptionally be valued for the purpose of the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration with the market price or fair value determined at the time the prospective remuneration plan for variable remuneration was granted. Points (a) to (c) of paragraph 138 should apply. All other requirements apply in the same way as to variable remuneration, e.g. the deferral period starts after the award of the variable remuneration.

140. ‘Carried interest’ payments within the meaning of Ar ticle 4(1)(d) of the AIFMD are subject to the remuneration provisions of the AIFMD; paragraph 2 of Annex II of the AIFMD specifically includes carried interest in the definition of remuneration³³ . The ESMA guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD apply³⁴ . For the purposes of these EBA guidelines and in particular of calculating the ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration for staff identified under section 13 of these guidelines, the following should apply:

• a. all payments made by the alternative investment funds to these staff members through carried interest vehicles which are not representing a pro-rata return on the investment made by these staff members should be considered as variable remuneration and be valued at the time of their award;
• b. all payments made by the alternative investment funds to these staff members through carried interest vehicles which represent a pro-rata return on any investment by these staff members (through the carried interest vehicle) to the alternative investment fund should not be included in the calculation.

141.Dividends paid on vested shares or equivalent ownership interests that staff received as part of their remuneration or other shares held by staff as shareholders or owners of an institution are not part of remuneration for the purpose of these guidelines. The same applies to interest paid to staff on other vested instruments or investments. 142.Dividend and interest payments must not be used as a payment method for variable remuneration which would lead to a circumvention of the remuneration requirements established by the CRD.

³³ Annex II, paragraph 2 of the AIFMD states that ‘ The principles set out in paragraph 1 shall apply to remuneration of any type paid by the AIFM, to any amount paid directly by the AIF itself, including carried interest, and to any transfer of units or shares of the AIF, made to the benefits of those categories of staff, including senior management, risk takers, control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile or the risk profiles of the AIF that they manage ’ (emphasis added).

³⁴ ESMA/2013/232, available at: http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-232_aifmd_guidelines_on_remuneration_-_en.pdf. On the specific treatment of carried interest under the AIFMD, see, in particular, paragraphs 10, 13 and 16 and 159 of the ESMA guidelines.

143.Institutions should be able to substantiate their legitimate interest in awarding retention bonuses to retain an identified staff member. For example, retention bonuses may be used under restructurings, in wind-down, after a change of control or to ensure the finalisation of major projects. Institutions should document the event or justification that made it necessary to award a retention bonus and the time period, including the start and the end date, for which the reason is assumed to exist. Institutions should define the retention conditions and applicable performance conditions (see also paragraph 147). Institutions should specify a retention period and a date or event after which it determines whether the retention and performance conditions have been met.

144.As a general principle, institutions should not award multiple retention bonuses to a staff member; in exceptional cases and where duly justified, more than one retention bonus may be paid to a staff member, but at different moments in time and under the conditions specified in this section with regard to each retention bonus. The retention bonuses should only be awarded after the retention conditions and applicable performance conditions have been met. Moreover, the retention bonus should only be awarded if no reasons exist that lead to a situation where the retention bonus should not be awarded, e.g. material compliance breaches, misconduct or other failures of that staff member.

145.A retention bonus should be in accordance with the requirements under Articles 93, 141 and 141b and the respective supervisory powers under Article 104(1)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU, which could lead to a situation where the retention bonus might need to be reduced, possibly even down to zero, depending on the maximum distributable amount (MDA) or other restrictions imposed by competent authorities.

146.When assessing and considering whether the award of a retention bonus to identified staff is appropriate, institutions and competent authorities may take into account at least the following:

• a. the concerns that lead to the risk that certain staff may choose to leave the institution;
• b. the reasons why the retention of that staff member is crucial for the institution;
• c. the consequence if the staff member concerned leaves the institution; and
• d. whether the amount of the awarded retention bonus is necessary and proportionate to retain the targeted staff member.

147.A retention bonus should be based on specific conditions that differ from the performance conditions applied to other parts of the variable remuneration and include a retention condition and specific performance conditions. The specific conditions for a retention bonus should lead to the retention objective (i.e., retention of staff in the institution for a predefined period of time or until a certain event). The specific performance conditions should include conditions that are related to the legitimate interest for which the staff member should be retained and to the conduct of staff and should be compatible with the provisions in paragraph 145. Retention bonuses should not lead to a situation where the total variable remuneration, consisting of performance-related variable remuneration and retention bonus, of the staff member is no longer linked to the performance of the individual, the business unit concerned and the overall results of the institution as required under Articles 92(2)(g)(ii) and 94(1)(a).

148.Retention bonuses should not be awarded to merely compensate for performance-related remuneration not paid due to insufficient performance or the institution’s financial situation.

149.Retention bonuses are variable remuneration and therefore, if awarded to identified staff, must comply with the requirements on variable remuneration under Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the maximum ratio between the variable and fixed remuneration, ex post risk alignment, payment in instruments, deferral, retention, malus and clawback.

150.A retention bonus must be taken into account in the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed remuneration as variable remuneration. Independent of the fact that the retention bonus will be awarded only after the end of the retention period, the retention bonus should be taken into account in the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration following one of the methods specified below:

• a. The retention bonus is split into annual amounts for each year of the retention period calculated on a linear pro rata basis. Where the exact length of the retention period is not known upfront, the institution should set and duly document a period considering the situation and measures taken that justify the payment of a retention bonus. The calculation of the ratio should be based on the period set; or
• b. The full amount of the retention bonus is considered in the year when the retention condition is met.

151.Discretionary pension benefits are a form of variable remuneration. Where the terms of the company’s pension scheme include pension benefits that are not based on performance and that are consistently granted to a category of staff, such pension benefits should not be considered discretionary, but should be considered as part of routine employment packages in line with the section of these guidelines on definitions. Discretionary pension benefits are not severance payments, even if the employee decides to retire early.

152.The institution should ensure that, where a staff member leaves the institution or retires, discretionary pension benefits are not paid without the consideration of the economic situation of the institution or risks that have been taken by the staff member which can affect the institution in the long term.

153.The full amount of discretionary pension benefits must be awarded, in accordance with Article 94(1)(o) of Directive 2013/36/EU and subject to the derogation under Article 94(3) of this Directive, in instruments referred to in point (l) of this Article and:

• a. where an identified staff member leaves the institution before retirement, the institution must hold the full amount of discretionary pension benefits in instruments at least for a period of five years without the application of pro rata vesting;
• b. where an identified staff member reaches retirement, a five-year retention period must be applied to the full amount paid in instruments.

154.Institutions should ensure that malus and clawback arrangements are applied in the same way to discretionary pension benefits as to other components of variable remuneration.

9. Exceptional remuneration components

155.Guaranteed variable remuneration can take several forms, such as a ‘guaranteed bonus‘, ‘welcome bonus‘, ‘sign - on bonus‘, ‘minimum bonus‘, etc., and can be awarded either in cash or in instruments.

156.When awarding guaranteed variable remuneration in accordance with Article 94(1)(d) and (e) of Directive 2013/36/EU when hiring new staff, institutions are not permitted to guarantee variable remuneration for longer than the first year of employment. Guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional and can only occur where the institution has a sound and strong capital base, in accordance with Article 94(1)(e) of that Directive and section 6 of these guidelines.

157.Institutions should only award once to the same single staff member guaranteed variable remuneration. This requirement should also apply at a consolidated and sub-consolidated level and includes situations where staff receive a new contract from the same institution or another institution within the scope of consolidation.

158.Institutions and competent authorities may decide to not include the amount of guaranteed variable remuneration in the calculation of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of the total remuneration for the first performance period, where the guaranteed variable remuneration is awarded when hiring new staff before the first performance period starts.

159.As part of the arrangements guaranteeing this part of variable remuneration, institutions may decide to not apply the requirements on malus and clawback arrangements to guaranteed variable remuneration. Institutions may pay out the full amount in non-deferred cash.

160.The compensation for the buyout of a previous contract should be awarded only when the conditions defined in paragraph 156 of these guidelines are met.

161.Remuneration should be considered as being granted as compensation or for the buyout of a previous contract where the deferred variable remuneration of the staff member was reduced or revoked by the previous employer because of the termination of the contract. For remuneration packages relating to the compensation or buyout of contracts in previous employment, all requirements for variable remuneration and the provisions within these guidelines apply, including deferral, retention, pay out in instruments and clawback arrangements.

9.3 Severance and other payments after the end of a contract

162. Institutions’ remuneration policies should specify the possible use of severance paym ents, including the maximum amount or criteria for the determination of such amounts that can be awarded as severance pay to identified staff.

163.Institutions should have a framework in which severance pay is determined and approved in the context of the early termination of a contract by the institution, including a clear allocation of the responsibilities and decision-making powers and the procedural involvement of the control functions.

164.Severance payments should not provide for a disproportionate reward, but for an appropriate compensation of the staff member in cases of early termination of the contract. In accordance with Article 94(1)(h) of Directive 2013/36/EU, severance payments must reflect performance achieved over time and must not reward failure or misconduct.

165.Severance pay should not be awarded where there is an obvious failure which allows for the immediate cancellation of the contract or the dismissal of staff.

166.Severance pay should not be awarded where a staff member resigns voluntarily in order to take up a position in a different legal entity, unless a severance payment is required by national labour law.

167.Severance payments include additional payments on top of the regular remuneration in the following specific situations:

• a. redundancy remuneration for loss of office in case of an early termination of the contract by the institution or its subsidiary;
• b. remuneration awarded for a limited time period that is agreed to introduce a cooling‐off period after the termination of the contract and is subject to a non‐competition clause;
• c. the institution terminates the contracts of staff because of a failure of the institution or early intervention measures;
• d. the institution wants to terminate the contract following a material reduction of the institution’s activities in which the staff member was active or where business areas are acquired by other institutions without the option for staff to stay employed in the acquiring institution;
• e. the institution and a staff member agree on a settlement in case of an actual labour dispute that could otherwise realistically lead to an action in front of a court.

168.Where institutions award severance pay, the institutions should be able to demonstrate to the competent authority the reasons for the severance payment, the appropriateness of the amount awarded and the criteria used to determine the amount, including that it is linked to the performance achieved over time and that it does not reward failure or misconduct.

169.When determining the amount of severance pay to be awarded, the institution should take into account the performance achieved over time and assess where relevant the severity of any failure. Identified failures should be distinguished between failures of the institution and failures of the identified staff as follows:

• a. failures of the institution should be considered when the total amount of the severance pay for staff is determined, taking into account the capital base of the institution; such severance pay should not be higher than the reduction of costs achieved by the early termination of contracts;
• b. failures of identified staff should lead to a downward adjustment of the amount of severance pay which would otherwise be awarded when only the performance over time would be considered in the estimation of the severance pay, including the possibility for a reduction of the amount down to zero.

170.Failures of institutions include the following situations:

• a. where the institution benefits from government intervention or is subject to early intervention or resolution measures in accordance with Directive 2014/59/EU³⁵ ;
• b. where the opening of normal insolvency proceedings of the institution, as defined in Article 2(1)(47) of Directive 2014/59/EU, has been filed;
• c. where significant losses lead to the situation that the institution no longer has a sound capital base and, following this, the business area is sold or the business activity is reduced.

171.Failures of identified staff should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and include the following situations:

• a. where a member of the management body is no longer considered as meeting appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
• b. where the identified staff member participated in or is responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses for the institution, as defined in the institution ’ s remuneration policy;
• c. where an identified staff member acts contrary to internal rules, values or procedures based on intent or gross negligence.

172.Severance payments should be considered as variable remuneration and as a general principle therefore, if awarded to identified staff, all requirements under Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU apply. However, severance payments should in the following circumstances not be taken into account for the purpose of the calculation of that ratio and for the application of deferral and the pay out in instruments:

• a. severance payments mandatory under national labour law or mandatory following a decision of a court;
• b. severance payments under (i) and (ii) where the institution is able to demonstrate the reasons and the appropriateness of the amount of the severance payment:
• (i) severance payments calculated through an appropriate predefined generic formula (e.g. gardening leave) set within the remuneration policy in the cases referred to in paragraph 167;
• (ii) severance payments corresponding to the additional amount due in application of a non-competition clause in the contract and paid out in future periods, up to the amount of the fixed remuneration which would have been paid, for the non-competition period, if staff were still employed;
• c. severance payments under paragraph 167, not fulfilling the condition in point (i) of paragraph 172(b), where the institution has demonstrated to the competent authority the reasons and the appropriateness of the amount of the severance payment.

173.When calculating the amount that is not taken into account in the calculation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration, the fact that a non-competition clause is included in the contract does not necessarily imply that the whole amount paid for the early termination of the contract is paid to compensate the identified staff for committing to not competing for a certain period of time. Only those amounts of the settlement specifically identified in the contract as compensation for the non-competition clause would comply with paragraph 172. Where national legislation limits the length of non-competition clauses, any payment made beyond those time limits cannot be considered as a ‘ settlement made for a non-competition clause ’ and therefore cannot be excluded from the ratio of variable to fixed.

174.When calculating the ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration, the following amounts of severance pay should be taken into account as variable remuneration for the purpose of the calculation of that ratio for the last performance period:

• a. the sum of any amounts higher than the fixed remuneration for the future periods under point (b)(ii) of paragraph 172;
• b. any other severance pay not listed in paragraph 172.

³⁵ Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).

175.Regular remuneration payments related to the duration of a notice period should not be considered as severance payments. The payment of an appropriate fixed amount after the regular end of an employment contract (i.e. after coming to its regular end or being cancelled by staff in line with the applicable notice periods) and to compensate staff where the institution restricts the taking up of an occupational activity should not be subject to the requirements applicable to variable remuneration, where this is compatible with national law. Such payments should not be made to replace severance payments under paragraph 167.

176.Additional payments in the context of the regular end of a contractual period or of the appointment as member of the management body, e.g. awarded discretionary pension benefits, should not be treated as severance payments. Where such components are variable remuneration and are paid to identified staff, they are subject to all specific requirements for variable remuneration and the provisions within these guidelines.

10 Prohibitions

177.Where an appropriate remuneration policy is aligned with risks, it should be sufficiently effective and able to result in practice in a downward adjustment to the amount of variable remuneration awarded to staff and the application of malus and clawback arrangements.

178.Institutions should ensure to the extent possible that identified staff members are not able to transfer the downside risks of variable remuneration to another party through hedging or certain types of insurance, e.g. by implementing policies for dealing in financial instruments and disclosure requirements. 179.Identified staff should be considered to have hedged the risk of a downward adjustment in remuneration if the identified staff member enters into a contract with a third party or the institution and either of the following conditions is met:

• a. the contract requires the third party or the institution to make payments directly or indirectly to the identified staff member that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the staff member’s variable remuneration has been reduced;
• b. the identified staff member purchases or holds derivatives that are intended to hedge losses associated with financial instruments received as part of the variable remuneration.

180.Identified staff should be considered to have insured the risk of a downward adjustment where staff take out an insurance contract with a stipulation to compensate them in the event of a downward adjustment in remuneration. This should in general not prevent taking out insurance to cover personal payments such as healthcare and mortgage instalments.

181.The requirement to not use personal hedging strategies or insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in staff ’ s remuneration arrangements should apply to deferred and retained variable remuneration.

182.Institutions should maintain effective arrangements to ensure that the identified staff member complies with the provisions of this section. At least a declaration of self-commitment by the identified staff member that he or she will refrain from concluding personal hedging strategies or insurance for the purpose of undermining the risk alignment effects is necessary. Institutions’ human resources or internal control functions should perform at least spot-check inspections of the compliance with this declaration with regard to the internal custodianship accounts. Random checks should at least include the internal custodianship accounts of identified staff. Notification to the institution of any custodial accounts outside the institution should also be made mandatory.

183.Institutions should ensure that variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods which aim at or effectively lead to non-compliance with remuneration requirements and the provisions of these Guidelines for identified staff or, where such requirements are applied to all staff, with remuneration requirements for all staff. This includes arrangements between the institution and third parties in which the staff member has a financial or personal interest.

184. ‘Circumvention’ is non -compliance with remuneration requirements and takes place if an institution is actually not meeting the objective and purpose of requirements when considered together, while formally the institution complies with the wording of the individual remuneration requirements.

185.Circumvention takes place in the following circumstances, among others:

• a. where variable remuneration is considered as fixed remuneration in line with the wording of these guidelines, but not with its objectives;
• b. where variable remuneration other than guaranteed variable remuneration is awarded or vests although, effectively:
• i. there has been no positive performance measured in line with Title IV of these guidelines by the staff member, business unit or institution;
• ii. there is no effective risk alignment (i.e. ex ante or ex post risk adjustment); or
• iii. the variable remuneration is not sustainable according to the institution´s financial situation;
• c. where staff receive payments from the institution or an entity within the scope of consolidation which do not fall under the definition of remuneration, but are vehicles or methods of pay that contain an incentive for risk assumption or provide disproportionate returns on investments on instruments of the firm that are significantly different from conditions for other investors who would invest in such a vehicle;
• d. where staff receive payments from the institution or an entity within the scope of consolidation which do not fall under the definition of remuneration, but are vehicles or methods to circumvent the remuneration requirements (e.g. non-redeemable loan);
• e. where fixed remuneration components are awarded as a fixed number of instruments and not as a fixed amount;
• f. where staff are awarded remuneration in instruments or are able to buy instruments which are not priced at the market value or the fair value in the case of non-listed instruments and the additional value received is not taken into account in the variable remuneration;
• g. where adjustments to fixed remuneration components are frequently negotiated and adjustments are in fact made to align the remuneration with the performance of staff;
• h. where allowances are awarded at an excessive amount that is not justified for the underlying circumstances;
• i. where remuneration is labelled as payment for early retirement and not taken into account as variable remuneration, where in fact the payment has the character of a severance payment, as it is made in the context of the early termination of the contract, or where in fact the staff member does not retire after such award is made or where the payments are not granted on a monthly basis;
• j. any measures that would lead to a situation where in fact the remuneration policy would no longer be gender neutral. 186.Institutions should ensure that the method for measuring the performance has appropriate controls to ensure that the award criteria cannot be manipulated. Where such controls are not in place, the variable remuneration is not appropriately linked to performance and the remuneration policy is not appropriately implemented and any payment of variable remuneration can lead to a violation of regulatory requirements. Possible manipulations include, for instance, courtesy decisions in the bilateral performance measurement process, e.g. where no objective standards exist for the decision-making pr ocess regarding staff members’ goal attainment.

187.Institutions should not provide compensation for any reduction or restructuring of variable remuneration, e.g. made in the context of recovery and resolution measures or other exceptional government intervention, in later years or by other payments, vehicles or methods.

188.Institutions should not create group structures or offshore entities or contracts with persons that act on behalf of the institution in order to manipulate the outcome of the identification process (e.g. because one Member State applies the derogation within Article 109(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU) and to circumvent the application of the remuneration requirements and the provisions of these Guidelines to staff to which these requirements and provisions should otherwise apply.

189.Where short-term contracts (e.g. one year) are used and renewed on a regular basis by institutions, competent authorities should review if such contracts form a vehicle or method of circumvention of the remuneration requirements of Directive 2013/36/EU, e.g. as they would in fact create variable remuneration, and take appropriate measures to ensure that institutions comply with the requirements of Articles 92 and 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

190.Where remuneration is fixed remuneration according to the guidelines in section 7, but is paid out in instruments, institutions and competent authorities should consider if the instruments used turn the fixed component of remuneration into a variable component of remuneration as a link to the performance of the institution is established. Institutions should not use financial instruments as part of the fixed remuneration to circumvent variable remuneration requirements and the instruments used should not provide incentives for excessive risk taking.

Title III - Remuneration of specific functions

191.The remuneration of the members of the management body in its management function (he reafter ‘management function’) should be consistent with their powers, tasks, expertise and responsibilities.

192.In order to properly address conflicts of interest and without prejudice to paragraphs 193 and 194, members of the supervisory function should be compensated only with fixed remuneration. Incentive-based mechanisms based on the performance of the institution should be excluded. The reimbursement of costs to members of the supervisory function and the payment of a fixed amount per working hour or day, even if the time to be reimbursed is not predefined, are considered as fixed remuneration.

193.Where the supervisory function in exceptional cases is awarded variable remuneration, the variable remuneration and risk alignment should be strictly tailored to the assigned oversight, monitoring and control tasks, reflecting the individual’s authorities and responsibilities and the achievement of objectives linked to their functions.

194.Where variable remuneration is awarded in instruments, appropriate measures should be taken to preserve the independence of judgement of those members of the management body, including the setting of retention periods until the end of the mandate.

195.The internal control functions should be independent and have sufficient resources, knowledge and experience to perform their tasks with regard to the institution ’ s remuneration policy. The independent control functions should cooperate actively and regularly with each other and other relevant functions and committees with regard to the remuneration policy and risks which may arise from remuneration policies.

196.The remuneration of staff in the independent control functions should allow the institution to employ qualified and experienced personnel in these functions. The remuneration of independent control functions should be predominantly fixed, to reflect the nature of their responsibilities.

197.The methods used for determining the variable remuneration of control functions, i.e. risk management, compliance an d internal audit function, should not compromise staff’s objectivity and independence.

Title IV - Remuneration policy, award and pay out of variable remuneration for identified staff

198.Institutions must ensure that the remuneration policy for identified staff complies with all principles set out in Articles 92 and 94 and, where applicable, Article 93 of Directive 2013/36/EU and is gender neutral.

199.Institutions should implement, for different categories of identified staff, specific remuneration policies and risk alignment mechanisms as appropriate to ensure that the impact of the category of identified staff on the institution’s risk profile is appropriately aligned with their remuneration. 200.Where institutions consider paying out less than 100% of the fixed component of remuneration in cash, this decision should be well reasoned and approved as part of the remuneration policy.

201.Where an institution in the legal form of a stock corporation and in particular a listed institution applies a shareholding requirement to some categories of identified staff, in order to achieve a better alignment of the incentives provided to staff with the risk profile of the institution in the long term, the amount should be clearl y documented in the institution’s policies. When a shareholding requirement is applied, staff should hold a certain number of shares or nominal amount of shares as long as they are employed in the same position or a position of equal or higher seniority.

202.Institutions must have a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration for identified staff, in accordance with Article 94(1)(f) of Directive 2013/36/EU. The amount of variable remuneration awarded should appropriately react to changes in the performance of the staff member, the business unit and the institution. The institution should specify how the variable remuneration reacts to performance changes and the performance levels. This should include performance levels where variable remuneration decreases down to zero. Unethical or non-compliant behaviour should lead to a significant reduction of the staff member’s variable remuneration.

203.The gender-neutral fixed remuneration of identified staff should reflect their professional experience and organisational responsibility, taking into account the level of education, the degree of seniority, the level of expertise and skills, the constraints (e.g. social, economic, cultural or other relevant factors) and job experience, the relevant business activity and remuneration level of the geographical location.

204.The amount of fixed remuneration must be sufficiently high in order to ensure that the reduction of the variable remuneration down to zero would be possible. Staff should not be dependent on the award of variable remuneration as this might otherwise create incentives for short-term-oriented excessive risk taking, including the mis-selling of products, where without such short-term risk taking the performance of the institution or staff would not allow for the award of variable remuneration.

205.The pay out of fixed remuneration in instruments, if any, should not impair the ability of the institution to apply a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration.

206.Institutions should set in advance in their remuneration policy the appropriate level of the maximum ratio between the variable and fixed components of total remuneration for identified staff, in accordance with the limits and procedures provided in Article 94(1)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU and national law, taking into account the business activities, the risks and the impact that different categories of staff have on the risk profile. Institutions may set different ratios for different jurisdictions, different business units, corporate and internal control functions and different categories of identified staff. The ratio set is the ratio between the variable component of remuneration that could be awarded as a maximum for the following performance period and the fixed component of remuneration for the following performance period.

207.The maximum ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration that could be awarded as a maximum in a given performance year, including the amount to be taken into account for the retention bonus, divided by the sum of all fixed components of remuneration to be awarded in relation to the same performance year. In any case, all remuneration components should be correctly allocated to either variable or fixed remuneration in line with these guidelines. Institutions may omit some of the fixed remuneration components where they are not material, e.g. where proportionate non-monetary benefits are awarded.

208.In exceptional and duly justified cases, the remuneration policy may provide for a different ratio for individual identified staff members belonging to a certain category of staff compared with other staff members included in the same category of staff.

209.The ratios set between the variable and fixed remuneration components for categories of staff or single staff members should be approved by the management body in its supervisory function or, where required, by the shareholders’ meeting. The ratio between the varia ble and fixed remuneration components should be set independent of any potential future ex post risk adjustments or fluctuation in the price of instruments.

210.The effective ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration that have been awarded for the last performance year as set out in these guidelines, including amounts awarded for multi-year accrual periods, divided by the sum of fixed components of remuneration awarded for the same performance year. For multi-year accrual periods that do not revolve annually, institutions may alternatively take into account in each year of the performance period the maximum amount of variable remuneration that can be awarded at the end of the performance period divided by the number of years of the performance period.

211.The effective ratio between variable remuneration awarded and fixed remuneration should increase with the performance achieved and include levels of awards that would only be achieved for performance which is ‘above target’ or ‘exceptional’. The effective ratio must not exceed the maximum ratio set in accordance with Article 94(1)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU, national law and the institution’s remuneration policy.

212.When calculating the maximum or effective ratio, institutions should apply the EBA guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate for variable remuneration under Article 94(1)(g)(iii) of Directive 2013/36/EU only when Member States have implemented Article 94(1)(g)(iii) of Directive 2013/36/EU or when the ratio is calculated for identified staff of an institution located in a third country that is a subsidiary of an EU parent institution.

213.The risk alignment process includes the performance and risk measurement process (section 14.1); the award process (section 14.2); and the pay-out process (section 15). At each stage of the risk alignment process, the variable remuneration should be adjusted for all current and future risks taken. Institutions should ensure that incentives to take risks are balanced by incentives to manage risk.

214.Institutions should align the time horizon of the risk and performance measurement with the institution’s business cycle in a multi-year framework. Institutions should set the accrual period and the pay-out periods for remuneration at an appropriate length, differentiating between remuneration that should be paid upfront and remuneration that should be paid after deferral and retention periods. The accrual and pay-out periods should take into account the business activity and position of the category of identified staff or, in exceptional cases, of a single identified staff member.

215.Within the risk alignment process, an appropriate combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria in the form of absolute and relative criteria should be used at all stages to ensure that all risks, performance and necessary risk adjustments are reflected. Absolute performance measures should be set by the institution on the basis of its own strategy, including its risk profile and risk appetite. Relative performance measures should be set to compare performance with peers, either ‘internal’ (i.e. within the organisation) or ‘external’ (i.e. similar institutions). Quantitative and qualitative criteria and the processes applied should be transparent and, as far as possible, predefined. Both quantitative and qualitative criteria may partly rely on judgement.

216.Where judgemental approaches are used, institutions should ensure a sufficient level of transparency and objectivity when judgements are made by:

• a. setting a clear written policy outlining parameters and key considerations on which the judgement will be based;
• b. providing clear and complete documentation of the final decision regarding the risk and performance measurement or risk adjustments applied;
• c. involving relevant control functions;
• d. considering the personal incentives of the staff making the judgement and any conflicts of interest;
• e. implementing appropriate checks and balances, including making such adjustments within a panel involving staff from business units, corporate and control functions, etc.;
• f. approving the assessment made by a control function or at an appropriate hierarchical level above the function making the assessment, e.g. at the management body in its management or supervisory function or at the remuneration committee. 217.Institutions should make the risk alignment process transparent to identified staff, including any elements that are based on judgement rather than objective facts or data.

218.Institutions should provide detailed information to the remuneration committee or to the supervisory function if the final outcome after applying judgemental measures is significantly different from the initial outcome using predefined measures.

219.The variable remuneration of identified staff should be aligned to all risks and the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual. The relative importance of each level of the performance criteria should be determined beforehand in the remuneration policies and adequately balanced to take into account the objectives at each level, the position or responsibilities held by the staff member, the business unit in which he or she is active and current and future risks.

220.Institutions should define the objectives of the institution, business units and staff. These objectives should be derived from the institution’s business and risk strategy, corporate values, risk appetite and long-term interests and also consider the cost of capital and the liquidity of the institution. I nstitutions should assess the institution’s business units’ and identified staff members’ achievements during the accrual period against their objectives.

221.Institutions should take into account all current and future risks, whether on or off balance sheet, differentiating between risks relevant to the institution, business units and individuals. Though institutions usually bear all types of risk at institution-wide level, at the level of individual identified staff members or business units only some types of risk may be relevant.

222.Institutions should also use measures for the risk alignment of remuneration where an exact quantification of the risk exposure is difficult, such as reputational and operational risk. In such cases, the risk assessment should be based on suitable proxies, including risk indicators, capital requirements or scenario analysis.

223.In order to conservatively take into account all material risks at the institution and business unit levels, institutions should use the same risk measurement methods as used for internal risk measurement purposes, e.g. within the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) and in the institution’s individual liquidity adequacy assessment. Institutions should take into account expected and unexpected losses and stressed conditions. For example, if an institution uses an Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) to calculate its operational capital requirements, this methodology will already include high-severity losses and scenario analysis. Similarly, institutions’ credit risk and market risk or economic capital models will also incorporate stressed conditions. 224.The institutions should be able to demonstrate to the competent authority how the risk calculations are broken down by business units and different types of risks. The extent and quality of methods and models used within the ICAAP should be reflected by the institution in a proportionate way in the remuneration policy. More sophisticated ICAAP methods should lead to a more sophisticated variable remuneration policy, including risk-sensitive adjustment techniques.

225.Institutions should set and document both quantitative and qualitative, including financial and non-financial, performance criteria for individuals, business units and the institution. The performance criteria should not incentivise excessive risk taking or mis-selling of products.

226.Institutions should use an appropriate balance between quantitative and qualitative as well as absolute and relative criteria.

227.The criteria used to measure risk and performance should be linked as closely as possible to the decisions made by the identified staff member and the category of staff members that is subject to the performance measurement and should ensure that the award process has an appropriate impact on staff’s behaviour.

228.Performance criteria should include achievable objectives and measures on which the identified staff member has some direct influence. For example, variables at individual level for a lending officer could be the performance of loans originated or monitored by that person, while for the manager of a business unit it could be the performance of the management team of that unit. When assessing performance, the results and outcomes actually realised should be measured.

229.Quantitative criteria should cover a period which is long enough to properly capture the risk taken by identified staff members, business units and the institution and should be risk adjusted and include economic efficiency measures. Examples of performance criteria are risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC), return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC), economic profit, internal economic risk capital, net economic contribution, risk-adjusted cost of funding, risk figures derived from the internal capital adequacy assessment process or financial figures which relate to the budget of functions (e.g. for corporate function, including legal and human resources) or to their operational risk profile, or pure accounting adjustments.

230.Operating efficiency indicators (e.g. profits, revenues, productivity, costs and volume metrics) or some market criteria (e.g. share price and total shareholder return) do not incorporate explicit risk adjustment and are very short term and therefore not sufficient to capture all risks of the identified staff member’s activities. Such performance criteria require additional risk adjustments.

231.Qualitative criteria (such as the achievement of results, compliance with strategy within the risk appetite and compliance track record) should be relevant at an institution, business unit or individual level. Examples of qualitative criteria are the achievement of strategic targets, customer satisfaction, adherence to risk management policy, compliance with internal and external rules, leadership, teamwork, creativity, motivation and cooperation with other business units, internal control and corporate functions.

232. Where control functions’ staff receive variable remuneration, it should be appraised and the variable part of remuneration determined separately from the business units they control, including the performance which results from business decisions (e.g. new product approval) where the control function is involved.

233.The criteria used for assessing the performance and risks should predominantly be based on the internal control functions’ objectives. Variable remuneration for control functions should predominantly follow from control objectives, e.g. the Tier 1 ratio, the non-performing loan ratio, the non-performing loan recovery rate or audit findings. Their variable remuneration may be based also to some extent on the performance of the institution as a whole. The institution should consider setting a significantly lower ratio between the variable and fixed components of remuneration for control functions compared to the business units they control.

234.If the head of the risk management function (Chief Risk Officer or CRO) is also a member of the management body, the principles set out in paragraphs 232 and 233 should also apply to the CRO’s remuneration.

235.Institutions should set a bonus pool. When determining bonus pools or individual awards, institutions should consider all current risks, expected losses, estimated unexpected losses and stressed conditions associated with the institution’s activities.

236.Variable remuneration should be awarded after the end of the accrual period. The accrual period should be at least one year. Where longer periods are used, different accrual periods may overlap, for example if a new multi-year period starts each year.

237.After the accrual period, the institution should determine the individual identified staff membe rs’ variable remuneration by translating the performance criteria and risk adjustments into actual remuneration awards. During this award process, the institution should adjust remuneration for potential adverse developments in the future (‘ex ante risk adjustment‘).

238.Institutions should define one or more bonus pools for the period for which variable remuneration is awarded and calculate the overall institution-wide bonus pool as a sum of these bonus pools.

239.When setting the bonus pools, institutions should take into account the ratio between the variable and fixed components of total remuneration applicable to categories of identified staff, performance and risk criteria defined for the overall institution, control objectives and the financial situation of the institution, including its capital base and liquidity. The performance indicators used to calculate the bonus pool should include long-term performance indicators and take into account the realised financial results. A prudent use of accounting and valuation methods should be in place which ensures a true and fair evaluation of the financial results, capital base and liquidity.

240.The bonus pools should not be set at a certain level to meet remuneration demands.

241.Institutions should have appropriate processes and controls in place when determining the overall bonus pool.

242.Where institutions use a top-down approach, they should set the amount of the bonus pool at the level of the institution, which is then fully or partially distributed among the business units and control functions after the evaluation of their performance. The individual awards should subsequently be based on the assessment of the individual’s performance.

243.Where institutions set the bonus pool in a bottom-up approach, the process should start at the level of the individual staff member. Depending on the performance criteria by which staff are assessed, a bonus pool allocation should be made for the staff member; the bonus pool of the business unit and the institution equals the sums of potential awards allocated to the respective subordinated levels. The institution should ensure that the institution’s overall performance is appropriately taken into account.

244.When distributing the bonus pool to the level of the business unit or individual staff member, the allocation should be based as appropriate on predefined formulae and judgemental approaches. Institutions may use scorecards or other appropriate methods to combine different approaches.

245.When choosing the approach, institutions should take into account the following: formulae are more transparent and, therefore, lead to clear incentives, as the staff member knows all factors determining his or her variable remuneration. However, formulae may not capture all objectives, especially the qualitative ones, which can be better captured by judgemental approaches. The judgemental approach gives more flexibility to management and can, therefore, weaken the risk-based incentive effect of the performance-based variable remuneration. It should, therefore, be applied with appropriate controls and in a well-documented and transparent process. 246.Factors such as budget constraints, retention of staff and recruiting considerations, subsidisation among business units, etc. should not dominate the distribution of the bonus pool as they can weaken the relationship between performance, risk and remuneration.

247. Institutions should maintain records on how the bonus pool and staff’s remuneration were determined, including how estimates based on different approaches were combined.

248.Institutions should determine the bonus pool and variable remuneration to be awarded based on an assessment of performance and risks taken. The adjustment for risks before the award is made (‘ex ante risk adjustment’) should be based on risk indicators and ensure that the variable remuneration awarded is fully aligned with the risks taken. The criteria used for the ex ante risk adjustment should be sufficiently granular to reflect all relevant risks.

249.Depending on the availability of risk adjustment criteria, institutions should determine at what level they apply ex ante risk adjustments to the calculation of the bonus pool. This should be at the level of the business unit or at the level of organisational substructures thereof, e.g. the trading desk or the individual staff member.

250.Risk alignment should be achieved by using risk-adjusted performance criteria, including performance criteria that are adjusted for risk based on separate risk indicators. Quantitative and qualitative criteria should be used.

251.The ex ante risk adjustments made by institutions, where based on quantitative criteria, should largely rely on existing measures within the institutions used for other risk management purposes. Where adjustments to such measures are made within risk management processes, institutions should also make consistent changes in the remuneration framework. Quantitative criteria include:

• a. economic capital, economic profit, return on risk-weighted assets and return on allocated equity;
• b. the cost and quantity of the capital required for the risks of its activities, whereas the distribution of capital costs should reflect the risk profile of the institution and the whole of the institution’s equity should be fully allocated and charged;
• c. the cost and quantity of liquidity risk assumed in the course of business;
• d. indirect liquidity costs (i.e. mismatch liquidity costs, cost of contingent liquidity risk and other liquidity risk exposures that an institution may have).

252.When measuring the profitability of the institution and its business units, the measurement should be based on the net revenue where all direct and indirect costs related to the activity are included. Institutions should not exclude costs of corporate functions, e.g. IT costs, group overheads or discontinued businesses.

253.Institutions should make qualitative ex ante risk adjustments when determining the bonus pool and identified staff’s remuneration through, for example, the use of balanced scorecards that explicitly include risk and control considerations such as compliance breaches, risk limit breaches and internal control indicators (e.g. based on internal audit results) or other similar methods.

254.Institutions should pay the variable remuneration partly upfront and partly deferred and in an appropriate balance between equity, equity-linked and other eligible instruments and cash in accordance with Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Before paying out the deferred part of cash or the vesting of deferred instruments, a reassessment of the performance and, if necessary, an ex post risk adjustment should be applied to align variable remuneration to additional risks that have been identified or materialised after the award. This also applies where multi-year accrual periods are used.

255.Institutions should implement a deferral schedule that appropriately aligns the remuneration of staff with the institution’s activities, business cycle and risk profile and the activities of the identified staff members, so that a sufficient part of the variable remuneration can be adjusted for risk outcomes over time through ex post risk adjustments.

256.A deferral schedule is defined by different components:

• a. the proportion of the variable remuneration that is being deferred (section 15.2);
• b. the length of the deferral period (section 15.2);
• c. the speed at which the deferred remuneration vests, including the time span from the end of the accrual period until the vesting of the first deferred amount (section 15.3).

257.Institutions should take into account within the deferral schedule the form in which the deferred variable remuneration is awarded and should, where appropriate, differentiate their deferral schedules by varying these components for different categories of identified staff. The combination of these components should lead to an effective deferral schedule in which clear incentives for long-term-oriented risk taking are provided by transparent risk alignment procedures.

258.The deferral period starts after the award is made (e.g. at the moment the upfront part of the variable remuneration is paid out). Deferral can be applied to both types of variable remuneration: cash and instruments.

259.When setting the actual deferral period and proportion to be deferred in accordance with the minimum requirements under Article 94(1)(m) and Article 94(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU, institutions should consider:

• a. the responsibilities and authorities of identified staff and the tasks they performed;
• b. the business cycle and nature of the institution’s activities;
• c. expected fluctuations in the economic activity and performance and risks of the institution and business unit and the impact of identified staff on these fluctuations;
• d. the approved ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration and the absolute amount of variable remuneration.

260.Institutions should determine for which categories of identified staff, also considering their roles and responsibilities, deferral periods longer than the required minimum period of at least four to five years should be applied to ensure that the variable remuneration is aligned with the risk profile in the long term. Where longer multi-year accrual periods are used and where the longer accrual period provides more certainty about the risks that have materialised since the beginning of the accrual period, institutions should consider this fact when setting deferral and retention periods and may, where appropriate, introduce deferral periods that are shorter than the deferral periods which would be appropriate when a one-year accrual period would be used. The minimum requirement of a four-year deferral period and five year deferral period for members of the management body and senior management in significant institutions applies in any case.

261.For members of the management body and senior management, significant institutions that do not benefit from the waiver within Article 94(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU should defer a significantly higher portion than 50% of the variable remuneration paid in instruments.

262.Institutions should set an appropriate portion of remuneration that should be deferred for a category of identified staff or a single identified staff member at or above the minimum proportion of 40%. In case of particularly high amounts of variable remuneration, the proportion of deferral for such staff members should be at least 60%.

263.Institutions should define what level of variable remuneration constitutes a particularly high amount, taking into account the average remuneration paid within the institution, the EBA remuneration benchmarking report and, where available, national and other remuneration benchmarking results and the thresholds set by competent authorities. When implementing the guidelines, competent authorities should set an absolute or relative threshold, considering the above criteria. Remuneration at or above that threshold should always be considered as being a particularly high amount.

264.Where institutions determine the proportion that is deferred by a cascade of absolute amounts (e.g. part between 0 and 100: 100% upfront; part between 100 and 200: 50% upfront and the rest is deferred; and part above 200: 25% upfront and the rest is deferred), institutions should be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that on an average weighted basis for each identified staff member the institution respects the 40% to 60% minimum deferral threshold and that the deferred portion is appropriate and correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the identified staff member in question.

265.Where the general principles of national contract and labour law prevent the substantial reduction of variable remuneration where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, institutions should apply a deferral scheme and use instruments for the award of variable remuneration which ensure that ex post risk adjustments are applied as far as possible. This may include any of the following:

• a. the setting of longer deferral periods;
• b. avoiding the use of pro rata vesting in situations where malus can be applied, but the application of clawback would be subject to legal impediments;
• c. awarding a higher portion of variable remuneration in instruments that are aligned to the performance of the institution and subject to sufficiently long deferral and retention periods.

266.The first deferred portion should not vest sooner than 12 months after the start of the deferral period. The deferral period ends when the awarded variable remuneration has vested or where the amount was reduced to zero as malus was applied.

267.Deferred remuneration should either vest fully at the end of the deferral period or be spread out over several payments in the course of the deferral period in accordance with Article 94(1)(m) of Directive 2013/36/EU.

268.Pro rata vesting means for e.g. a deferral period of four years that at the end of years n+1, n+2, n+3 and n+4, one fourth of the deferred remuneration vests, with n being the moment at which the upfront part of awarded variable remuneration is paid.

269.Vesting should not take place more frequently than on a yearly basis to ensure a proper assessment of risks before the application of ex post adjustments.

270.The instruments used for the award of variable remuneration should contribute to the alignment of variable remuneration with the performance and risks of the institution.

271.Where instruments issued by an institution in the scope of consolidation under points (i) and

• (ii) of Article 94(1)(l) of the CRD are available, the variable remuneration should consist of a balance of different types of instruments. Institutions should, where such instruments are available, prioritise the use of instruments subject to bail-in, in line with the instruments set out in the RTS on instruments, and shares, rather than the use of value-based items like share-linked instruments.

272.The availability of instruments under Article 94(1)(l)(i) of the CRD depends on the legal form of an institution:

• a. For institutions which are stock corporations (both listed and non-listed), shares or share-linked instruments are available.
• b. For institutions which are non-stock corporations, ownership interests that are equivalent to shares or non-cash instruments that are equivalent to share-linked instruments are available.

273.Share-linked or other equivalent non-cash instruments (e.g. stock appreciation rights, types of synthetic shares) are those instruments or contractual obligations, including instruments based on cash, whose value is based on the market price or, where a market price is not available, the fair value of the stock or equivalent ownership right and track the market price or fair value. All such instruments should have the same effect in terms of loss absorbency as shares or equivalent ownership interests.

274. The availability of ‘other instruments’ under Article 94 (1)(l)(ii) of Directive 2013/36/EU depends on whether an institution or an institution in the scope of consolidation has already issued such instruments and sufficient amounts of such instruments are available. Where institutions are primarily wholesale funded, or rely to a large extent on additional Tier 1, Tier 2 or bail-in-able debt to meet their capital requirements, such instruments should be available for the purposes of variable remuneration, provided that these ‘other instruments’ comply with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 527/2014.

275. Where there are no specific factors or national laws that prevent the use of ‘other instruments’ under Article 94(1)(l)(ii) of Directive 2013/36/EU, or factors that prevent institutions from issuing instruments in compliance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 527/2014, then such instruments should be used for the award of variable remuneration, where they are available.

276.Where both equity or equity-linked and other eligible instruments defined under Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 527/2014 are available, it is possible to pay variable remuneration as a balance of different instruments. In that case, institutions must ensure that the portion of variable remuneration that is paid in instruments comprises an appropriate balance of instruments under point (i) and point (ii) of Article 94(1)(l) of Directive 2013/36/EU. Institutions should be able to demonstrate that they have taken into account the interests of shareholders, creditors, bondholders and other stakeholders when setting the balance between different instruments.

277.Institutions should ensure that they have the awarded instruments available when the variable remuneration awarded in instruments vests. Institutions may decide not to hold the instruments during the deferral period, but should in that case take into account the relevant market risks.

278.Instruments should be priced at the market price or their fair value on the date of the award of these instruments. This price is the basis for the determination of the initial number of instruments and for later ex post adjustments to the number of instruments or their value. Such valuations should also be done before the vesting to ensure that ex post risk adjustments are applied correctly and before the retention period ends. Institutions that are not large institutions and that are not listed may establish the value of the ownership interests and ownership interest-linked instruments based on the last annual financial results.

279.Institutions may award a fixed number or nominal amount of deferred instruments using different techniques, including trustee depot facilities and contracts, provided that in every case the number or nominal amount of the instruments awarded is provided to identified staff at vesting, unless the number or nominal amount is reduced by the application of malus. Institutions should make sure that the awarded instruments are available for the pay out to staff at the latest when they vest.

280.Institutions should not pay any interest or dividend on instruments which have been awarded as variable remuneration under deferral arrangements to identified staff; this also means that interest and dividends payable during the deferral period should not be paid to staff after the deferral period ends. Such payments should be treated as received and owned by the institution.

281.Competent authorities should not limit the possibility to use instruments under Article 94(1)(l) to such an extent that institutions cannot establish an appropriate balance between instruments under point (i) and point (ii) of Article 94(1)(l) of Directive 2013/36/EU.

282.Where applicable, the requirement to pay, in accordance with Article 94(1)(l) of Directive 2013/36/EU, at a minimum 50% of any variable remuneration in instruments should be applied equally to the non-deferred and the deferred part and both parts should consist of a balance of instruments in line with the guidelines in section 15.4. 283.Institutions should prioritise the use of instruments rather than award variable remuneration in cash. Institutions should set the percentage which must be awarded in a balance of instruments at or above 50% separately for the deferred and non-deferred parts of variable remuneration. Where institutions award a higher portion than 50% of the variable remuneration in instruments, they should prioritise a higher share of instruments within the deferred portion of the variable remuneration component.

284.The ratio of variable remuneration that is paid out in instruments should be calculated as the quotient between the amount of variable remuneration awarded in instruments and the sum of the variable remuneration awarded in cash, instruments and in other benefits. All amounts should be valued at the point of award unless stated otherwise in these guidelines.

285.The retention period applied to variable remuneration paid in instruments should be set at an appropriate length in order to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution.

286.Institutions should be able to explain how the retention policy relates to other risk alignment measures and how they differentiate between instruments paid upfront and deferred instruments.

287.When setting the retention period, institutions should consider the overall length of the deferral and the planned retention period and the impact of the category of identified staff on the institutions’ risk profile and the length of the business cycle relevant to the category of staff.

288.A longer retention period as applied in general to all identified staff should be considered in cases where the risks underlying the performance can materialise beyond the end of the deferral and standard retention period, at least for the staff with the highest impact on the institutions’ risk profile.

289.For awarded instruments, a retention period of at least one year should be set. Longer periods should be set in particular where ex post risk adjustments mainly rely on changes in the value of instruments which have been awarded. Where the deferral period is at least five years, a retention period for the deferred part of at least six months may be imposed for identified staff other than members of the management body and senior management for whom a minimum retention period of one year should be applied.

15.7 Risk adjustment

290.Malus or clawback arrangements are explicit ex post risk adjustment mechanisms where the institution itself adjusts remuneration of the identified staff member based on such mechanisms (e.g. by lowering awarded cash remuneration or by reducing the number or value of instruments awarded). 291.Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract or labour law, institutions must be able to apply malus or clawback arrangements to up to 100% of the total variable remuneration in accordance with Article 94(1)(n) of Directive 2013/36/EU regardless of the method used for the payment, including deferral or retention arrangements.

292.Ex post risk adjustments should always be performance or risk related. They should respond to the actual risk outcomes or changes to persisting risks of the institution, business line or staff’s activities. They should not be based on the amount of dividends paid or the evolution of the share price.

293.Institutions should analyse whether their initial ex ante risk adjustments were sufficient, e.g. whether risks have been omitted or underestimated or new risks were identified or unexpected losses occurred. The extent to which an ex post risk adjustment is needed depends on the accuracy of the ex ante risk adjustment and should be established by the institution based on back-testing.

294.When setting criteria for the application of malus and clawback in accordance with Article 94(1)(n) of Directive 2013/36/EU, institutions should also set a period during which malus or clawback will be applied to identified staff. This period should at least cover deferral and retention periods. Institutions may differentiate between criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Clawback should in particular be applied in the case of fraud or other conduct with intent or severe negligence which led to significant losses.

295.Institutions should use at least the performance and risk criteria initially used in order to ensure a link between the initial performance measurement and its back-testing. Institutions should, in addition to the criteria set out in Article 94(1)(n)(i) and (ii) of Directive 2013/36/EU, use specific criteria including:

• a. evidence of misconduct or serious error by the staff member (e.g. breach of code of conduct and other internal rules, especially concerning risks);
• b. whether the institution and/or the business unit subsequently suffers a significant downturn in its financial performance (e.g. specific business indicators);
• c. whether the institution and/or the business unit in which the identified staff member works suffers a significant failure of risk management;
• d. significant increases in the institution’s or business unit’ s economic or regulatory capital base;
• e. any regulatory sanctions, e.g. punitive, administrative, disciplinary or otherwise, where the conduct of the identified staff member contributed to the sanction.

296.Where malus can only be applied at the time of vesting of the deferred payment, institutions may choose, where possible, to apply clawback after the pay out or vesting of the variable remuneration. The application of malus may not be possible where the derogation under Article 94(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU applies as the requirement to defer variable remuneration is not applied; institutions should ensure that clawback can be applied.

297.Malus and clawback arrangements should lead to a reduction of the variable remuneration where appropriate. Under no circumstances should an explicit ex post risk adjustment lead to an increase of the variable remuneration initially awarded or, where malus or clawback was already applied in the past, to an increase of the reduced variable remuneration.

298.Institutions should use instruments for variable remuneration where the price reacts to changes in the institution’s perfor mance or risk. The evolution of the stock price or the price of other instruments should not be considered as a substitute for explicit ex post risk adjustments.

299.Where instruments were awarded and staff, after deferral and retention periods, sell these instruments or the instrument is paid out in cash at its final maturity, staff should be able to receive the amount due. The amount can be higher than the amount initially awarded where the market price or the instrument’s fair value has increased.

Title V - Institutions that benefit from government intervention

300.In line with section 6 of these guidelines, where institutions benefit from exceptional government intervention, competent authorities and institutions should establish regular contacts with regard to the setting of the pool of possible variable remuneration and the award of variable remuneration to ensure compliance with Articles 93 and 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Any payment of variable remuneration should not endanger compliance with the established recovery and exit plan from exceptional government intervention.

301.The Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (2013/C 216/01) should be applied within the remuneration policies. Any condition with regard to remuneration imposed on institutions when state aid has been approved by the Commission and granted and within any related acts should be reflected appropriately in the institutions’ remuneration policy.

302. The variable remuneration of an institution’s staff, including members of the management body, should not prevent an orderly and timely payback of the exceptional government intervention or the achievement of objectives set in the restructuring plan.

303.The institution should ensure that a bonus pool or the vesting and pay out of variable remuneration does not pose a detriment to the timely building up of its capital base and a decrease in its dependence on exceptional government intervention. 304.Without prejudice to any existing conditions imposed by the Member State or the Union with regard to remuneration, the relevant competent authority should set, for institutions that have been given exceptional government intervention, the percentage of the net revenue under point (a) of Article 93 of Directive 2013/36/EU that can be used for variable remuneration and assess if the variable remuneration is aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth and take measures to restructure the remuneration where necessary.

305.Strict limits on the variable remuneration of members of the management body should be applied in the context of restructuring remuneration within the meaning of point (b) of Article 93 of Directive 2013/36/EU when:

• a. The relevant competent authority requires the institution not to pay out variable remuneration for members of the management body from the date on which the exceptional government intervention was received or to apply malus and clawback to variable remuneration taking into account potential failures of the management body.
• b. The relevant competent authority may require the institution not to award any variable remuneration to members of the management body as long as the exceptional government intervention is not yet paid back, or until a restructuring plan for the institution is implemented or accomplished. Such measures should be limited in time. The period during which the limits apply or the criteria for the application of such limits should be clearly recorded and communicated to the institution when government support is given.

306.In order to restructure remuneration in accordance with Article 93(b) of Directive 2013/36/EU in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, competent authorities should require:

• a. where appropriate, the limiting of variable remuneration for members of the management body to amounts down to zero so that the variable remuneration has no considerable impact on the recovery of the institution;
• b. the alignment of performance measures used for determining variable remuneration with the recovery progress of the institution and the contribution of identified staff, including the management body in this regard;
• c. the application of clawback and malus for earlier award periods as appropriate, in particular to staff who significantly contributed to the situation under which that institution required state aid;
• d. an increase in the percentage of variable remuneration which is deferred up to 100%;
• e. the alignment of the accrual and deferral periods with the recovery or restructuring phase and plans. 307.Institutions and competent authorities should take into account that there may be the need to provide for the possible award of variable remuneration to newly appointed members of the management body who are hired during the recovery or restructuring phase of the institution to ensure that suitable members of the management body can be appointed during that phase.

Title VI - Competent authorities

308.Competent authorities should ensure, taking into account these guidelines, the EBA guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate and the EBA guidelines on the supervisory review process, that institutions comply with the requirements on remuneration policies set out in Directive 2013/36/EU, Regulation (EU) 575/2013 and the provisions of the RTS on identified staff, including that they have appropriate gender-neutral remuneration policies for all staff and for identified staff. Competent authorities should apply a risk-based approach when supervising the remuneration policies of institutions.

309.Without prejudice to other supervisory and disciplinary measures and sanctions, competent authorities should require institutions to take adequate actions in order to remedy any identified deficiencies. Where institutions do not comply with such requests, appropriate supervisory measures should be taken.

310.Competent authorities should ensure that institutions align their remuneration policy and practices to the business strategy and the long-term interest of the institution, taking into account its business and risk strategy, corporate culture and values, and risk profile.

311. Competent authorities should ensure that institutions’ remuneration policies, practices and processes are appropriate and review, in addition to the reviews required under the EBA guidelines on the supervisory review process, in particular:

• a. the governance arrangements and processes for designing and monitoring the remuneration policy;
• b. that an appropriate exchange of information among all internal bodies and functions, including within the group, involved in designing, executing and monitoring the remuneration policy is carried out;
• c. the process developed for conducting the annual review of the remuneration policies and practices and its main results, including whether the remuneration policy is gender neutral;
• d. that a remuneration committee with sufficient powers and resources to perform its functions is established where required;
• e. the impact of the remuneration policy and practices on the conduct of business, including advising and selling of products to different customer groups;
• f. that remuneration policies are taken into account within the internal capital adequacy assessment process and the liquidity planning and vice versa.

312.As part of the above reviews, competent authorities should in particular, but not only :

• a. use the minutes of the deliberation of the supervisory function on remuneration policies, in particular with respect to the results of the oversight of the institution’s remuneration system ’ s design and processes and the tasks conducted by the remuneration committee;
• b. use the minutes of the remuneration committee and other committees, including the risk committee, involved in the oversight of the remuneration system’s design and operation;
• c. hold meetings with members of the institution’s management body and other relevant functions.

313.Competent authorities should ensure that institutions supervised on a consolidated and sub-consolidated basis have established a remuneration policy at the group and sub-consolidated level, including – as far as required by the national implementation of Article 109(4) to (6) of Directive 2013/36/EU – subsidiaries which are not themselves subject to Directive 2013/36/EU, which is implemented consistently within the group, including for the purposes of the determination of identified staff.³⁶

314.Competent authorities should ensure that the institutions’ identification process :

• a. includes the qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in Article 92 of Directive 2013/36/EU and in the RTS on identified staff and where appropriate additional criteria defined by the institution;
• b. is applied appropriately on an individual, consolidated or sub-consolidated level; and
• c. ensures that requests for prior approval under the RTS on identified staff are processed in accordance with these guidelines.

315.Competent authorities should be satisfied with the overall outcome of the identification process and should assess if all staff members whose activities have or may have a material impact on the institution’s risk profile have been identified and that any exclusions of staff from the category of identified staff, where staff were only identified by the quantitative criteria under Article 92 of Directive 2013/36/EU and in the RTS, are well reasoned and that the requirements under Article 92 of Directive 2013/36/EU and the respective processes set out in these guidelines and the RTS have been complied with.

³⁶ Please also refer to the guidelines in paragraphs 74 and 75 of these guidelines.

316.With regard to specific forms of remuneration under section 8 of these guidelines, competent authorities should, without prejudice to Section 19:

• a. review any guaranteed variable remuneration arrangements (amount, duration, conditions, etc.);
• b. check whether an institution has a framework in place to determine and approve severance payments;
• c. assess whether the objectives for control function staff are function specific;
• d. review the remuneration of members of the management and supervisory function of the management body.

317.Competent authorities should review:

• a. the performance and risk assessment and alignment process and the appropriateness of its time horizon;
• b. the appropriate combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria used to measure performance and risk and determine whether:
• ii. the criteria are aligned with the institution’s objectives;
• iii. they are realistic compared with the individual’s, business unit’s and institution’s objectives;
• iv. the individual criteria are appropriate to measure the individual’s performance;
• c. whether internal control functions, in particular the risk management function, are appropriately involved in the determination of ex ante risk adjustments;
• d. the appropriateness of the top-down and bottom-up approaches used to calculate the bonus pool;
• e. whether the institution is complying with the limitation of the ratio between the variable and fixed components of the total remuneration and the capping of its overall bonus pool to the limits set by Articles 141 and 141b of Directive 2013/36/EU and by Article 16a of Directive 2014/59/EU;
• f. the time horizon of the applicable deferral and retention schedules and how it relates to the business cycle of an institution;
• g. the combination of shares or equivalent ownership interests or share-linked and equivalent non-cash instruments that the institution uses to meet the 50% threshold referred to in Article 94(1)(l) of Directive 2013/36/EU to ensure that it adequately reflects the long-term interests of the institution;
• h. whether explicit ex post risk adjustments are based on the performance assessment of the staff member, business unit and institution and the criteria used to measure the performance of the staff member;
• i. whether malus and clawback have been appropriately applied to both the cash and equity part of the deferred and non-deferred variable remuneration and the criteria on which malus and clawback rely;
• j. that variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods which aim at or effectively lead to non-compliance with remuneration requirements as specified in these Guidelines for identified staff or, where applicable, for all staff.

318.Competent authorities should review the public disclosures on remuneration made by institutions in accordance with Article 96 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 450 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013, and should establish for which institutions a regular review of disclosures should be performed.

319.In addition to the benchmarking of remuneration practices required under Article 75(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU and the exercise on data collection regarding high earners under Article 75(3) of that Directive, competent authorities should require periodic (or ad hoc) supervisory reporting on remuneration disclosures as appropriate in order to monitor the development of remuneration practices within institutions and in particular within significant institutions.

320.Colleges of supervisors established pursuant to Article 116 of Directive 2013/36/EU should discuss remuneration issues in line with the supervisory review process, taking into account the additional areas of supervisory review required under these guidelines.

Annex 1 ‐ MAPPING OF THE REMUNERATION REQUIREMENTS

INCLUDED IN DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU AND REGULATION (EU)

requirements: (institution-wide identified staff; Articles 74 and 92 including institutions should to 96 of DIRECTIVE identified staff) consider applying 2013/36/EU the requirements to all staff Art. 74 x Art. 92 x Art. 93 x Art. 94(1)(a) x Art. 94(1)(b) x Art. 94(1)(c) x Art. 94(1)(d) x Art. 94(1)(e) x Art. 94(1)(f) x Art. 94(1)(g)(i) x Art. 94(1)(g)(ii) x

Art. 94(1)(h) x Art. 94(1)(i) x Art. 94(1)(j) x Art. 94(1)(k) x Art. 94(1)(l) x Art. 94(1)(m) x Art. 94(1)(n) x Art. 94(1)(o) x Art. 94(1)(p) x

Art. 95 Obligatory for significant institutions; other institutions should consider establishing such a committee Art. 96 x Art. 109 Institutions' arrangements, processes and mechanisms/group application Art. 141 Limitation of distributions Art. 141b Limitation of distributions

Annex 2 ‐ Information with regard to the approval of higher

Institution name

Legal Entity Identifier

Number of staff (end of the last financial

Number of identified staff (outcome of the