+4. Guidelines
---+Title I - Remuneration policies
---+1. Remuneration policies for all staff
------+12. In accordance with Article 26 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, investment firms are required to …
------+13. The remuneration policy should specify all components of remuneration and include also the …
------+14. The fixed remuneration of staff should reflect their professional experience and organisational …
------+15. Where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support, the investment …
------+16. The investment firm’s remuneration policy for all staff should be consistent with the …
------+17. Investment firms should be able to demonstrate to the competent authorities that the …
------+18. Where variable remuneration is awarded, such awards should be based on the investment firms’ …
------+19. The remuneration policy should be consistent with the requirement for an investment firm to …
------+20. The remuneration policy should contain: a. the performance objectives for the investment firm …
------+21. Investment firms should ensure that potential conflicts of interest caused by the pay-out of …
------+22. Where remuneration policies or group remuneration policies are implemented in investment firms …
------+23. Without prejudice to any measures adopted by Member States to prevent or compensate for …
------+24. A gender neutral remuneration policy should ensure that all aspects of the remuneration policy …
------+25. When determining the pay per unit of measurement or time, investment firms should duly consider …
------+26. In order to monitor the application of gender neutral remuneration policies, investment firms …
------+27. Investment firms may consider in a gender neutral manner additional aspects when determining …
---+2. Governance of remuneration
---+2.1 Responsibilities, design, approval and oversight of the remuneration policy
------+28. The management body in its supervisory function (hereafter ‘supervisory function’) should be …
------+29. The supervisory function should collectively have adequate knowledge, skills and experience …
------+30. The supervisory function should ensure that the investment firm’s remuneration policies and …
------+31. Conflicts of interests with regard to the remuneration policy and remuneration awarded should …
------+32. The remuneration policy and practices and the procedures to determine them should be clear …
------+33. The supervisory and management functions and, where established, the remuneration and the risk …
------+34. The remuneration policy should provide for an effective framework for performance measurement …
------+35. The compliance function and the risk management function, where established, or staff entrusted …
------+36. The supervisory function should determine and oversee the remuneration of the members of the …
------+37. The supervisory function should take into account the input provided by all competent corporate …
------+38. The human resources function should participate in and inform on the drawing up and the …
------+39. The risk management function should assist in and inform on the definition of suitable …
------+40. The compliance function should analyse how the remuneration policy affects the investment …
------+41. The internal audit function, where established, should carry out an independent review of the …
------+42. Within a group context, the competent functions within the Union parent undertaking and …
---+2.2 Shareholders’ involvement
------+43. Depending on the investment firm’s legal form and on the applicable national law, the approval …
------+44. Where the approval of the remuneration of individual members of the management body and other …
------+45. In order that shareholders can make informed decisions in line with paragraphs 43 and 44, the …
------+46. The supervisory function remains responsible for the proposals submitted to the shareholders’ …
---+2.3 Setting up a remuneration committee
------+47. Unless otherwise specified by national law, an investment firm with on and off ‐ balance-sheet …
------+48. The remuneration committee might be established at group level, including in situations where …
------+49. Where no remuneration committee has to be established, the provisions of these guidelines …
---+2.3.1 Composition of the remuneration committee
------+50. In line with Article 33(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, the remuneration committee consists of …
------+51. The chair and the majority of members of the remuneration committee should qualify as …
------+52. Members of the remuneration committee should have collectively appropriate knowledge, expertise …
---+2.3.2 Role of the remuneration committee
------+53. The remuneration committee should: a. be responsible for the preparation of decisions on …
------+54. Where the investment firm has established a remuneration committee, the remuneration of the …
---+2.3.3 Process and reporting lines
------+55. The remuneration committee should: a. have access to all data and information concerning the …
------+56. The remuneration committee should collaborate with other committees of the supervisory function …
------+57. When established, the risk committee should, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration …
------+58. A member of the risk committee should, where relevant, participate in the meetings of the …
---+2.4 Review of the remuneration policy
------+59. The supervisory function and, where established, the remuneration committee should ensure that …
------+60. Investment firms should monitor the development of the gender pay gap; in case of investment …
------+61. Where material differences between the average pay between male and female staff or male and …
------+62. In groups of investment firms, a central review of compliance with the regulation, group …
------+63. Investment firms should perform the central and independent review on an individual basis. In a …
------+64. Notwithstanding the responsibility of the management body in its supervisory function, the …
------+65. As part of the central and independent internal review, investment firms should assess whether …
------+66. The other relevant internal corporate functions (i.e. human resources, legal, strategic …
------+67. Where periodic reviews reveal that the remuneration policies do not operate as intended or …
------+68. The results of the performed internal review and actions taken to remedy any findings should be …
---+2.5 Internal transparency
------+69. The remuneration policy of an investment firm should be internally disclosed to all staff and …
------+70. Staff should be informed about the characteristics of their variable remuneration, as well as …
---+3. Remuneration policies and group context
------+71. In accordance with Article 25 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, investment firms must, without …
------+72. At the consolidated level, the Union parent undertaking and competent authorities should ensure …
------+73. Regarding investment firms and entities within a group located in more than one Member State …
------+74. When applying the requirements on a consolidated basis, the remuneration requirements …
------+75. Staff seconded from a parent undertaking in a third country to an EU subsidiary that is an …
------+76. Short-term contracts or secondments must not be used as a means of circumventing the …
------+77. The remuneration requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 and the provisions of these …
---+4 Proportionality
------+78. The proportionality principle as set out under Article 26(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 aims …
------+79. When applying the remuneration requirements and the provisions of these guidelines in a …
------+80. The obligation to have sound and effective remuneration policies and practices applies to all …
------+81. When assessing what is proportionate and in determining the required level of sophistication of …
------+82. Where investment firms are authorised to provide the services and activities listed in point …
------+83. For the above purposes, investment firms and competent authorities should take into account at …
------+84. Before remuneration requirements and the provisions set out in these guidelines are applied in …
------+85. When implementing specific remuneration policies for different categories of identified staff …
------+86. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms comply with the remuneration …
------+87. Without prejudice to the implementation of Article 32(4) of Directive 2019/2034/EU by Member …
------+88. When establishing the amount of the annual variable remuneration paid to a staff member and the …
------+89. When calculating the average of the value of the assets for the four-year period immediately …
------+90. Where national law empowers competent authorities to set the thresholds under point (a) of …
------+91. Where national law empowers competent authorities to set the thresholds under Article 32(7) of …
---+5. The identification process
------+92. It is the responsibility of investment firms to identify the members of staff whose …
------+93. The self-assessment should be based on the qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in the …
------+94. When applying quantitative criteria based on staff members’ remuneration, the fixed …
------+95. When applying quantitative criteria defined in EUR, investment firms which award remuneration …
------+96. The self-assessment should be clear, consistent, properly documented and periodically updated …
------+97. The following information should at least be included in the documentation of the …
------+98. Investment firms should keep records of the identification process and its results and should …
------+99. The documentation of the self-assessment should at least include the number of identified …
------+100. The documentation should also include staff members who have been identified under …
---+5.1 Prior approval of exclusions
------+101. Where the investment firm determines in accordance with the RTS on identified staff that the …
------+102. The prior approval regarding exclusions of staff identified in relation to the quantitative …
------+103. Where identified staff would be excluded in subsidiaries which are not themselves subject to …
------+104. Requests for prior approval should include all names or another unique identifier for …
---+5.2 Governance of the identification process
------+105. The management body has the ultimate responsibility for the identification process and the …
------+106. Where a remuneration committee is established, it should be actively involved in the …
------+107. The compliance function, the risk management function or the staff entrusted with the risk …
---+5.3 Identification process on individual and consolidated level
------+108. When identifying the categories of staff under Article 30(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 …
------+109. When applying qualitative identification criteria at consolidated level, staff members in a …
------+110. When applying quantitative identification criteria on a consolidated basis, investment firms …
------+111. When applying qualitative identification criteria, investment firms should identify the staff …
---+5.4 Role of the Union parent undertaking
------+112. The Union parent undertaking should ensure the overall consistency of the group remuneration …
---+5.5 Role of subsidiaries and branches
------+113. Investment firms that are subsidiaries of a Union parent undertaking should implement within …
------+114. All subsidiaries should actively participate in the identification process carried out by the …
------+115. Subsidiaries that are not themselves subject to Directive (EU) 2019/2034 are not required to …
------+116. Branches in a Member State of investment firms having their head office in a third country and …
------+117. For third country branches located in a Member State, the criteria for the identification …
---+6. Capital base
------+118. Investment firms and competent authorities should ensure that the award, pay-out and vesting …
------+119. When assessing if the capital base is sound, the investment firm should take into account its …
------+120. Investment firms should include the impact of variable remuneration - both upfront and …
------+121. The total variable remuneration awarded by an investment firm must not limit the ability of …
------+122. Investment firms which do not have a sound capital base or where the soundness of the capital …
------+123. Competent authorities should intervene where the awarding of variable remuneration is …
---+Title II - Structure of remuneration
---+7. Categories of remuneration
------+124. Under Directive (EU) 2019/2034, remuneration is either fixed or variable remuneration; there …
------+125. Where the clear allocation of a component to the fixed remuneration is not possible based on …
------+126. Remuneration is fixed where the conditions for its award and its amount: a. are based on …
------+127. Remuneration components that are either part of a general investment firm-wide policy where …
------+128. The following remuneration components should also be considered as fixed, where all similar …
---+8. Particular cases of remuneration components
---+8.1 Allowances
------+129. The variable and fixed remuneration of investment firms may consist of different components …
------+130. In particular where allowances are considered as fixed remuneration, but show any of the …
------+131. Where allowances are based on the role, function or organisational responsibility of staff, in …
------+132. Competent authorities should ensure that allowances are not a vehicle or method that …
---+8.2 Variable remuneration based on future performance
------+133. When the award of variable remuneration, including long term incentive plans (LTIPs), is based …
------+134. Where a prospective remuneration plan for variable remuneration, including LTIPs, is …
---+8.3 Dividends and interest payments
------+135. Dividends paid on vested shares or equivalent ownership interests that staff receive as …
---+8.4 Retention bonuses
------+136. Investment firms should be able to substantiate their legitimate interest in awarding …
------+137. As a general principle, investment firms should not award multiple retention bonuses to a …
------+138. A retention bonus should be in accordance with the requirements to maintain a sound capital …
------+139. When assessing and considering whether the award of a retention bonus to identified staff is …
------+140. A retention bonus should be based on specific conditions that differ from the performance …
------+141. Retention bonuses should not be awarded to merely compensate for performance-related …
------+142. Investment firms should set the retention period as the point in time of the event or as the …
------+143. Retention bonuses are variable remuneration and therefore if awarded to identified staff, must …
------+144. Independent of the fact that the retention bonus will be awarded only after the end of the …
---+8.5 Discretionary pension benefits
------+145. Discretionary pension benefits are a form of variable remuneration. Where the terms of the …
------+146. The investment firm should ensure that where a staff member leaves the investment firm or …
------+147. The full amount of discretionary pension benefits must be awarded, in accordance with Article …
------+148. Investment firms should ensure that malus and clawback arrangements are applied in the same …
---+9. Exceptional remuneration components
---+9.1 Guaranteed variable remuneration
------+149. Guaranteed variable remuneration can take several forms such as a ‘guaranteed bonus‘, ‘welcome …
------+150. When awarding guaranteed variable remuneration in accordance with Article 32(1)(e) of …
------+151. Investment firms should only award once to the same single staff member guaranteed variable …
------+152. As part of the arrangements guaranteeing this part of variable remuneration, investment firms …
---+9.2 Compensation or buyout from previous employment contract
------+153. The compensation for the buyout of a previous contract should be awarded only when the …
------+154. Remuneration should be considered as being granted as compensation or for the buyout of a …
---+9.3 Severance and other payments after the end of a contract
---+9.3.1 Severance pay
------+155. Investment firms’ remuneration policies should specify the possible use of severance payments …
------+156. Investment firms should have a framework in which severance pay is determined and approved in …
------+157. Severance payments should not provide for a disproportionate reward, but for an appropriate …
------+158. Severance pay should not be awarded where there is an obvious failure which allows for the …
------+159. Severance pay should not be awarded where a staff member resigns voluntarily in order to take …
------+160. Additional payments in the context of the regular end of a contractual period or appointment …
------+161. Severance payments include additional payments on top of the regular remuneration in the …
------+162. Where investment firms award severance pay, the investment firms should be able to demonstrate …
------+163. When determining the amount of severance payments to be made, the investment firm should take …
------+164. Failures of investment firms include the following situations: a. where the opening of normal …
------+165. Failures of identified staff should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and include the …
------+166. Severance payments should be considered as variable remuneration and as a general principle …
---+9.3.1 Other payments after the end of a contract
------+167. Regular remuneration payments related to the duration of a notice period should not be …
------+168. Additional payments in the context of the regular end of a contractual period or of the …
---+10 Prohibitions
---+10.1 Personal hedging
------+169. Where an appropriate remuneration policy is aligned with risks, it should be sufficiently …
------+170. Investment firms should ensure to the extent possible that identified staff members are not …
------+171. Identified staff should be considered to have hedged the risk of a downward adjustment in …
------+172. Identified staff should be considered to have insured the risk of a downward adjustment where …
------+173. The requirement to not use personal hedging strategies or insurance to undermine the risk …
------+174. Investment firms should maintain effective arrangements to ensure that the identified staff …
---+10.2 Circumvention
------+175. Investment firms should ensure that variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or …
------+176. ‘Circumvention’ is the non-compliance with remuneration requirements and takes place if an …
------+177. Circumvention takes place in the following circumstances, among others: a. where variable …
------+178. Investment firms should ensure that the method for measuring the performance has appropriate …
------+179. Investment firms should not provide compensation for any reduction or restructuring of …
------+180. Investment firms should not create group structures or offshore entities or contracts with …
------+181. Where short-term contracts (e.g. one year) are used and renewed on a regular basis by …
------+182. Where remuneration is fixed remuneration in accordance with the guidelines in section 7, but …
---+Title III – Remuneration of specific functions
---+11. Remuneration of members of the management and supervisory function of the management body
------+183. The remuneration of the members of the management body in its management function (hereafter …
------+184. In order to properly address conflicts of interest and without prejudice to paragraphs 185 and …
------+185. Where the supervisory function in exceptional cases is awarded variable remuneration, the …
------+186. Where variable remuneration is awarded in instruments, appropriate measures should be taken to …
---+12 Remuneration of control functions
------+187. The internal control functions should have sufficient resources, knowledge and experience to …
------+188. The remuneration of staff in control functions should allow the investment firm to employ …
------+189. The methods used for determining the variable remuneration of control functions, i.e. risk …
---+Title IV – Remuneration policy, award and pay-out of variable remuneration for identified staff
---+13. Remuneration policy for identified staff
------+190. Investment firms must ensure that the remuneration policy for identified staff complies with …
------+191. The appropriate ratio between the variable and fixed remuneration components for identified …
------+192. Investment firms should implement, for different categories of identified staff, specific …
------+193. Where investment firms consider paying out less than 100% of the fixed component of …
------+194. Where an investment firm in the legal form of a stock corporation and in particular a listed …
---+13.1 Fully flexible policy on variable remuneration
------+195. Investment firms must have a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration for its staff …
------+196. The amount of fixed remuneration must be sufficiently high in order to ensure that the …
------+197. The pay-out of fixed remuneration in instruments, if any, should not impair the ability of the …
---+13.2 Ratio between fixed and variable remuneration
------+198. When setting the fixed remuneration components for staff under Article 30(1), the investment …
------+199. The ratio set is the ratio between the variable component of remuneration that could be …
------+200. When setting the ratio, investment firms should take into account their business activities …
------+201. When setting the ratio, investment firms should consider that a variable component linked to …
------+202. Investment firms may set different ratios for different jurisdictions, different business …
------+203. The maximum ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration …
------+204. The effective ratio should be calculated as the sum of all variable components of remuneration …
------+205. Investment firms may not take into account the amount of guaranteed variable remuneration …
------+206. Investment firms should be able to explain the reasoning for the maximum ratios set between …
---+14. Risk alignment process
------+207. The risk alignment process includes the performance and risk measurement process (section …
------+208. An investment firm should align the time horizon of the risk and performance measurement with …
------+209. Within the risk alignment process, an appropriate combination of quantitative and qualitative …
------+210. Where judgemental approaches are used, investment firms should ensure a sufficient level of …
------+211. Investment firms should make the risk alignment process transparent to identified staff …
------+212. Investment firms should provide detailed information to the remuneration committee or to the …
---+14.1 Performance and risk measurement process
------+213. The variable remuneration of identified staff should be aligned to all risks and the …
---+14.1.1 Risk assessments
------+214. The investment firm should define the objectives of the investment firm, business units and …
------+215. Investment firms should take into account all current and future risks, whether on or …
------+216. Investment firms should also use measures for risk alignment of remuneration where an exact …
------+217. In order to conservatively take into account all material risks at the investment firm and …
------+218. The investment firms should be able to demonstrate to the competent authority how the risk …
---+14.1.2 Risk-sensitive performance criteria
------+219. Investment firms should set and document both quantitative and qualitative, including …
------+220. Investment firms should use an appropriate balance between quantitative and qualitative as …
------+221. The criteria used to measure risk and performance should be linked as closely as possible to …
------+222. Performance criteria should include achievable objectives and measures on which the identified …
------+223. Quantitative criteria should cover a period which is long enough to properly capture the risk …
------+224. Operating efficiency indicators (e.g. profits, revenues, productivity, costs and volume …
------+225. Qualitative criteria (such as the achievement of results, compliance with strategy within the …
---+14.1.3 Specific criteria for control functions
------+226. Where control functions’ staff receive variable remuneration, it should be appraised and the …
------+227. The criteria used for assessing the performance and risks should predominantly be based on the …
------+228. If the head of the risk management function (Chief Risk Officer or CRO), where established, is …
------+229. Where an investment firm does not establish and maintain an audit or risk management function …
---+14.2 Award process
------+230. Investment firms should set a bonus pool. When determining bonus pools or individual awards …
------+231. Variable remuneration should be awarded after the end of the accrual period. The accrual …
------+232. After the accrual period, the investment firm should determine the individual identified staff …
---+14.2.1 Setting of bonus pools for identified staff
------+233. Investment firms should define one or more bonus pools for the period for which variable …
------+234. When setting the bonus pools, investment firms should take into account the ratio between the …
------+235. The bonus pools should not be set at a certain level to meet remuneration demands.
------+236. Investment firms should have appropriate processes and controls in place when determining the …
------+237. Where investment firms use a top-down approach, they should set the amount of the bonus pool …
------+238. Where investment firms set the bonus pool in a bottom-up approach, the process should start at …
------+239. When distributing the bonus pool to the level of the business unit or individual staff member …
------+240. When choosing the approach, investment firms should take into account the following: formulae …
------+241. Factors such as budget constraints, retention of staff and recruiting considerations …
------+242. Investment firms should maintain records on how the bonus pool and the staff’s remuneration …
---+14.2.2 The ex ante risk adjustment in the award process
------+243. Investment firms should determine the bonus pool and variable remuneration to be awarded based …
------+244. Depending on the availability of risk adjustment criteria, investment firms should determine …
------+245. Risk alignment should be achieved by using risk-adjusted performance criteria, including …
------+246. The ex ante risk adjustments made by investment firms, where based on quantitative criteria …
------+247. When measuring the profitability of the investment firm and its business units, the …
------+248. Investment firms should make qualitative ex ante risk adjustments when determining the bonus …
---+15. Pay-out process for variable remuneration
------+249. Without prejudice to the application of waivers under Article 32(4) of Directive (EU) …
---+15.1 Non-deferred and deferred remuneration
------+250. Without prejudice to the application of waivers under Article 32(4) of Directive (EU) …
------+251. A deferral schedule is defined by different components: a. the proportion of the variable …
------+252. Investment firms should take into account within the deferral schedule the form in which the …
---+15.2 Deferral period and proportion of deferred remuneration
------+253. The deferral period starts after the award is made (e.g. at the moment the upfront part of the …
------+254. When setting the actual deferral period and proportion to be deferred in accordance with the …
------+255. Investment firms should determine for which categories of identified staff, also considering …
------+256. Investment firms should set an appropriate portion of remuneration that should be deferred for …
------+257. Investment firms should define what level of variable remuneration constitutes a particularly …
------+258. Where investment firms determine the proportion that is deferred by a cascade of absolute …
------+259. Where the general principles of national contract and labour law prevent the substantial …
---+15.3 Vesting of deferred remuneration
------+260. The first deferred portion should not vest sooner than 12 months after the start of the …
------+261. Deferred remuneration should either vest fully at the end of the deferral period or be spread …
------+262. Pro rata vesting means, for example, a deferral period of four years that at the end of years …
------+263. Vesting should not take place more frequently than on a yearly basis to ensure a proper …
---+15.4 Award of variable remuneration in instruments
------+264. The instruments used for the award of variable remuneration should contribute to the alignment …
------+265. Investment firms should prioritise the use of instruments, as set out in Article 32 (j) of …
------+266. Where an investment firm does not issue any eligible instruments, but does not benefit from a …
------+267. Competent authorities, when deciding on applications to use alternative arrangements, should …
------+268. Share-linked or other equivalent non-cash instruments (e.g. stock appreciation rights, types …
------+269. Investment firms should ensure that they have the awarded instruments available when the …
------+270. Instruments should be priced at the market price or their fair value on the date of the award …
------+271. Investment firms may award a fixed number or nominal amount of deferred instruments using …
------+272. Investment firms should not pay any interest or dividend on instruments which have been …
---+15.5 Minimum portion of instruments and their distribution over time
------+273. Where applicable, the requirement to pay, in accordance with Article 32(1)(j) of Directive …
------+274. Investment firms should prioritise the use of instruments rather than award variable …
------+275. The ratio of variable remuneration that is paid out in instruments should be calculated as the …
---+15.6 Retention policy
------+276. The retention period applied to variable remuneration paid in instruments should be set at an …
------+277. The investment firm should be able to explain how the retention policy relates to other risk …
------+278. When setting the retention period, investment firms should consider the overall length of the …
------+279. A longer retention period as applied in general to all identified staff should be considered …
------+280. For awarded instruments, a retention period of at least one year should be set. Longer periods …
---+15.7 Risk adjustment
---+15.7.1 Malus and clawback
------+281. Malus or clawback arrangements are explicit ex post risk adjustment mechanisms where the …
------+282. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract or labour law, investment …
------+283. Ex post risk adjustments should always be performance or risk-related. They should respond to …
------+284. Investment firms should analyse whether their initial ex ante risk adjustments were …
------+285. When setting criteria for the application of malus and clawback in accordance with Article …
------+286. Investment firms should use at least the initially used performance and risk criteria to …
------+287. Where malus can only be applied at the moment of vesting of the deferred payment, investment …
------+288. Malus and clawback arrangements should lead to a reduction of the variable remuneration where …
---+15.7.2 Implicit adjustments
------+289. Investment firms should use instruments for variable remuneration where the price reacts to …
------+290. Where instruments were awarded and staff, after deferral and retention periods, sell these …
---+Title V – Investment firms that benefit from government intervention
---+16. State support and remuneration
------+291. In line with section 6 of these present guidelines, where investment firms benefit from …
------+292. For investment firms that fall under the scope of Directive 2014/59/EU, the Communication from …
------+293. The variable remuneration of an investment firm’s staff should not prevent an orderly and …
------+294. The investment firm should ensure that a bonus pool or the vesting and paying out of variable …
------+295. Competent authorities should monitor that the investment firm complies with the conditions of …
---+Title VI - Competent authorities
---+17. Remuneration policies
------+296. Competent authorities should apply a risk-based approach when supervising the remuneration …
------+297. Competent authorities should ensure within their supervisory review, taking into account these …
------+298. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms align their remuneration policy and …
------+299. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms’ remuneration policies, practices …
------+300. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms have set an appropriate maximum …
------+301. Competent authorities should review the gender pay gap within investment firms and follow up …
------+302. Competent authorities should be satisfied with the overall outcome of the identification …
------+303. Without prejudice to other supervisory and disciplinary measures and sanctions, competent …
---+20. Disclosures
------+304. Competent authorities should review the public disclosures on remuneration made by investment …
------+305. In addition to the benchmarking of remuneration practices required under Article 34(1) of …
---+21. Colleges of supervisors
------+306. Colleges of supervisors established pursuant to Article 48 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 should …
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4. Guidelines
4. Guidelines
1. Overview
1.1 References
1.2 Identified Requirements
1.3 Related Standards
2. Identified Requirements
Requirements
| Source |
Requirement |
3. Related Standards
Standards
| Source |
Requirement |
- EBA - Published by the European Banking Authority at https://www.eba.europa.eu/
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