+Guidelines on remuneration policies for investment firms (EBA/GL/2021/13)
---+1. Compliance and reporting obligations
------+Status of these guidelines
---------+1. This document contains guidelines issued pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 …
---------+2. Guidelines set the EBA view of appropriate supervisory practices within the European System of …
------+Reporting requirements
---------+3. In accordance with Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, competent authorities must …
---------+4. Notifications will be published on the EBA website in line with Article 16(3).
---+2. Subject matter, scope and definitions
------+Subject matter
---------+5. These guidelines specify further, in accordance with Article 26(4) and Article 34(3) of …
---------+6. While investment firms are required to have remuneration policies for all staff, additional …
------+Addressees
---------+7. These guidelines are addressed to competent authorities as referred to in Article 4 (2), point …
------+Scope of application
---------+8. These guidelines apply on an individual and consolidated basis within the scope set out in …
------+Definitions
---------+9. The terms used and defined in Directive 2019/34/EU, Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No …
---+3. Implementation
------+Date of application
---------+10. These guidelines apply from 30 April 2022.
------+Transitional provisions
---------+11. Investment firms should implement any adjustments of their remuneration policies by 30 April …
---+4. Guidelines
------+Title I - Remuneration policies
------+1. Remuneration policies for all staff
---------+12. In accordance with Article 26 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, investment firms are required to …
---------+13. The remuneration policy should specify all components of remuneration and include also the …
---------+14. The fixed remuneration of staff should reflect their professional experience and organisational …
---------+15. Where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support, the investment …
---------+16. The investment firm’s remuneration policy for all staff should be consistent with the …
---------+17. Investment firms should be able to demonstrate to the competent authorities that the …
---------+18. Where variable remuneration is awarded, such awards should be based on the investment firms’ …
---------+19. The remuneration policy should be consistent with the requirement for an investment firm to …
---------+20. The remuneration policy should contain: a. the performance objectives for the investment firm …
---------+21. Investment firms should ensure that potential conflicts of interest caused by the pay-out of …
---------+22. Where remuneration policies or group remuneration policies are implemented in investment firms …
---------+23. Without prejudice to any measures adopted by Member States to prevent or compensate for …
---------+24. A gender neutral remuneration policy should ensure that all aspects of the remuneration policy …
---------+25. When determining the pay per unit of measurement or time, investment firms should duly consider …
---------+26. In order to monitor the application of gender neutral remuneration policies, investment firms …
---------+27. Investment firms may consider in a gender neutral manner additional aspects when determining …
------+2. Governance of remuneration
------+2.1 Responsibilities, design, approval and oversight of the remuneration policy
---------+28. The management body in its supervisory function (hereafter ‘supervisory function’) should be …
---------+29. The supervisory function should collectively have adequate knowledge, skills and experience …
---------+30. The supervisory function should ensure that the investment firm’s remuneration policies and …
---------+31. Conflicts of interests with regard to the remuneration policy and remuneration awarded should …
---------+32. The remuneration policy and practices and the procedures to determine them should be clear …
---------+33. The supervisory and management functions and, where established, the remuneration and the risk …
---------+34. The remuneration policy should provide for an effective framework for performance measurement …
---------+35. The compliance function and the risk management function, where established, or staff entrusted …
---------+36. The supervisory function should determine and oversee the remuneration of the members of the …
---------+37. The supervisory function should take into account the input provided by all competent corporate …
---------+38. The human resources function should participate in and inform on the drawing up and the …
---------+39. The risk management function should assist in and inform on the definition of suitable …
---------+40. The compliance function should analyse how the remuneration policy affects the investment …
---------+41. The internal audit function, where established, should carry out an independent review of the …
---------+42. Within a group context, the competent functions within the Union parent undertaking and …
------+2.2 Shareholders’ involvement
---------+43. Depending on the investment firm’s legal form and on the applicable national law, the approval …
---------+44. Where the approval of the remuneration of individual members of the management body and other …
---------+45. In order that shareholders can make informed decisions in line with paragraphs 43 and 44, the …
---------+46. The supervisory function remains responsible for the proposals submitted to the shareholders’ …
------+2.3 Setting up a remuneration committee
---------+47. Unless otherwise specified by national law, an investment firm with on and off ‐ balance-sheet …
---------+48. The remuneration committee might be established at group level, including in situations where …
---------+49. Where no remuneration committee has to be established, the provisions of these guidelines …
------+2.3.1 Composition of the remuneration committee
---------+50. In line with Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, the remuneration committee consists of …
---------+51. The chair and the majority of members of the remuneration committee should qualify as …
---------+52. Members of the remuneration committee should have collectively appropriate knowledge, expertise …
------+2.3.2 Role of the remuneration committee
---------+53. The remuneration committee should: a. be responsible for the preparation of decisions on …
---------+54. Where the investment firm has established a remuneration committee, the remuneration of the …
------+2.3.3 Process and reporting lines
---------+55. The remuneration committee should: a. have access to all data and information concerning the …
---------+56. The remuneration committee should collaborate with other committees of the supervisory function …
---------+57. When established, the risk committee should, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration …
---------+58. A member of the risk committee should, where relevant, participate in the meetings of the …
------+2.4 Review of the remuneration policy
---------+59. The supervisory function and, where established, the remuneration committee should ensure that …
---------+60. Investment firms should monitor the development of the gender pay gap; in case of investment …
---------+61. Where material differences between the average pay between male and female staff or male and …
---------+62. In groups of investment firms, a central review of compliance with the regulation, group …
---------+63. Investment firms should perform the central and independent review on an individual basis. In a …
---------+64. Notwithstanding the responsibility of the management body in its supervisory function, the …
---------+65. As part of the central and independent internal review, investment firms should assess whether …
---------+66. The other relevant internal corporate functions (i.e. human resources, legal, strategic …
---------+67. Where periodic reviews reveal that the remuneration policies do not operate as intended or …
---------+68. The results of the performed internal review and actions taken to remedy any findings should be …
------+2.5 Internal transparency
---------+69. The remuneration policy of an investment firm should be internally disclosed to all staff and …
---------+70. Staff should be informed about the characteristics of their variable remuneration, as well as …
------+3. Remuneration policies and group context
---------+71. In accordance with Article 25 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, investment firms must, without …
---------+72. At the consolidated level, the Union parent undertaking and competent authorities should ensure …
---------+73. Regarding investment firms and entities within a group located in more than one Member State …
---------+74. When applying the requirements on a consolidated basis, the remuneration requirements …
---------+75. Staff seconded from a parent undertaking in a third country to an EU subsidiary that is an …
---------+76. Short-term contracts or secondments must not be used as a means of circumventing the …
---------+77. The remuneration requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 and the provisions of these …
------+4 Proportionality
---------+78. The proportionality principle as set out under Article 26(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 aims …
---------+79. When applying the remuneration requirements and the provisions of these guidelines in a …
---------+80. The obligation to have sound and effective remuneration policies and practices applies to all …
---------+81. When assessing what is proportionate and in determining the required level of sophistication of …
---------+82. Where investment firms are authorised to provide the services and activities listed in point …
---------+83. For the above purposes, investment firms and competent authorities should take into account at …
---------+84. Before remuneration requirements and the provisions set out in these guidelines are applied in …
---------+85. When implementing specific remuneration policies for different categories of identified staff …
---------+86. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms comply with the remuneration …
---------+87. Without prejudice to the implementation of Article 32(4) of Directive 2019/2034/EU by Member …
---------+88. When establishing the amount of the annual variable remuneration paid to a staff member and the …
---------+89. When calculating the average of the value of the assets for the four-year period immediately …
---------+90. Where national law empowers competent authorities to set the thresholds under point (a) of …
---------+91. Where national law empowers competent authorities to set the thresholds under Article 32(7) of …
------+5. The identification process
---------+92. It is the responsibility of investment firms to identify the members of staff whose …
---------+93. The self-assessment should be based on the qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in the …
---------+94. When applying quantitative criteria based on staff members’ remuneration, the fixed …
---------+95. When applying quantitative criteria defined in EUR, investment firms which award remuneration …
---------+96. The self-assessment should be clear, consistent, properly documented and periodically updated …
---------+97. The following information should at least be included in the documentation of the …
---------+98. Investment firms should keep records of the identification process and its results and should …
---------+99. The documentation of the self-assessment should at least include the number of identified …
---------+100. The documentation should also include staff members who have been identified under …
------+5.1 Prior approval of exclusions
---------+101. Where the investment firm determines in accordance with the RTS on identified staff that the …
---------+102. The prior approval regarding exclusions of staff identified in relation to the quantitative …
---------+103. Where identified staff would be excluded in subsidiaries which are not themselves subject to …
---------+104. Requests for prior approval should include all names or another unique identifier for …
------+5.2 Governance of the identification process
---------+105. The management body has the ultimate responsibility for the identification process and the …
---------+106. Where a remuneration committee is established, it should be actively involved in the …
---------+107. The compliance function, the risk management function or the staff entrusted with the risk …
------+5.3 Identification process on individual and consolidated level
---------+108. When identifying the categories of staff under Article 30(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 …
---------+109. When applying qualitative identification criteria at consolidated level, staff members in a …
---------+110. When applying quantitative identification criteria on a consolidated basis, investment firms …
---------+111. When applying qualitative identification criteria, investment firms should identify the staff …
------+5.4 Role of the Union parent undertaking
---------+112. The Union parent undertaking should ensure the overall consistency of the group remuneration …
------+5.5 Role of subsidiaries and branches
---------+113. Investment firms that are subsidiaries of a Union parent undertaking should implement within …
---------+114. All subsidiaries should actively participate in the identification process carried out by the …
---------+115. Subsidiaries that are not themselves subject to Directive (EU) 2019/2034 are not required to …
---------+116. Branches in a Member State of investment firms having their head office in a third country and …
---------+117. For third country branches located in a Member State, the criteria for the identification …
------+6. Capital base
---------+118. Investment firms and competent authorities should ensure that the award, pay-out and vesting …
---------+119. When assessing if the capital base is sound, the investment firm should take into account its …
---------+120. Investment firms should include the impact of variable remuneration - both upfront and …
---------+121. The total variable remuneration awarded by an investment firm must not limit the ability of …
---------+122. Investment firms which do not have a sound capital base or where the soundness of the capital …
---------+123. Competent authorities should intervene where the awarding of variable remuneration is …
------+Title II - Structure of remuneration
------+7. Categories of remuneration
---------+124. Under Directive (EU) 2019/2034, remuneration is either fixed or variable remuneration; there …
---------+125. Where the clear allocation of a component to the fixed remuneration is not possible based on …
---------+126. Remuneration is fixed where the conditions for its award and its amount: a. are based on …
---------+127. Remuneration components that are either part of a general investment firm-wide policy where …
---------+128. The following remuneration components should also be considered as fixed, where all similar …
------+8. Particular cases of remuneration components
------+8.1 Allowances
---------+129. The variable and fixed remuneration of investment firms may consist of different components …
---------+130. In particular where allowances are considered as fixed remuneration, but show any of the …
---------+131. Where allowances are based on the role, function or organisational responsibility of staff, in …
---------+132. Competent authorities should ensure that allowances are not a vehicle or method that …
------+8.2 Variable remuneration based on future performance
---------+133. When the award of variable remuneration, including long term incentive plans (LTIPs), is based …
---------+134. Where a prospective remuneration plan for variable remuneration, including LTIPs, is …
------+8.3 Dividends and interest payments
---------+135. Dividends paid on vested shares or equivalent ownership interests that staff receive as …
------+8.4 Retention bonuses
---------+136. Investment firms should be able to substantiate their legitimate interest in awarding …
---------+137. As a general principle, investment firms should not award multiple retention bonuses to a …
---------+138. A retention bonus should be in accordance with the requirements to maintain a sound capital …
---------+139. When assessing and considering whether the award of a retention bonus to identified staff is …
---------+140. A retention bonus should be based on specific conditions that differ from the performance …
---------+141. Retention bonuses should not be awarded to merely compensate for performance-related …
---------+142. Investment firms should set the retention period as the point in time of the event or as the …
---------+143. Retention bonuses are variable remuneration and therefore if awarded to identified staff, must …
---------+144. Independent of the fact that the retention bonus will be awarded only after the end of the …
------+8.5 Discretionary pension benefits
---------+145. Discretionary pension benefits are a form of variable remuneration. Where the terms of the …
---------+146. The investment firm should ensure that where a staff member leaves the investment firm or …
---------+147. The full amount of discretionary pension benefits must be awarded, in accordance with Article …
---------+148. Investment firms should ensure that malus and clawback arrangements are applied in the same …
------+9. Exceptional remuneration components
------+9.1 Guaranteed variable remuneration
---------+149. Guaranteed variable remuneration can take several forms such as a ‘guaranteed bonus‘, ‘welcome …
---------+150. When awarding guaranteed variable remuneration in accordance with Article 32(1)(e) of …
---------+151. Investment firms should only award once to the same single staff member guaranteed variable …
---------+152. As part of the arrangements guaranteeing this part of variable remuneration, investment firms …
------+9.2 Compensation or buyout from previous employment contract
---------+153. The compensation for the buyout of a previous contract should be awarded only when the …
---------+154. Remuneration should be considered as being granted as compensation or for the buyout of a …
------+9.3 Severance and other payments after the end of a contract
------+9.3.1 Severance pay
---------+155. Investment firms’ remuneration policies should specify the possible use of severance payments …
---------+156. Investment firms should have a framework in which severance pay is determined and approved in …
---------+157. Severance payments should not provide for a disproportionate reward, but for an appropriate …
---------+158. Severance pay should not be awarded where there is an obvious failure which allows for the …
---------+159. Severance pay should not be awarded where a staff member resigns voluntarily in order to take …
---------+160. Additional payments in the context of the regular end of a contractual period or appointment …
---------+161. Severance payments include additional payments on top of the regular remuneration in the …
---------+162. Where investment firms award severance pay, the investment firms should be able to demonstrate …
---------+163. When determining the amount of severance payments to be made, the investment firm should take …
---------+164. Failures of investment firms include the following situations: a. where the opening of normal …
---------+165. Failures of identified staff should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and include the …
---------+166. Severance payments should be considered as variable remuneration and as a general principle …
------+9.3.1 Other payments after the end of a contract
---------+167. Regular remuneration payments related to the duration of a notice period should not be …
---------+168. Additional payments in the context of the regular end of a contractual period or of the …
------+10 Prohibitions
------+10.1 Personal hedging
---------+169. Where an appropriate remuneration policy is aligned with risks, it should be sufficiently …
---------+170. Investment firms should ensure to the extent possible that identified staff members are not …
---------+171. Identified staff should be considered to have hedged the risk of a downward adjustment in …
---------+172. Identified staff should be considered to have insured the risk of a downward adjustment where …
---------+173. The requirement to not use personal hedging strategies or insurance to undermine the risk …
---------+174. Investment firms should maintain effective arrangements to ensure that the identified staff …
------+10.2 Circumvention
---------+175. Investment firms should ensure that variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or …
---------+176. ‘Circumvention’ is the non-compliance with remuneration requirements and takes place if an …
---------+177. Circumvention takes place in the following circumstances, among others: a. where variable …
---------+178. Investment firms should ensure that the method for measuring the performance has appropriate …
---------+179. Investment firms should not provide compensation for any reduction or restructuring of …
---------+180. Investment firms should not create group structures or offshore entities or contracts with …
---------+181. Where short-term contracts (e.g. one year) are used and renewed on a regular basis by …
---------+182. Where remuneration is fixed remuneration in accordance with the guidelines in section 7, but …
------+Title III – Remuneration of specific functions
------+11. Remuneration of members of the management and supervisory function of the management body
---------+183. The remuneration of the members of the management body in its management function (hereafter …
---------+184. In order to properly address conflicts of interest and without prejudice to paragraphs 185 and …
---------+185. Where the supervisory function in exceptional cases is awarded variable remuneration, the …
---------+186. Where variable remuneration is awarded in instruments, appropriate measures should be taken to …
------+12 Remuneration of control functions
---------+187. The internal control functions should have sufficient resources, knowledge and experience to …
---------+188. The remuneration of staff in control functions should allow the investment firm to employ …
---------+189. The methods used for determining the variable remuneration of control functions, i.e. risk …
------+Title IV – Remuneration policy, award and pay-out of variable remuneration for identified staff
------+13. Remuneration policy for identified staff
---------+190. Investment firms must ensure that the remuneration policy for identified staff complies with …
---------+191. The appropriate ratio between the variable and fixed remuneration components for identified …
---------+192. Investment firms should implement, for different categories of identified staff, specific …
---------+193. Where investment firms consider paying out less than 100% of the fixed component of …
---------+194. Where an investment firm in the legal form of a stock corporation and in particular a listed …
------+13.1 Fully flexible policy on variable remuneration
---------+195. Investment firms must have a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration for its staff …
---------+196. The amount of fixed remuneration must be sufficiently high in order to ensure that the …
---------+197. The pay-out of fixed remuneration in instruments, if any, should not impair the ability of the …
------+13.2 Ratio between fixed and variable remuneration
---------+198. When setting the fixed remuneration components for staff under Article 30(1), the investment …
---------+199. The ratio set is the ratio between the variable component of remuneration that could be …
---------+200. When setting the ratio, investment firms should take into account their business activities …
---------+201. When setting the ratio, investment firms should consider that a variable component linked to …
---------+202. Investment firms may set different ratios for different jurisdictions, different business …
---------+203. The maximum ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration …
---------+204. The effective ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration …
---------+205. Investment firms may not take into account the amount of guaranteed variable remuneration …
---------+206. Investment firms should be able to explain the reasoning for the maximum ratios set between …
------+14. Risk alignment process
---------+207. The risk alignment process includes the performance and risk measurement process (section …
---------+208. An investment firm should align the time horizon of the risk and performance measurement with …
---------+209. Within the risk alignment process, an appropriate combination of quantitative and qualitative …
---------+210. Where judgemental approaches are used, investment firms should ensure a sufficient level of …
---------+211. Investment firms should make the risk alignment process transparent to identified staff …
---------+212. Investment firms should provide detailed information to the remuneration committee or to the …
------+14.1 Performance and risk measurement process
---------+213. The variable remuneration of identified staff should be aligned to all risks and the …
------+14.1.1 Risk assessments
---------+214. The investment firm should define the objectives of the investment firm, business units and …
---------+215. Investment firms should take into account all current and future risks, whether on or …
---------+216. Investment firms should also use measures for risk alignment of remuneration where an exact …
---------+217. In order to conservatively take into account all material risks at the investment firm and …
---------+218. The investment firms should be able to demonstrate to the competent authority how the risk …
------+14.1.2 Risk-sensitive performance criteria
---------+219. Investment firms should set and document both quantitative and qualitative, including …
---------+220. Investment firms should use an appropriate balance between quantitative and qualitative as …
---------+221. The criteria used to measure risk and performance should be linked as closely as possible to …
---------+222. Performance criteria should include achievable objectives and measures on which the identified …
---------+223. Quantitative criteria should cover a period which is long enough to properly capture the risk …
---------+224. Operating efficiency indicators (e.g. profits, revenues, productivity, costs and volume …
---------+225. Qualitative criteria (such as the achievement of results, compliance with strategy within the …
------+14.1.3 Specific criteria for control functions
---------+226. Where control functions’ staff receive variable remuneration, it should be appraised and the …
---------+227. The criteria used for assessing the performance and risks should predominantly be based on the …
---------+228. If the head of the risk management function (Chief Risk Officer or CRO), where established, is …
---------+229. Where an investment firm does not establish and maintain an audit or risk management function …
------+14.2 Award process
---------+230. Investment firms should set a bonus pool. When determining bonus pools or individual awards …
---------+231. Variable remuneration should be awarded after the end of the accrual period. The accrual …
---------+232. After the accrual period, the investment firm should determine the individual identified staff …
------+14.2.1 Setting of bonus pools for identified staff
---------+233. Investment firms should define one or more bonus pools for the period for which variable …
---------+234. When setting the bonus pools, investment firms should take into account the ratio between the …
---------+235. The bonus pools should not be set at a certain level to meet remuneration demands.
---------+236. Investment firms should have appropriate processes and controls in place when determining the …
---------+237. Where investment firms use a top-down approach, they should set the amount of the bonus pool …
---------+238. Where investment firms set the bonus pool in a bottom-up approach, the process should start at …
---------+239. When distributing the bonus pool to the level of the business unit or individual staff member …
---------+240. When choosing the approach, investment firms should take into account the following: formulae …
---------+241. Factors such as budget constraints, retention of staff and recruiting considerations …
---------+242. Investment firms should maintain records on how the bonus pool and the staff’s remuneration …
------+14.2.2 The ex ante risk adjustment in the award process
---------+243. Investment firms should determine the bonus pool and variable remuneration to be awarded based …
---------+244. Depending on the availability of risk adjustment criteria, investment firms should determine …
---------+245. Risk alignment should be achieved by using risk-adjusted performance criteria, including …
---------+246. The ex ante risk adjustments made by investment firms, where based on quantitative criteria …
---------+247. When measuring the profitability of the investment firm and its business units, the …
---------+248. Investment firms should make qualitative ex ante risk adjustments when determining the bonus …
------+15. Pay-out process for variable remuneration
---------+249. Without prejudice to the application of waivers under Article 32(4) of Directive (EU) …
------+15.1 Non-deferred and deferred remuneration
---------+250. Without prejudice to the application of waivers under Article 32(4) of Directive (EU) …
---------+251. A deferral schedule is defined by different components: a. the proportion of the variable …
---------+252. Investment firms should take into account within the deferral schedule the form in which the …
------+15.2 Deferral period and proportion of deferred remuneration
---------+253. The deferral period starts after the award is made (e.g. at the moment the upfront part of the …
---------+254. When setting the actual deferral period and proportion to be deferred in accordance with the …
---------+255. Investment firms should determine for which categories of identified staff, also considering …
---------+256. Investment firms should set an appropriate portion of remuneration that should be deferred for …
---------+257. Investment firms should define what level of variable remuneration constitutes a particularly …
---------+258. Where investment firms determine the proportion that is deferred by a cascade of absolute …
---------+259. Where the general principles of national contract and labour law prevent the substantial …
------+15.3 Vesting of deferred remuneration
---------+260. The first deferred portion should not vest sooner than 12 months after the start of the …
---------+261. Deferred remuneration should either vest fully at the end of the deferral period or be spread …
---------+262. Pro rata vesting means, for example, a deferral period of four years that at the end of years …
---------+263. Vesting should not take place more frequently than on a yearly basis to ensure a proper …
------+15.4 Award of variable remuneration in instruments
---------+264. The instruments used for the award of variable remuneration should contribute to the alignment …
---------+265. Investment firms should prioritise the use of instruments, as set out in Article 32 (j) of …
---------+266. Where an investment firm does not issue any eligible instruments, but does not benefit from a …
---------+267. Competent authorities, when deciding on applications to use alternative arrangements, should …
---------+268. Share-linked or other equivalent non-cash instruments (e.g. stock appreciation rights, types …
---------+269. Investment firms should ensure that they have the awarded instruments available when the …
---------+270. Instruments should be priced at the market price or their fair value on the date of the award …
---------+271. Investment firms may award a fixed number or nominal amount of deferred instruments using …
---------+272. Investment firms should not pay any interest or dividend on instruments which have been …
------+15.5 Minimum portion of instruments and their distribution over time
---------+273. Where applicable, the requirement to pay, in accordance with Article 32(1)(j) of Directive …
---------+274. Investment firms should prioritise the use of instruments rather than award variable …
---------+275. The ratio of variable remuneration that is paid out in instruments should be calculated as the …
------+15.6 Retention policy
---------+276. The retention period applied to variable remuneration paid in instruments should be set at an …
---------+277. The investment firm should be able to explain how the retention policy relates to other risk …
---------+278. When setting the retention period, investment firms should consider the overall length of the …
---------+279. A longer retention period as applied in general to all identified staff should be considered …
---------+280. For awarded instruments, a retention period of at least one year should be set. Longer periods …
------+15.7 Risk adjustment
------+15.7.1 Malus and clawback
---------+281. Malus or clawback arrangements are explicit ex post risk adjustment mechanisms where the …
---------+282. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract or labour law, investment …
---------+283. Ex post risk adjustments should always be performance or risk-related. They should respond to …
---------+284. Investment firms should analyse whether their initial ex ante risk adjustments were …
---------+285. When setting criteria for the application of malus and clawback in accordance with Article …
---------+286. Investment firms should use at least the initially used performance and risk criteria to …
---------+287. Where malus can only be applied at the moment of vesting of the deferred payment, investment …
---------+288. Malus and clawback arrangements should lead to a reduction of the variable remuneration where …
------+15.7.2 Implicit adjustments
---------+289. Investment firms should use instruments for variable remuneration where the price reacts to …
---------+290. Where instruments were awarded and staff, after deferral and retention periods, sell these …
------+Title V – Investment firms that benefit from government intervention
------+16. State support and remuneration
---------+291. In line with section 6 of these present guidelines, where investment firms benefit from …
---------+292. For investment firms that fall under the scope of Directive 2014/59/EU, the Communication from …
---------+293. The variable remuneration of an investment firm’s staff should not prevent an orderly and …
---------+294. The investment firm should ensure that a bonus pool or the vesting and paying out of variable …
---------+295. Competent authorities should monitor that the investment firm complies with the conditions of …
------+Title VI - Competent authorities
------+17. Remuneration policies
---------+296. Competent authorities should apply a risk-based approach when supervising the remuneration …
---------+297. Competent authorities should ensure within their supervisory review, taking into account these …
---------+298. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms align their remuneration policy and …
---------+299. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms’ remuneration policies, practices …
---------+300. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms have set an appropriate maximum …
---------+301. Competent authorities should review the gender pay gap within investment firms and follow up …
---------+302. Competent authorities should be satisfied with the overall outcome of the identification …
---------+303. Without prejudice to other supervisory and disciplinary measures and sanctions, competent …
------+20. Disclosures
---------+304. Competent authorities should review the public disclosures on remuneration made by investment …
---------+305. In addition to the benchmarking of remuneration practices required under Article 34(1) of …
------+21. Colleges of supervisors
---------+306. Colleges of supervisors established pursuant to Article 48 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 should …
 English - European Union - Financial Industry -

Guidelines on remuneration policies for investment firms (EBA/GL/2021/13)

Guidelines on remuneration policies for investment firms (EBA/GL/2021/13)

https://www.eba.europa.eu/legacy/regulation-and-policy/regulatory-activities/remuneration/guidelines-remuneration-policies – PDF

1. Overview

,
1. Compliance and reporting obligations

1. Compliance and reporting obligations
2. Subject matter, scope and definitions

2. Subject matter, scope and definitions
3. Implementation

3. Implementation
4. Guidelines

4. Guidelines

1.1 References

1.2 Identified Requirements

1.3 Related Standards

2. Identified Requirements

Requirements

3. Related Standards

Standards
  • EBA - Published by the European Banking Authority at https://www.eba.europa.eu/